











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 








This thesis could not be accomplished without the support of many
individuals. I owe a debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Ab-
hay Abhyankar for invaluable guidance, advice, support and encouragement
through the entire research. He has been an inspiring and supportive mentor.
Our many meetings together were crucial in shaping this research and keep-
ing me focused on the relevant subjects. His patience with my shortcomings
and interest in my personal development has been a great encouragement
for me. I am also very grateful to my second supervisor, Dr Bing Xu, for
her constructive guidance, timely feedback and dedicated supports.
Special thanks to my parents, who gives me endless love and encourage-
ment. I would also like to express gratitude to my boyfriend, Chaojie, for





This is to declare that the work presented in the thesis is my own. This
thesis does not incorporate any material previously submitted for a degree
or professional qualication in any universities.




This thesis is composed of three chapters, which can be read indepen-
dently.
The rst chapter investigates how oil price volatility a¤ects the investment
decisions for a panel of Japanese rms. The model is estimated using a
system generalized method of moments technique for panel data. The results
are presented to show that there is a U-shaped relationship between oil price
volatility and Japanese rm investment. The results from subsamples of
these data indicate that this U-shaped relationship is more signicant for
oil-intensive rms and small rms.
The second chapter aims to examine the underlying causes of changes
in real oil price and their transmission mechanisms in the Japanese stock
market. I decompose real oil price changes into three components; namely,
oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock and oil-specic demand shock, and
then estimate the dynamic e¤ects of each component on stock returns using
a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model. I nd that the responses
of aggregate Japanese real stock returns di¤er substantially with di¤erent
underlying causes of oil price changes. In the long run, oil shocks account
for 43% of the variation in the Japanese real stock returns. The response
of Japanese real stock returns to oil price shocks can be attributed in its
entirety to the cash ow variations.
The third chapter tests the robustness of SVAR and investigates the
impact of oil price shocks on the di¤erent U.S. stock indices. I nd that the
responses of real stock returns of alternate stock indices di¤er substantially
depending on the underlying causes of the oil price increase. However, the
magnitude and length of the e¤ect depends on the rm size. The response
of U.S. stock returns to oil price shocks can be attributed to the variations
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Crude oil price is one of the important costs faced by rms and households.
It attracts considerable attention from economists, policymakers and the
media. The uctuation of oil price can a¤ect the economy frommany aspects
(Hamilton, 2003; Kilian, 2009). Hamilton (2009b) nds that 10 out of the 11
post-war U.S. recessions have been preceded by a sharp increase in the price
of crude oil. This thesis studies the interaction between oil price shocks and
nancial markets. It consists of three self-contained chapters, which can be
read individually.
The topic of the rst chapter is related to theoretical and empirical tests
of the relationship between oil price uncertainty and rm-level investment.
The impact of oil price volatility on rmsinvestment is considered one of
the main channels through which oil price shocks are transmitted to the
economy (Hamilton, 2008). The volatility of oil price introduces uncertainty
about future energy prices, which make rms postpone their irreversible
investment (Pindyck, 1991). The purpose of this chapter is to investigate
how oil price volatility a¤ects investment for a panel of Japanese rms. The
literature on real options and compound options suggests that there are two
options interacting with each other in the face of oil price uncertainty. One is
the option to wait for the uncertainty to resolve, and the other is the option
to grow the business. My results show that there is a U-shaped relationship
between oil price volatility and Japanese rm-level investment. This result is
robust with alternate measures of volatility. The model is estimated using a
12
large sample of Japanese data and a system generalized method of moments
technique for panel data. Further, my results from subsamples of these data
indicate that this U-shaped relationship is more signicant for oil-intensive
rms and small rms. Finally I nd that the signicant role of market
volatility in explaining investment suggests that market volatility is not fully
captured by the Q ratio, as previously documented.
While the rst chapter focuses on the e¤ect of oil price uncertainty on
rm-level investment, the other two focus on the e¤ect of oil price shocks
on the aggregate stock markets. Oil price shocks a¤ect stock price through
their e¤ect on the expected cash ows and discount rate, which are the two
determinants of stock price based on the present value model.
In the second chapter, I study, using a structural vector autoregressive
(SVAR) method, the dynamic relationship between oil price shocks and the
Japanese stock market. There is surprisingly little research on Japan given
that it is the third-largest economy in the world and has almost no domestic
oil resources. I nd that unexpected increases in global demand for all in-
dustrial commodities cause a persistent increase in the real price of Japanese
Crude Cocktail while the e¤ect of unexpected oil production disruption and
unexpected increases in the precautionary demand for oil are relatively mi-
nor. Next, I nd that, in contrast to the conventional perception, demand
shocks rather than supply shocks explain most of the changes in the real
price of the Japanese Crude Cocktail. Third, in contrast to research on
the U.S. stock market, I nd only marginal evidence that oil price shocks
contribute to the variation in Japanese real stock returns. Finally, again in
contrast to results for the U.S. market, I nd that the variation of Japanese
stock market returns caused by oil price shocks can be explained by changes
of expected real cash ows rather than changes of expected returns. These
results remain qualitatively similar to a number of robustness checks using
alternate model specications and data.
The purpose of third chapter is to test the robustness of SVAR and to
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investigate the impact of oil price shocks on the di¤erent U.S. stock indices
using alternate data. Kilian and Park (2009) show that the response of U.S.
value-weighted stock in0dex to oil shocks depends greatly on the di¤erent
underlying causes of increased prices. I use ve di¤erent stock indices and
two economic indices to carry out robustness check on these results. I nd
that the responses of real stock returns of alternate stock indices di¤er sub-
stantially depending on the underlying causes of the oil price increase. For
instance, the e¤ect of oil supply shock on U.S. stock returns is statistically
insignicant, but an unexpected increase in the global demand for industrial
commodities driven by increased global real economic activity will cause a
sustained increase in U.S. stock returns. However the magnitude and length
of the e¤ect depends on the rm size. The results for an increase in the
precautionary demand for oil are a bit mixed. For large rms, it causes
persistently negative stock returns. For small rms, it does not have any
signicant e¤ect. Overall, oil supply and demand shocks combined account
for 42% of the long-run variation in U.S. real stock returns at best. The
response of U.S. stock returns to shocks in oil markets can be attributed to
revisions of expected discount rates and revisions of expected cash ows.
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Chapter 1





The price of energy is one of the many input costs faced by rms. Although
there is considerable literature focusing on the e¤ect of oil price shocks at
the aggregate level (Bernanke, Gertler andWatson, 1997; Barsky and Kilian,
2002; Blanchard and Jordi, 2007; Kilian and Park, 2009; Hamilton, 2009b),
there is little research on the e¤ects of energy price on rm-level investment.
Hamilton (2008) points out that one of the main channels through which
energy price a¤ects the economy is through its e¤ect on rm investment
expenditure. Edelstein and Kilian (2007) point out that there are two chan-
nels by which energy price can a¤ect rm investments. First, an increase
in energy price drives up the marginal cost of production, as energy is an
important input cost in the whole production cycle; even though some rms
may not directly consume energy, such as crude oil, as part of the production
process, they do nevertheless use energy for indirect costs, such as heating
and transportation. Second, rising oil prices reduce consumer expenditures,
which in turn reduces demand for the rms product.
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Fluctuations in the price of energy introduce uncertainty about future
energy prices, which results in rms postponing irreversible investments
(Pindyck, 1991). Edelstein and Kilian (2007) also show that rms respond
to energy uncertainty from both the supply and demand sides. As a re-
sult, when energy prices go up, rms reduce investment because of declining
sales and considerations over future cost expenditure. This negative e¤ect
is magnied by uncertainty, which reduces the incentive to invest. However,
when energy prices fall, higher investment spending triggered by increasing
demand and falling costs is dampened by the increased uncertainty caused
by the price uctuation itself, reducing the incentive to invest.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how oil price volatility af-
fects investment for a panel of Japanese rms. Japan is the third largest
economy in the world and has little crude oil reserve to support its grow-
ing economy and large population. So understanding oil price shocks and
volatility is very important to Japans economy. However, as to my best
knowledge, there is no paper studying the relationship between oil price
volatility and Japanese rm-level investments. Mohn and Misund (2009)
and Henriques and Sadorsky (2011) are the two recent papers which focus
on how oil price volatility a¤ects U.S rm-level investment. Mohn and Mis-
und (2009) nd that oil price volatility has a positive e¤ect on investment
of international oil and gas rms. Henrique and Sadorsky (2011) expand
to a large sample of U.S. rms and use both real options and compound
option theory to investigate how oil price volatility a¤ects strategic invest-
ments. They nd that there is a U-shaped rather than linear relationship
between oil price uncertainty and investment. Since Japan fully depends on
imports mainly from Middle East for its oil consumption, I would expect to
see a more signicant negative e¤ect of oil price volatility on Japanese rm
investments. In addition, Ratti, Seol and Yoon (2011) nd that rm size
matters when determining the e¤ect of energy price shocks on investment.
Since large rms have more resources and greater capability to protect from
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high energy prices, I would expect that small rms su¤er more from energy
price uctuations and hence oil price volatility has a stronger e¤ect on the
investment decisions of small rms than large rms.
The literature on real options suggest that two options interact with each
other in the face of oil price uncertainty. One is the option to wait for the
resolution of price uncertainty and the other is the option to grow the busi-
ness. My results show that there is a U-shaped relationship between oil price
volatility and Japanese rm-level investment. I estimate the model using a
large sample of Japanese data and system-generalized method of moments
(GMM) techniques for panel data. Further, my results from subsamples of
these data indicate that this U-shaped relationship is more signicant for
oil-intensive rms and small rms. Finally, I nd that the signicant role of
market volatility in explaining investment suggests that market volatility is
not fully captured by Q-ratio, as previously documented (Abel and Eberly,
1999).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the litera-
ture on uncertainty and investment from both the theoretical and empirical
perspectives. Further, the relationship between oil price volatility and in-
vestment is examined in detail. Section 3 derives the Tobins q model used
in this study and discusses econometrics issues. It also introduces the data
used in this paper. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses
their implications. Section 5 summarizes and sets forth conclusions.
1.2 Literature Review
In this section, I review the theory and empirical evidence about the re-
lationship between uncertainty and investment in general. I focus on the
more recent literature and the link between energy price uncertainty and
investment.
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1.2.1 Uncertainty and Investment: Economic Theory
There has been considerable work done on the relationship between uncer-
tainty and investment. However, the results are mixed. Leahy and Whited
(1996) point out that these mixed results are attributable to di¤erent the-
ories emphasizing di¤erent channels. Economic theory does not provide a
clear conclusion and the empirical evidence is not strong enough to assert a
specic relationship between uncertainty and investment.
Leahy and Whited point out that it is important to di¤erentiate the rm
in isolation from rms viewed in relation to other rms. In the former, we
need to consider the variance of several aspects of the rms environment, for
example, the variance in daily stock returns. In the latter case, we emphasize
the relationship with other rms and focus on the covariance of returns with
other projects. In the former case, the uncertainty is directly linked to the
investment. In the latter, uncertainty can a¤ect the investment only through
its e¤ect on the covariance between di¤erent projects. Based on these two
cases, there are three popular models from di¤erent perspectives to address
the relationship between uncertainty and investment (Leahy and Whited,
1996).
The rst model is based on the role of covariance. The capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) describes the relationship between an assets required
rate of return and its risk. Risk is measured by the covariance of its return
and market portfolio return. Thus, higher covariance means higher risk of
investment, which in turn drives up the required rate of return and reduces
the level of capital stock. As a result, the CAPM predicts that there is a
negative relationship between investment and uncertainty.
The remaining two models emphasize the variance of shocks faced by indi-
vidual rms. They predict di¤erent e¤ects from uncertainty on investments
depending on the shape of the marginal revenue product of capital. The
rst model supports a convex marginal revenue product of capital function.
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Hartman (1972), for example, uses the relative exibility of labour-to-capital
to produce the convex return. His model is based on two assumptions. First,
rms can choose only the capital input prior to knowing the labour cost and
output price. Second, rms can choose the labour after observing wage and
output prices. So, under a linearly homogeneous production function, the
marginal product of both capital and labour is a function of the labour
capital ratio. If the labourcapital ratio can be changed to adjust to uctu-
ation of output price, the change in marginal revenue product of capital will
be more than the changes in output price. Thus, increased output price un-
certainty increases the incentive to invest. Abel (1983) nds that no matter
what curvature the marginal product of capital has, higher uncertainty leads
to higher investment given current product price. However, this curvature is
important in explaining the relationship between the expected growth rate
of investment and the expected growth rate of the marginal product of cap-
ital. When the function of the marginal product of capital is convex, the
expected growth rate of investment is less than the expected growth rate
of marginal product of capital, multiplied by the elasticity of investment
uncertainty, and vice versa.
The main class of models focuses on the role of irreversibility of rm
investment decisions and predicts a concave marginal revenue product of
capital. Most investments, however, are at least partly irreversible. They
always involve a sunk cost that cannot be recovered if the market turns out
to be worse than expected. However, rms are in control of the timing of
their investments. They can always postpone the investment decision and
wait until new information arrives. Thus, if a project is irreversible and can
be delayed, they become very sensitive to uncertainty over future payo¤s.
Irreversibility can arise from many aspects of business. Factories can-
not disinvest their projects or refund purchased machinery, because used
machinery and used equipment is very di¢ cult to value. Government and
regulations can also a¤ect irreversibility. For example, capital controls may
19
make it impossible to exchange foreign currency after selling assets (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994).
It is useful to think of an irreversible investment opportunity as a nan-
cial call option. A call option is an agreement between two parties where the
buyer of the option has the right to buy an asset at a specic price within a
specic time period. The value of the real option depends on the spot price
of the underlying asset and the volatility of the change in its future value.
After exercising the option, the buyer cannot retrieve the cost, although the
buyer could sell the asset to someone else. A rm with investment oppor-
tunities can excise the option, that is, spend the money now on projects, or
do so in the future to pursue another opportunity. This action is also irre-
versible. Similarly, this investment opportunity can be an asset or a project
that can be transferred to another rm. If a rm invests today, it loses
the opportunity to invest the resource elsewhere while waiting for the new
information. Changes in market conditions that can a¤ect the uctuation
of future cash ows can have a signicant impact on rm investment.
Bernanke (1983) uses irreversibility to explain the business cycle and in-
vestment uctuation. He argues that because of the irreversibility of invest-
ment and the opportunity cost of not investing in future, a rms optimal
decision may well be to postpone investment until new information emerges.
Pindyck (1988) argues that irreversibility makes the net present value rule
invalid. That is, the value of a unit capital must equal the sum of the cost
of a unit and the opportunity cost of investing now rather than in future.
Caballero (1991) shows that uncertainty can a¤ect irreversible investment
in two ways: rst through its e¤ect on a rms expected path of marginal
revenue of capital, and second through its e¤ect on its competitorsexpected
path of marginal revenue of capital.
The recent literature on real options focuses on the compound option the-
ory. Basically, compound option theory suggests that there are two options
when rms make their investments: the option to wait and the option to
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grow. The rst option tends to discourage investment while waiting for new
information to make a better decision. The other option encourages early
investment to take advantage in terms of market share and opportunities
for growth. Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) investigate decision making with
respect to irreversible investment under imperfect competition and uncer-
tainty. They point out that there are two assumptions in the literature:
rst, rms are assumed to have monopoly over investment opportunities.
That is, the investment opportunity is secured and there is only a small im-
pact on the market. Second, the product market is assumed to be perfectly
competitive. However, these two assumptions do not always hold in the real
world. For example, while rms wait for new information, other rms may
take this opportunity to gain market share or grow their business. Thus,
when facing uncertainty in an imperfect market, rms are a¤ected by two
options: the option to wait for new information and the option to grow the
business. Rising uncertainty increases the value of the option to wait to
invest, which results in delayed investments. However, this e¤ect does not
hold permanently. After a certain point, uncertainty eventually leads to an
increase in investments, due to the increased option value of taking market
share or business expansion. They also point out that as uncertainty rises,
the value of the growth option increases more than the value of the option
to wait to invest.
1.2.2 Uncertainty and Investment: Empirical Evidence
The existing studies on the relationship between investment and uncertainty
are not conclusive in response to the theories discussed above. In order to
test the role of covariance in uncertainty, Brainard, Shoven and Weiss (1980)
use the risk measured by CAPM to test its e¤ect on Tobins q, and the ra-
tio of market-to-book value of the capital stock; they nd that although
non-diversiable risk is important in explaining market value, the sign of
the coe¢ cient is mixed. It can be positive or negative, and only some of
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them are signicant. However, Leahy and Whited (1996) nd that changes
in covariance have very little e¤ect on investment. They study the rela-
tionship between investment and uncertainty using a panel of rms from
COMPUSTAT. They use the yearly volatility of rmsdaily stock return as
the measure for uncertainty, and nd a negative relationship in favour of the
concave model. Thus, irreversibility is the only explanation for this negative
relationship.
At the industry level, Caballero and Pindyck (1996) study the e¤ect of
uncertainty on the total investment of rms across di¤erent industries. They
note that it is important to distinguish between industry-level risk and rm-
level risk when studying the relationship between investment and uncertainty
across industries, because the distribution of future marginal revenue of
capital di¤ers for di¤erent risks. They nd that industry-level risk raises
the required rate of capital and a¤ect future distribution of cash ows while
rm-level risk has less impact on rm willingness to invest.
At the country level, Pindyck and Solimano (1993) explore the role of
irreversibility on the relationship between uncertainty and aggregate invest-
ment behaviour for both developed and developing countries. They argue
that rms only invest in projects when the required return reaches hurdle
rates, which are typically three or four times the cost of capital. Moreover,
uncertainty could raise this threshold. They use the variance of marginal
revenue product of capital as the measure of uncertainty and analyse the
real option value from the perspective of market structure. They nd that,
although the increase in this volatility increases the required return for in-
vestment, which in turn reduces investment spending, there is only a small
negative e¤ect of uncertainty on the level of investment. However, this does
not mean that volatility is not important in explaining the spending level,
given the large scale of investment and changing risk. Further, they nd
that for developing countries, this relationship is more negative than that
for developed countries.
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In more recent work, Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2007) use di¤erent
types of adjustment costs, uncertainty e¤ects, and functional form of rev-
enue functions, and conclude, because of the cautionary e¤ect and convexity
e¤ect caused by the high level of uncertainty, that investment responds less
to a given demand shock, for a large panel of U.K. manufacturing rms.
Ogawa and Suzuki (2000) study the relationship between uncertainty and
xed investment for Japanese industries in the backdrop of stagnating xed
investment in Japan after the bubble burst in the early 1990s. They use
di¤erent statistical methods to construct the uncertainty proxy and decom-
pose these measures into three components: economy-wide, industry-wide,
and rm-wide. They nd a signicantly negative relationship between un-
certainty and xed investment for Japanese manufacturing rms. Similar
to Ogawa and Suzuki (2000), Bulan (2005) focuses on U.S. manufacturing
rms and decomposes all uncertainty into market-level, industry-level, and
rm-level components. Bulans results show that both industry-level and
rm-level uncertainty have a negative e¤ect on rm investment after con-
trolling Tobins q , cash ow, protability, and leverage. Bloom (2009) builds
a model that structurally analyses the macroeconomic uncertainty shocks on
hiring and investment and evaluates the joint adjustment of labour and capi-
tal costs. He nds that uncertainty raises the value of options to wait, which
in turn causes a temporary pause in investment and hiring.
The rest of the work focuses on the use of di¤erent measures of uncer-
tainty. Federer (1993) examines the relationship between uncertainty and
aggregate investment spending using the risk premium embedded in the term
structure of interest rates to measure uncertainty. The justication for using
risk premium is that it is related to the markets uncertainty about future
movements in interest rates and other macroeconomic variables. He nds
a signicant and negative relationship between the lagged risk premium
and investment spending after controlling the cost of capital and average
q . Guiso and Parigi (1999) contribute to the literature by introducing an
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alternative uncertainty measure: a survey-based measure for probability dis-
tribution of future demand for products of rms. They nd that rms facing
greater uncertainty respond less to future expected demand and have an in-
centive to invest less, for their sample of Italian manufacturing rms. Bond
and Cummins (2004) study the empirical relationship between uncertainty
and rm investment for publicly traded U.S. rms between 1982 and 1999.
They use three di¤erent measures of uncertainty: the volatility of rm stock
returns, disagreement among future forecasts of rm prot, and the vari-
ance of forecast error of future prot. They nd that these three measures
are correlated with each other and overall, they have a signicant negative
long-run e¤ect on capital accumulation.
In supporting the compound option theory, Sarkar (2000) studies the ef-
fect of uncertainty on the probability that investment will take place. He
nds a U-shaped relationship between volatility and investment. That is,
at low levels of uncertainty, the probability of investment rstly increases
with uncertainty, but after volatility surpasses 0.39, it becomes a decreasing
function of uncertainty. Folta and OBrien (2004) investigate the relation-
ship between industry uncertainty and the decision of established rms to
enter a new industry, using COMPUSTAT industry and business sector data
between 1980 and 1999. They nd that this relationship is not monotonic.
Overall, 93% of the range of uncertainty has a negative e¤ect on entry, which
suggests that the option to wait is dominant most of the time. However,
at high levels of uncertainty, the uncertainty has a positive e¤ect on en-
try, which suggests that the option to grow outweighs the option to wait as
uncertainty reaches very high levels.
1.2.3 Oil Price Uncertainty and Investment Spending
Since oil price shocks have a signicant impact on the economy, they also
a¤ect rm investment decisions. Pindyck (1991) points out that energy price
shocks introduce uncertainty and a¤ect the marginal product of several types
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of capital. This may be the reason for declining investment spending during
the recessions of 1975 and 1980. Bernanke (1983) develops a model of de-
cision making between adding energy-e¢ cient capital and energy-ine¢ cient
capital. He argues that when the value of option to wait for new information
is high, rms prefer to invest later in order to receive more information.
In an early study, Uri (1980) introduces a model of investment behaviour
that considers the e¤ect of changing energy prices. He nds that the impact
of energy price on investment di¤ers for energy-intensive industries and less
energy-intensive ones. For energy-intensive industries, energy price has a
very dominant e¤ect on the investment for the next three years. For less
energy-intensive industry sectors, the results are mixed. Glass and Cahn
(1987) develop a theoretical model to relate investment with the price of
energy under di¤erent economic conditions. They nd that energy price
spikes do reduce aggregate real investment. These e¤ects are greatest during
economic booms and lowest during recessions. Moreover, these e¤ects are
diminishing as energy prices keep climbing. Hurn and Wright (1994) test
the e¤ect of oil price and oil price variance on irreversible investment using
data from the oil eld in the North Sea. They argue that resource extraction
rms place a positive value on waiting when facing uncertainty, since time
brings more information about the future payo¤ of the project. As long as
the investment opportunity is still available, a late decision is always a better
decision. The overall value of a late decision is equal to the value of waiting
for new information, minus the potential prot of the losing investment
opportunity. Their results show that oil price inuences the lag between
the discovery of a new eld and the decision to develop it. However, the
variance of oil price is not signicant with respect to this lag.
Mohn and Misund (2009) are the rst researchers to relate oil price
volatility to rm-level investment. They investigate the e¤ect of oil price
uncertainty on investment for international oil and gas rms over the pe-
riod 1992-2005. Their measures of uncertainty include volatility of overall
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stock market returns and oil price volatility. They nd that stock market
uncertainty has a negative e¤ect on investment, while oil price uncertainty
increases investment. Elder and Serletis (2010) also examine the e¤ect of oil
price uncertainty on investment and economic growth for U.S. rms based
on a structural vector regressive model that incorporates GARCH-in-mean
error. They use the conditional variance of oil price as the measure of uncer-
tainty. Their main results show a negative e¤ect of oil price uncertainty on
GDP, consumption, investment and industrial production, which are robust
to di¤erent measures of oil price, sample periods, and measures of output.
Elder and Serletis (2009) test the robustness of these results for Canadian
rms and nd similar results to those reported for the U.S.
In a very recent paper, Henriques and Sadorsky (2011) investigate how oil
price volatility a¤ects strategic investment using real options and compound
option theory. They study a sample of U.S. rms over the period 1990-
2007. They use both oil price volatility and squared oil price volatility as
measures of uncertainty. They conclude that there is a U-shaped rather
than linear relationship between oil price uncertainty and investment. Yoon
and Ratti (2011) use an error correction model of capital stock adjustment
to study the e¤ect of energy price uncertainty for 2600 U.S. manufacturing
rms over the period 1971-2006. They nd that energy uncertainty reduces
investment via a negative e¤ect on sales growth. However, this e¤ect is a
response e¤ect rather than a direct e¤ect, compared with Mohn and Misund
(2009). Ratti, Seoul and Yoon (2011) study the e¤ect of energy price on rm-
level investment across 15 European countries and across di¤erent industries.
They argue that their research benets from using the relative price of energy
over time and across countries and overcomes the drawback of using low-
frequency energy prices that yield a small impact on investment. They nd
a negative relationship between energy price shock and rm-level investment
both within individual countries and across the whole panel. They also show
that this negative e¤ect is more signicant for manufacturing rms than for
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other non-nancial rms.
1.2.4 Theoretical Basis and Hypothesis
The model used in this paper assumes a concave marginal revenue prod-
uct of capital and focuses on the role of irreversibility of rm investment.
Bernanke (1983) argues that because of the irreversibility of investment and
the opportunity cost of not investing in future, the optimal decision of a
rm is always to postpone investment until new information emerges when
facing uncertainty. This model predicts a negative e¤ect of uncertainty on
the rm investments.
Furthermore, I also incorporate compound option theory into this model.
Compound option theory suggests that there are two options when rms
make their investments: the option to wait and the option to grow. The
option to wait encourages rms to wait for new information and make a
better and late investment decision, while the option to grow encourages to
take early advantage in terms of market shares and opportunities. Kulati-
laka and Perotti (1998) point out that the relationship between uncertainty
and investment is not monotonic. At rst uncertainty increases the value
of the option to wait, which delays investment. After a certain point, un-
certainty eventually increases the size of the investment because the value
of the growth option increases more than the value of the option to wait to
invest.
On the empirical level, Henrique and Sadosky (2011) use a sample of
U.S. rms and nd that there is a U-shaped relationship between oil price
uncertainty and investment based on both real options and compound option
theory. Thus, since Japan fully depends on imports mainly from the Middle
East for its oil consumption, I would expect to see a more signicant negative
e¤ect of oil price volatility on Japanese rm investments. Moreover, because
two options interact with each other based on compound option theory, my
second hypothesis is that there is a U-shaped rather than linear relationship
27
between oil price volatility and Japanese rm-level investments.
The most recent work by Ratti, Seoul and Yoon (2011) uses a dynamic
model of investment with data on non-nancial rms in 15 European coun-
tries and relative energy price across di¤erent countries. They consider the
e¤ect of oil price changes on rm investments both over time and between
countries. They estimate a dynamic model of investment based on the Euler
equation approach, which assumes that capital and energy are the only in-
puts in production, that it is costly to adjust capital, and that there is debt
nancing. The rst di¤erence of this chapter from the above paper is that I
focus on a single country and use the absolute oil price imported by Japan.
Secondly, the dynamic model used in this chapter is based on neoclassi-
cal assumptions and inputs include xed capital inputs, gross investment,
labour inputs and current inputs. This model assumes that the rms only
quasi-xed input is homogeneous capital goods and the function of marginal
adjustment cost is dened.
Ratti, Seoul and Yoon (2011) also introduce the rm size into the baseline
model to test if rm size a¤ects the relationship between oil price shocks and
investments. They nd that large rms have less persistence in investment
than smaller rms. The negative e¤ect of increased energy prices on rm
investment is less for large rms. These results suggest that large rms
are exible when facing energy price increases and have better resources to
protect from the high energy prices than small rms. Thus, my hypothesis
regarding to the role of rm size in this study is that there is a U-shaped
relationship between oil price volatility and rm investment for both large
and small rms. However, I would expect this relationship is stronger for
small rms.
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1.3 The Model and Data
1.3.1 Tobins q Theory
Tobins q is introduced by Tobin (1969), who provides the starting point
relating investment to q . Tobins q is dened as the ratio between the market
value and replacement value of an asset or a rm. It assumes that the
maximised value of the rm can be measured by its stock market valuation
under the conditions of perfectly competitive markets and constant returns
to scale technology. Thus, the stock market valuation would capture all
relevant information about future protability. Additional information, such
as cash ows, could not contribute to current expectations.
If the market value simply reects the book value of the rm, Tobins
q is equal to 1. When the market value is more than the book value of the
rms assets and Tobins q is greater than 1, it implies that the rm stock is
over-valued and this is a good time to invest more, because the real cost of
capital is less than what the rm can get by issuing shares. When Tobins
q is less than 1, it suggests that the market undervalues the rm and that
the market value of the rm is less than its book value. As a result, the rm
will not replace the capital. Tobins q suggests that rm value is the driving
force behind investment spending in this model.
Tobins q model has been the most popular model among all models
that capture the dynamics of investment. Following Bond and Van Reenen
(2007), the Tobins q model can be derived as follows.
Assumptions are made to simplify many aspects. First, the objective of
the rm is assumed to be the maximization of the value of the equity owned
by all shareholders, who are assumed to be risk-neutral. So in this research,
I do not consider the e¤ect of risk on the rms required rate of return.
Second, this rm pays no taxes and issues no debt, so nancial policy is also
outside my consideration. Third, the market is perfectly competitive and
investors can access all information about prices and products at zero cost.
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There are three types of factors to be considered for production. Capital
assets include both tangible and intangible assets, which are durable. Labour
inputs are the people hired by the rm each year. The last factor is current
inputs, which are purchased by the rm but will not be fully consumed in a
particular period.
Based on the neoclassical assumptions above, the dynamic optimisation
problem for the rm can be characterized as




t+it(Kt+i; It+i; Lt+i;Mt+i)] (1)
where Vt is the rm value with output price pt, () is the rms net revenue
function, Kt is the xed capital inputs, It is the gross investment with price
pKt , Lt is the labour inputs with wage !t, Mt is the di¤erent types of current
inputs with price pMt . t+i is the rms discount rate equal to (1 + t+i) 1,
where t+i is the risk-free rate between period t + i   1 and period t + i and
t = 0. E() denotes the expected value conditioned on information available
in period t.
Due to capital accumulation, capital inputs can be expressed as
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It (2)
where  is the rate of depreciation for capital.
Based on this equation, the net revenue function is given by
t(Kt; It; Lt;Mt) = ptF (Kt; Lt;Mt)  pKt It   !tLt   pMt Mt (3)
where pt is the price of product and F (Kt; Lt;Mt) is the neoclassical production
function.














where t = 11  (
@Vt
@Kt 1
) is shadow value related to capital accumulation. Eq.4
sets the additional cost of capital equal to the shadow value. Eq.5 describes
the evolution path of shadow values and capital stock. Eq.6 and Eq.7 are
standard rst-order conditions for non-durable goods.
The linear homogeneity of the revenue function yields







Put Eq.4 and Eq.5 into Eq.8
t(Kt; It; Lt;Mt) = Kt(t   (1  )t+1Et(t+1)) + It( t) (9)
Combine Eq.9 and Eq.2
t(Kt; It; Lt;Mt) =  Kt(1  )t+1Et(t+1) + t(1  )Kt 1 (10)
Re-arrange Eq.10
t(1  )Kt 1 = t(Kt; It; Lt;Mt) +Kt(1  )t+1Et(t+1) (11)
Solving forward by repeated substitution gives
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t(1  )Kt 1 = Et(
1X
s=0
t+ss(Kt+s; It+s; Lt+s;Mt+s) = Vt (12)
Because t is a forward-looking measure of current and future marginal
revenue product of capital, Tobins q, which measures ratio of the maximized








Tobins q model assumes the rms only quasi-xed input is homogeneous
capital goods. To obtain an empirical investment model, the function of
marginal adjustment cost must be dened. Followed by Summers (1981)
and consistent with mainstream research in q theory, the function can be








The basic q model requires function G(It;Kt) to be homogeneous of degree
one in (It;Kt), which is constant return to scale. Then Eq.3 can be rewritten
as
t(Kt; It; Lt;Mt) = pt[F (Kt; Lt;Mt) G(It;Kt)]  pKt It   !tLt   pMt Mt (15)






























































where Qt = qt   1.
The advantage of q model is that the current investment decision is ex-
plicitly modelled, and the parameter in the model is from the adjustment
cost function, which should be invariant to structural changes. On the other
hand, q model may be seriously mis-specied because the adjustment cost
function may not be symmetric and quadratic as specied above. This re-
lationship can be asymmetric or even non-linear. Perfect competition and
constant returns to scale may not be realistic for any rm.
Many authors have critiqued q theory because there is discrepancy be-
tween its theoretical assumptions and the real conditions under which the
empirical work is done. For example, Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993)
nd that fundamentals are more useful in predicting investment of U.S. rms
than Tobins q from 1920s to 1990s. However, much literature challenges this
interpretation. Gomes (2001) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model
with nancial frictions and tests it with simulated data. He nds that To-
bins q has good explanatory power for the variability in Investment, and
that cash ow does not provide any additional power. Cooper and Ejar-
que (2003) point out that with a reasonable amount of curvature in proper
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function, q theory is still very useful for modelling investment. Bond et al.
(2004) argue that because q theory relates the rms maximized value with
its stock market valuation, if the stock market experiences bubbles or other
factors besides cash ows and future protability, Tobins q could not capture
all the information about the expected future prot of current investment
decisions.
The attractiveness of q model has at least two advantages. First, it is
simple and has an intuitive relationship between investment and book to
market ratio. Second, q represents a su¢ cient statistic for investment based
on neoclassical economic theory and is tested extensively in the empirical
applications. The focus of this study is the role of uncertainty in the invest-
ment behaviour of Japanese rms, thus the q model is a good starting point
for my theoretical model.
1.3.2 Empirical Model Specication
The q model in Eq.19 is a deterministic relationship between the investment
rate and the q variable. In order to introduce stochastic variation into the q






Qt + et (20)
where et is the additive shock to the investment. Eq.20 implies that Qt
should be an endogenous variable in this model.
In addition, Eq.20 is usually augmented with other explanatory variables
of interest. Following Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), many empirical
studies have added cash ow into the model, which relates the investment to
Tobins q. They argue that when rms face nancial constraints, investment
may be sensitive to the availability of internal funds. Furthermore, since
the purpose of this study is to test the e¤ect of oil price uncertainty on
investment, oil price uncertainty can be from both the supply side and the
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demand side, such as oil supply disruptions caused by cartel action or unrest
in the Middle East, world economic expansion, or precautionary demand
from speculators (Kilian 2009). Oil prices are a direct measure of uncertainty
in the crude oil market. Thus, following Henriques and Sadorsky (2011), I







Qt + 1cft + 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2
t + et (21)
Moreover, since rms may not have similar investment rates due to tech-
nology shocks, and there may be common trends a¤ecting all rms in the
same way (e.g., business cycles), Eq.21 is further augmented with xed ef-
fects for individual rms i and time period e¤ect t, where i is for individual
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t + i + t + eit (22)
There is no compelling reason to believe et is serially uncorrelated, fol-
lowing Mohn and Misund (2009), I assume that et follows an AR(1) process
eit = eit 1 + it (23)
Substituting Eq.22 into Eq.23 yields
Iit
Kit
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t   t 1 + it (24)
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t 1 + (1  )i + t   t 1 + it (25)
where it is the white noise and serially uncorrelated. b6 and b7 measure the
instantaneous e¤ect of oil price volatility and lag of oil price volatility on
investment. b8 and b9 measure the instantaneous e¤ect of squared oil price
volatility and lag of squared oil price volatility on investment.
1.3.3 Econometric Methods of Estimation
Eq.25 can be estimated as a dynamic panel model which contains an unob-
served panel e¤ect i. Since IitKit is correlated with i and there are endogenous
variables and lags associated with them on the right-hand side, ordinary least
squares (OLS) could give a biased estimation of parameters. The standard
solution of endogeneity in dynamic panel models is to use exogenous vari-
ables that are uncorrelated with error terms to instrument the endogenous
dependent variables. However, these exogenous variables are very di¢ cult
to nd for the panel rm data.
The rst-di¤erence GMM estimator introduced by Arellano and Bond
(1991), provides consistent estimates of parameters as long as the number of
rms is large. Heterogeneity is eliminated using a rst-di¤erence transforma-
tion; it is specially designed for samples in which N is large and T is small1,
since company panels are usually composed of a large number of rms with
a relatively small number of time periods. However, when the instrumental
variables are only weakly correlated with the lagged value of variables, this
1The Arellano-Bond estimator is designed for large number of cross-sectional units and a small number
of time-serious units. If T is relatively large, the use of all possible instruments may lead to low power
estimate (Arellano and Bond, 1998). Alvarez and Arellano (2003) derive the asymptotic properties of
rst di¤erence GMM. It suggests that if there are no endogenous regressors present, this estimator is
biased towards within the group, which is not a serious concern because it is still consistent. In this
study the number of time periods is 24 and there are endogenous regressors in the model. Thus, readers
are advised to look at the ndings using rst di¤erence GMM with caution.
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GMM estimator could have a large bias for an innite sample. Arellano
and Bover (1995) provide an alternative, using the lagged values of the rst
di¤erenced independent variable as the additional instrumental variables.
This signicantly improves the e¤ectiveness of the rst-di¤erenced estima-
tor in both the asymptotic and small samples. Blundell and Bond (1998)
expand the system-GMM estimator by introducing more instrumental vari-
ables, such as suitably lagged value of levels of dependent variables and
independent variables. The system-GMM estimator combines equations in
levels with equations in rst di¤erence and signicantly improves asymptotic
e¢ ciency and small sample properties.
While one-step GMM estimator uses a weighting matrix that is indepen-
dent of estimated parameters, the two-step estimation uses the error from
the rst step to construct the variance-covariance matrix, and re-estimates
the model in the second step. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using a
rst-step estimator for coe¢ cient estimation and a two-step estimator for
the over-identication test. Bond (2002) points out that two-step weight
matrix can improve e¢ ciency in large samples. However, in small samples,
the two-step GMM estimator has severe downward bias. Windmeijer (2005)
proposes a solution for the biased two-step estimator in small samples and
takes the fact into consideration that the usual asymptotic standard errors
do not consider the extra variation generated by the estimated parameters
in constructing the e¢ cient weighting matrix. He nds that using a bias-
correction could gain a more accurate approximation in a nite sample even
though the correction e¤ects are decreasing with sample size. Thus, in this
paper, all the estimations are performed with two-step, bias-corrected, and
robust estimators for the covariance matrix.
Furthermore, Hansen J test is used to test the validity of the over-
identication assumption for the instrument matrix, following Roodman
(2006). Compared with Hansen J, the Sargan test, which also tests over
identication, is not robust and is sensitive to heteroscedasticity and au-
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tocorrelation, and tends to over-reject the hypothesis. Thus, Hansen J is
used in this paper for the over-identication test. In addition, Arellano and
Bond (1991) tests for autocorrelation in di¤erences are provided up to or-
der 4. The null hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation. First-order
autocorrelation is acceptable while a higher order of autocorrelation could
be troublesome. This is because the idiosyncratic errors are independently
and identically distributed, and the rst-di¤erenced errors should be serially
correlated at rst order. If the model is correctly specied, there should be
no higher-order correlation.
In this paper, I use di¤erent econometric approaches including OLS,
GMM and system-GMM with di¤erent lags. All models are estimated using
Stata 11. Oil volatility, squared oil volatility, time e¤ects and their lags
are treated as exogenous, while Q, cash ow, their lags, and lagged invest-
ment are treated as endogenous. The reason for using both oil volatility and
squared oil volatility in the model is that compound option theory suggests
that the option to wait and the option to grow interact with each other
when rms face investment decisions. Both volatilities are used to test the




The rm-level data are obtained from DataStream2. The data set consists
of an unbalanced panel of publicly traded rms drawn from TOPIX1000,
excluding both nancial and utility rms. The reason to use TOPIX 1000
is simply because they are the largest data sample I could get from DataS-
tream. The data sample spans 24 years from 19872010 only because DataS-
tream did not report Japanese rm data in earlier years. The data sample
2Please refer to Table 1 for detailed description and variable codes.
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is mainly after the big Japanese recession, during which the performance of
the Japanese economy has been less impressive compared with other devel-
oped countries. As shown in Figure 1, after miracleeconomic expansion
in 1980s, Japanese overall real economic growth slowed signicantly in the
late 1990s, due to over investment and failed monetary policy. The econ-
omys stagnation nally ended in recent years, when the GDP growth rate
surpassed that of the U.S. and European Union.
TOPIX1000 are selected based on free-oat adjusted market capitaliza-
tion. The TOPIX1000 consists of TOPIX core30, TOPIX large70, TOPIX
mid400, and 500 highly market-capitalized stocks from the TOPIX. Leahy
and Whited (1996) note that the advantage of using panel data to study
uncertainty is that it provides a rm-level environment. All rm data are
obtained from DataStream.
Consistent with previous literature, the Tobins q is calculated following
Chuang and Pruitt (1994)
Tobin0s q =
(CE + PS + LD + CL  CA)t
TAt 1
(26)
where CE is the market value of equity, PS is the preferred stock, LD is the
long-term debt, CL is the current liability, CA is the current asset and TA is
the total asset.
Firm investment is measured by capital expenditure on property, plant,
and equipment. Capital stock is represented by the total asset. So the







where PPE is the expenditure on property, plant and equipment and TA is
the total asset.






where NI is the net income before extra items and preferred dividends, DDA
is the depreciation, depletion and amortization, TA is the total asset.
Whited (2006) points out that it is important to remove the outliers when
working with rm panel data. So for Tobin0sq, ItKt , cft, any observations lying
outside the 99% condence intervals are removed as outliers. In addition,
compared with other developed countries, mergers and acquisitions are less
frequent in Japan, so I lose no other data in my samples.
Oil Price Volatility
I compute the oil price volatility as a historical estimate of the variance over
the sample period. I use the daily oil price obtained from the U.S. Energy
Information Agency, and choose the daily closing oil price of the nearest
contract to maturity of West Texas Intermediate. Annual oil price volatility






(rot   E(rot ))2 
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N (29)
where rot is the daily oil price return, which is calculated as rot = 100Ln(pt=pt 1).
N is the number of trading days each year, 252. For the calculation of market
volatility, the oil price return is replaced by the TOPIX1000 stock index
return.
For a robustness check, I also use alternate volatility estimated from a
exponential-GARCH(1,1). The GARCH-type models allow the conditional
variance to be dependent upon previous own lag. The EGARCH proposed
by Nelson (1991) releases the non-negative constraints in the pure GARCH
model. Moreover, EGARCH captures the asymmetric e¤ects that are ap-
parent in many nancial time series. EGARCH has demonstrated superior
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in-sample estimation and forecasting than other conditional variance models
in many studies (e.g., Alexander, 2008). In this study, EGARCH well cap-
tures the asymmetric e¤ect of oil price shocks, which indicates that negative
shocks have a greater impact on conditional volatility than positive shocks
of the same magnitude.
Subsamples
Oil-intensive Industries and Less Oil-intensive Industries I apply
the industry classication used in Fukunaga, Hirakata and Sudo (2010) to
construct two subsamples. They use the cost share of oil in each industry as
the criterion to decide whether a particular industry is oil-intensive. Results
show that in Japan, oil intensity is high in Oil and Coal Products, Glass
and Ceramic Products, Non-ferrous Metals, Iron and Steel, and Chemicals.
On the other hand, Pulp and Paper, Metal Products, Rubber Products,
Machinery, Precision Instruments, Transportation Equipment and Electric
Appliances are classied as less oil-intensive industries. All data are ob-
tained from DataStream.
Large Firms and Small Firms The large rms group is composed of
TOPIX Large Cap and Mid Cap. The Topix100 Index calculates the index
value based on market capitalization and includes the 100 most liquid and
largest stocks. The TOPIX Mid400 excludes Topix100 stocks and includes
the remaining stocks in the Topix500. The small rms group is composed
of TOPIX Small Cap stocks, 1169 small rms; it excludes the stocks in the
TOPIX500 and includes the remaining rms in the TOPIX. All data are
obtained from DataStream.
Statistical Summary
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the model.
Investment rate I=K, Cash ow rate CF=K and Tobins q is measured in
41
Eq.26, Eq.27 and Eq.28, where Q = q   1. Oilvol is the annual oil price
volatility in percentage. Oilvolsq is the squared value of Oilvol. MOilvol is the
oil price volatility in percentage calculated from EGARCH(1,1) in Eq.31 for
the robustness check. MOilvolsq is the squared value of MOilvol. Marvol is
the market volatility of TOPIX1000. The average investment rate (I=K) for
Japanese rms from 1987-2010 is 30.4% while the average cash ow rate
(CF=K) is only 5.6%. Q has a range of -0.957 to -0.065 for all the rms in
this time period, which suggests that all the rms are undervalued and their
market values are less than the book values.
Table 3 shows the correlations among investment rate (I=K), cash ow
rate (CF=K), q and volatilities. As expected, investment (I=K) is positively
correlated with Q and Cash ow (CF=K). Investment (I=K) is negatively
related to oil price volatility (Oilvol) and the square of oil price volatility
(Oilvolsq), but positively correlated to market volatility (Marvol).
1.4 Empirical Results
As pointed out by Bond (2002), when series are highly persistent, weak
instruments could lead to nite sample bias when using rst-di¤erenced
GMM estimators. First-di¤erence GMM estimator, introduced by Arellano
and Bond (1991), requires the autoregressive parameters to be signicantly
less than 1. Thus, before we estimate the dynamic qmodel, we have to decide
whether the dynamic properties of these variables are suitable to be used in
GMM. A simple AR(1) regression with and without xed e¤ects is presented
in Table 4. All the coe¢ cients of lagged value are below 1, suggesting that
the rst-di¤erence of all the variables are suitable as instruments for the
dynamic model.
1.4.1 Results of Pooled Firm Estimation
Table 5 reports the empirical results of the impact of oil price volatility on
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rm-level investment. There are eight regression methods to be used for
the estimation: OLS, OLS with xed e¤ect, rst-di¤erence GMM, and ve
System-GMM models.3 The OLS ignores the unobserved panel-level e¤ect
and provides a biased estimation. The xed e¤ect estimator is chosen based
on the Hausman test which evaluates the signicance of xed e¤ect estima-
tor versus a random e¤ect estimator. Test results show that the 2 statistic
is equal to 2366 and p-value is equal to 0, which means we reject the hy-
pothesis that the individual e¤ect is uncorrelated with the other regressors
in the model. Thus a random e¤ect model produces a biased estimator while
a xed e¤ect model is preferred. The xed e¤ect model uses a transforma-
tion to remove the unobserved e¤ect prior to estimation. The GMM and
system-GMM consider the unobserved panel e¤ect and control for the en-
dogeneity. Investment ( IK ), cash ow (CFK), Tobins q (Q) are treated as
endogenous. Each equation includes the xed e¤ect for individual rm ef-
fects and time period e¤ects. The time period e¤ects are represented as year
dummies. The GMM estimators di¤er in the choice of instrument variables.
The purpose of using di¤erent GMM estimators is to see how sensitive the
results are to di¤erent estimation techniques. Table 6 provides details of
model specication for rst-di¤erence GMM and system-GMM.
The estimated coe¢ cient on the lagged investment (L: IK ) is positive and
statistically signicant at the 0.001 level. The coe¢ cient value is from 0.5426
(GMM) to 0.9576 (OLS); all the estimated values from system-GMM are
within this range. This is consistent with econometric theory, which states
that the estimations from OLS and GMM give the highest and lowest bench-
marks separately. Q ratio (L:Q) contributes signicantly to the explanation
of investment rates (I=K), especially current value. The literature generally
rejects the empirical performance of Tobins q in explaining investment and
shows that cash ow and other measures of protability have strong ex-
planatory power for investment (see Chirinko, 1993, for a review). However,
3Please nd in Table 6 the specication for each system-GMM model.
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Hayashi (1990) shows that q has signicant explanatory power for Japanese
manufacturing rms. This e¤ect is even more signicant than cash ow.
In addition, the lagged value of Q (L:Q) in my data sample has no statisti-
cally signicant impact on rm-level investment. Results for the cash ows
(CF=K) show a signicant e¤ect on rm investments. This indicates that the
cash ow variable contains additional information about future protability
not captured by Q. There are explanations in the literature of the signicance
of cash ow in explaining investment spending. Myers and Majluf (1984)
identify the adverse selection that rm insiders have better information than
the capital markets about the value of their rms. Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988) show that excessive cost of external nancing from nancial
markets causes some rms to be liquidity-constrained, so such rms rely
heavily on cash ow to nance investment. Moreover, Jensen (1986) argues
from the perspective of agency theory that managers may invest the free
cash ow of rms into unprotable projects rather than paying it out to
shareholders. This could also link cash ow with investment spending. The
immediate response of investment to cash ow is negative, but this negative
e¤ect disappears for the lagged cash ow. This suggests that Japanese rms
treat cash ow with caution. They do not spend cash ow in the same year
but with a delay. Hovakimian (2009) nds an explanation of the negative
relationship between cash ow and investment based on the corporate life-
cycle hypothesis. Cash ow and investment may follow di¤erent directions
in the di¤erent stages of growth opportunities. Firms can raise considerable
funds from external resources, such as stock and debt, as long as the market
perceives that the investment could lead to large future prots. Moreover,
it takes time for rms to accumulate enough cash ows to use as a source of
nancing.
The estimated coe¢ cient of oil price volatility (Oilvol) is negative and
signicant for all models except system-GMM 5. All estimations for both
current volatility (Oilvol) and lagged volatility (L:Oilvol) are negative, sug-
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gesting that oil price volatility reduces the investment rates of Japanese
rms. The estimated coe¢ cient of the squared oil price volatility (Oilvolsq)
is positive and signicant. The results of oil price volatility and squared oil
price volatility suggest a U-shaped relationship between oil price volatility
and Japanese rm-level investment. This is consistent with the theoretical
prediction from the strategic growth options literature. It is also consistent
with the empirical results of Henriques and Sadorsky (2011), which suggest
that there is a U-shaped relationship between oil price volatility and U.S.
rm investment. This U-shaped relationship also holds for lagged value of
oil price volatility (L:Oilvolsq), suggesting that this relationship is robust and
persistent.
The Wald 2 is reported to test the joint signicance of all model para-
meters. They are all insignicant, which shows that the null hypothesis that
all the coe¢ cients are not equal to 0 at the same time holds for my data
sample. The AR(1) to AR(4) are used to test the higher-order autocorrelation.
Arellano and Bond (1991) introduce a test for zero autocorrelation in the
rst-di¤erenced errors of GMM. If the model is correctly specied, the rst-
di¤erenced errors are serially correlated at rst order, and at higher order
the autocorrelation should be statistically insignicantly di¤erent from zero.
The p-value for these high order test for all my GMM models are greater
than 0.10, indicating that there is no higher-order correlation at the 10%
level of signicance.
Hansen J statistic is used to test over-identifying restrictions when there
are more moment conditions than parameters to be estimated. It follows a 2
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying
restrictions. The null hypothesis is that there is no over-identifying problem.
The limitation of the Hansen J statistic is that when the null hypothesis is re-
jected, it does not give any guidance as to the sources of failure of the model.
The results of the Hansen J statistic show that there is no over-identication
for GMM_SYS2 and GMM_SYS4. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected
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with a p-value larger than 0.05, indicating that the instruments are appropri-
ately uncorrelated with the disturbance process. All the other models show
a mis-specication in the instrument list from Hansen J, which suggests un-
reliable estimates from these models. However, the purpose of displaying all
the models here is to show a consistent U-shaped relationship between oil
price volatility and investment under di¤erent model specications.
There are eight regression methods used for the estimation: OLS, OLS
with xed e¤ect, rst-di¤erence GMM and ve system GMMs. OLS ignores
the unobserved panel-level e¤ect and provides a biased estimation. The xed
e¤ect estimator uses a transformation to remove the unobserved e¤ect prior
to estimation but ignores the endogeneity of dependent variables. First-
di¤erence GMM is designed for short T and large N, where T=24 in this
study. Thus the preferred method of estimation is the system GMM. Among
all 5 system GMMs, the best model is chosen based on the autocorrelation
test and the over-identifying test.
1.4.2 Results of Robustness Check
I now briey report the alternate results of redoing the analysis when the
volatility is measured in a di¤erent way. The EGARCH (1,1) is used to
re-estimate the oil price volatility (Oilvol)from 1987-2010 as follows,
zt = a0 + a1zt 1 + et; where et j It 1 s N(0; 2t ) (30)













where zt is the log di¤erence in oil price, et is the error term and 2t is the
conditional variance of the error from the EGARCH model.
Eq.25 is re-estimated with this volatility and the results are reported
in Table 7. The coe¢ cient of lagged value of investment is positive and
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signicant at the 1% level. The Q-ratio also has a positive e¤ect on the
current investment. The e¤ect of cash ow on the investment is still non-
monotonic, with a negative e¤ect from the current cash ow and a positive
e¤ect from the lagged cash ow on the rms investment. The negative
coe¢ cient of oil price volatility and the positive coe¢ cient of squared oil
price volatility suggest that there is a U-shaped relationship between oil price
volatility and rm investment. In summary, the estimation with EGARCH
volatility changes just slightly in terms of magnitude and signicance. The
main results still hold and remain robust.
1.4.3 Oil-Intensive Firms and Less Oil-Intensive Firms
I now consider the e¤ect of energy intensity of industries on the relationship
between oil price volatility and rm-level investment. There are two groups
of rms constructed, as in 1.3.4: oil-intensive rms and less oil-intensive
rms. Table 8 provides a summary statistics of these two groups. The
means of investment (I=K), cash ow (CF=K), and Tobins q (Q) are all
larger in oil-intensive rms than in less oil-intensive ones.
Results in Tables 9 and 10 show the estimation of these two groups sep-
arately. Overall, the coe¢ cients of I=K, Q, CF=K and their lagged values
are similar to those from the full sample. The consistent negative coe¢ cient
of lagged oil price volatility (L:Oilvol) in oil-intensive rms indicates that
rm-level investment responds negatively to oil price volatility with a de-
lay. Also, the lagged value of squared oil price volatility (L:Oilvolsq) increase
investment spending with a delay. In summary, there is a U-shaped rela-
tionship between the investments of oil-intensive rms and lagged oil price
volatility. For the less oil-intensive subsample, the results are quite di¤er-
ent. The hypothesis that oil price volatility has an e¤ect on investment is
strongly rejected in all ve of my system-GMM models. This suggests that
a rise in uncertainty about oil prices has no statistically signicant e¤ect on
investment by less oil-intensive rms. This is consistent with the intuition
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that less oil-intensive rms use lower proportion of oil in production and
that oil intensity is a key characteristic of the transmission channel of oil
price to rms on the supply side (Fukunage, Hirakata and Sudo, 2010). The
reason for di¤erent results for oil-intensive rms and less oil intensive ones
is because of the role of crude oil played in the whole production process.
For example, the chemical industry uses crude oil as one of its important
raw inputs. The price uctuations of crude oil directly a¤ect the production
and cost, and thus investment decisions are strongly a¤ected by oil price
volatility. On the other hand, electric appliances industry may only use oil
for heating and transportation. Oil prices thus form only a small part of cost
faced by rms in this industry. Hence, any changes in the oil price would
have very limited impact on production, and the investment decision is not
a¤ected signicantly by oil price volatility.
1.4.4 Large and Small Firms
These two subsamples are used here to test the role of rm size in the
relationship between investment and oil price volatility. Using subsamples
rather than dummy variables to assess the size e¤ect brings with it the
di¢ culty of how to classify whether a rm is large or not, given changing
market values each year. Suppose rm A is classied as a large rm in year
1, it might become a small rm in year 2. Although we could classify all 757
rms spanning 24 years by market value each year, it will give us two very
unbalanced panels merged with missing years for some of the rms. Using
TOPIX Mid400 and TOPIX Small Cap as two subsamples is better as it
includes more rms in the data sample and each rm is assigned as small or
large consistently over the time period.
Sadorsky (2008) summarizes three streams of research about the rela-
tionship between oil price movement and stock price. The rst stream nds
that large rms have more resources and greater capability to shift away
from high energy prices. Small rms lack economies of scale and have dif-
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cultly changing their input mix (Caves and Barton, 1990). The second
stream shows that small rms may be innovative and e¢ cient dealing with
energy price increases, because of less complex management structure and
quick decision making (Aigniger and Tichy, 1991). In the third stream,
Nguyen and Lee (2002) nd that both small and large rms are equally
e¢ cient in their U.S. manufacturing-rm samples. This implies that when
facing energy price movement, rm size is not a decisive factor in measuring
the e¢ ciency of adjustment of the input.
Table 11 compares the summary statistics of large and small rms. Large
rms have higher Q-ratio (Q) and investment (I=K) and less cash ow
(CF=K) as a percentage of total assets than small rms. In Tables 12 and
13, Eq.25 is re-estimated for large and small rms separately. Similar to the
results for the full sample, all the variables except lagged Q ratio (Q) are
signicant for both subsamples. It is worth noting that in small rms the co-
e¢ cient of cash ow is (CF=K) positive. This result is consistent with Bond
et al. (2004) that higher coe¢ cients on cash ow are reported for smaller
rms because of bubbles in their share prices. Moreover, Vogt (1994) argues
that rms with low Q-ratio should rely heavily on internal cash ows to
nance investment, based on the free cash ow hypothesis.
Oil price volatility (Oilvol) and its lagged value (L:Oilvol) have a signicant
and negative e¤ect on investment rate for both groups. In addition, squared
oil price volatility (Oilvolsq) and its lagged value (L:Oilvolsq) have a signicant
and positive e¤ect on investment. The U-shaped relationship between oil
price volatility and investment based on compound option theory is present
in both large and small rms. However, the negative e¤ect on investment
is stronger and more signicant for small rms. These results are consistent
with Ratti, Seol and Yoon (2011), who use total assets as a measure of rm
size and nd that the negative e¤ect of increased energy price on investment
is less for larger rms.
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1.4.5 Oil Price Volatility and Market Volatility
Table 14 provides the estimation results of the impact of both oil price uncer-
tainty and market turbulence on total investment expenditure. The relation-
ship between investment and uncertainty is tested with a variety of control
variables. Model 1 shows the standard econometric procedure of using Q
via market-to-book ratio as the control variable. The results indicate that
the basic Tobins q model is mis-specied for Japanese rms. The Hansen
J test of over-identication restriction rejects the hypothesis that the model
meets the over-identication restrictions, regardless of which instrument set
is used. This is either because the model is mis-specied or there is new
information in addition to stock market valuation about the fundamental
value of the rm. Thus, in model 2, cash ow (CF=K) is augmented in the
model 1. The p-value of Hansen J statistics shows that including cash ow
(CF=K) and its lagged value (L:CF=K) in the model helps to pass the battery
of specication tests. Q-ratio contributes signicantly to the explanation of
investment rates. Cash ow and its lagged value have strong explanatory
power for investment. The results show that the role of oil price volatility
(Oilvol) and market volatility (Marvol) is robust with augmented cash ows.
Lagged oil price volatility (L:Oilvol) has a signicant and negative e¤ect on
rm-level investment, while lagged market volatility (L:Marvol) has a signif-
icant and positive e¤ect. In model 3, I further augment the previous model
and include both squared oil price volatility (Oilvolsq) and squared market
volatility (Marvolsq). The immediate investment response to an increase in
the oil price volatility (Oilvol) is negative. However, this negative e¤ect is
not persistent, because of the positive coe¢ cient of lagged oil price volatility
(L:Oilvol). This may be caused by the fact that high oil price volatility is usu-
ally transitory. The irreversibility dominates if the volatility is temporary,
whereas the compound options prevail if the volatility is permanent (Mohn
and Misund, 2009). On the other hand, both market volatility (Marvol) and
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its lagged value (L:Marvol) have a positive e¤ect on rm investment. The
squared volatility (Marvolsq;Oilvolsq) has exactly opposite results on rm
investment compared with that of volatility itself.
Omitted variable bias occurs when a model leaves out one or more im-
portant independent variables. In Table 14 from Model 1 to Model 3, each
time we allows additional factors to enter the analysis, the Wald Chi^2 is
statistically signicant based on p-value, which suggests all variables are
jointly signicant. For example, from Model 1 to Model 2, we include ex-
tra independent variables cash ow (CF=K) and its lagged value (L:CF=K).
The Wald Chi^2 shows joint signicance of all variables including the newly
added ones. This is also consistent with the correlation results from Table
3, where cash ow rates (CF=K) do have a correlation with Q. That means
in Model 1 the cash ow rates become part of the noise term. Thus, the
conclusion drawn here is that the coe¢ cients of Q, oil price volatility and
market volatility are di¤erent in these 3 models.
Table 15 shows a summary of estimated investment and uncertainty re-
sults. In the third row of Table 15, we observe that the cumulative e¤ect
of positive oil price shocks can be calculated to -0.05733, with a p-value
equal to 0.4 The dependent variable is the investment (I=K) as a share of
total assets, which is a ratio and can be interpreted as a percentage. The
volatility variables (Oilvol) are also calculated from the standard deviation
of daily percentage price change. So the cumulative coe¢ cient means that
a 1 percentage point increase in oil price volatility (Oilvol) will reduce the
investment rate (I=K) by 5.733 percentage points. While the instantaneous
e¤ect on investment (I=K) from uncertainty is directly given by the coe¢ -
cients of estimations, the last row of Table 15 calculates the long-term e¤ect
of oil price volatility (Oilvol) and its lagged value (L:Oilvol), when taking
account of the autoregressive coe¢ cient on L:I=K. According to Eq.25, the
persistent e¤ect is equal to (b6 + b7)=(1  b1). Thus, the persistent e¤ect of oil
4The p-value is calculated through the non-linear test procedure in Stata.
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price volatility (Oilvol) is -0.5676 (p=0.000). This implies that a permanent
increase in oil price volatility of 1 percentage point reduces the average in-
vestment by 56.76 percentage points. Compared to the Mohn and Misund
(2009) results, the investment rate of Japanese rms responds more strongly
to oil price volatility than U.S. rms. This can be partly attributed to the
fact that Japan has meagre oil reserves and depends entirely on imported
oil. Japanese rms are more sensitive to oil price volatility than rms in
other oil importing countries.
As illustrated in the second column of Table 15, results are quite di¤er-
ent for market volatility. Both contemporaneous (Marvol)and lagged e¤ects
(L:Marvol)take a positive sign, and the latter is higher in magnitude than the
former. The cumulative e¤ect of market volatility (Marvol)of 1 percentage
point increases the investment (I=K)rate by 5.937 percentage points. When
taking the coe¢ cient of lagged investment rate (L:I=K)into consideration in
the long run, a 1 percentage point increase in market volatility (Marvol)will
increase the investment by 58.78 percentage points. My results show a strong
relationship between market volatility and rm-level investment. Abel and
Eberly (1999) argue that long-run capital stock already incorporates uncer-
tainty by increasing the hurdle rate at which projects would be protable.
In other words, macroeconomic volatility is embedded in the q ratio. This is
contrary to my results, which show the market valuation of rm value does
not fully capture the e¤ect of aggregate uncertainty.
1.5 Conclusion
The investment decision is the most important decision rms face because
it helps to grow the business and achieve competitive advantage. Crude oil
as an important input of production has been very volatile, especially in re-
cent years. This makes decision making more di¢ cult for managers, policy
makers, and others. In this paper, I use real option theory and relate oil
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price volatility to rm strategic investments for a panel of Japanese rms. I
nd that there is not simply a linear relationship between oil price volatility
and strategic investment. Instead, there is a U-shaped relationship between
them after controlling Tobins q-ratio and cash ow. This is consistent with
compound option theory, which suggests that two options, the option to wait
to invest and the option to grow the business, interact with each other. The
U-shaped relationship is robust to a number of di¤erent econometric esti-
mations and di¤erent measures of volatility. The results for two subsamples,
oil-intensive rms and less oil-intensive rms, show that oil volatility has a
strong and signicant e¤ect on investment by oil-intensive rms, whereas
oil volatility has no statistically signicant e¤ect on less oil-intensive rms.
Firm size matters when considering the relationship between oil price volatil-
ity and investment. The negative e¤ect of oil price volatility on investment
is stronger and more signicant for small rms. The cumulative e¤ect of
oil price volatility shows that a one percentage point increase in oil price
volatility will reduce the investment rate by 5.733 percentage points. Com-
pared to Mohn and Misund (2009), the investment rates of Japanese rms
respond more strongly to oil price volatility than U.S. rms. Furthermore,
the model is augmented with stock market volatility. Both market volatil-
ity and oil price volatility have signicant e¤ects on rm investment, which
suggests that the market valuation of rm value through Tobins q does not
fully capture the e¤ect of aggregate uncertainty.
This is the rst paper to address the relationship between oil price volatil-
ity and Japanese rm investments. It is clear that for Japanese rms, espe-
cially the oil intensive rms and small rms, oil price volatility plays a very
important role in rm-level investment decisions. The fact that Japan is
fully dependent on crude oil imports sharpens the role of oil as an input into
production and an inuence on investment demand. Beyond this there is a
strong indication that over the period of dramatic oil price uctuations, oil
price uncertainty rst depresses the rms investment by increasing the value
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of the option to wait, then encourages the investment when the value of the
option to grow exceeds the value of the option to wait. Thus for the policy
maker, a stable oil price could benet rm-level investment, especially for
oil-intensive rms and small rms. For future study, it would be interesting
to separate the di¤erent causes of oil price uctuation, and test whether the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Statistical summary
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
I/K 15932 0.304 0.146 0.012 0.825
CF/K 14274 0.056 0.039 -0.124 0.185
Q 14999 -0.594 0.161 -0.957 -0.065
Oilvol 18168 37.096 11.747 19.879 62.084
Oilvolsq 18168 1514.119 975.592 395.158 3854.474
MOilvol 18168 3.682 2.284 1.314 10.464
MOilvolsq 18168 18.768 25.840 1.726 109.487
Marvol 18168 20.070 6.584 8.808 41.985
Note: Investment rate I=K is calculated as Property, Plant and Equipment / total assets.
Cash ow rate CF=K is measured as (Net Income+Depreciation) / Total Asset. Tobins
q is measured as (Market Value of Equity+Preferred Stock+Long Term Debt+Current
Debt-Current Asset)t / Total Assett 1, and Q = q   1. Oilvol is the annual oil price
volatility in percentage by calculating the square root of the sum of squared daily returns
for each calendar year. Oilvolsq is the squared value of Oilvol. MOilvol is the oil
price volatility in percentage calculated from EGARCH(1,1) in Eq.31 for the robustness
check. MOilvolsq is the squared value of MOilvol. Marvol is the market volatility of





























































































































































































































































































Table 4. AR(1) estimation for model variables
Estimator I/K CF/K Q Oilvol MOilvol Marvol
OLS 0.977*** 0.727*** 0.918*** 0.189*** 0.357*** 0.018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013)
FE 0.815*** 0.481*** 0.650***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Table 4 reports estimated coe¢ cients and their p-values on the lagged dependent
variable for a AR(1) process: yt = yt 1 + ut using OLS and xed e¤ect (FE) estimator
with Stata. The results show all the autoregressive parameters are all below 1, implying
the rst di¤erence of variables contains information beyond that of a random walk.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6. Number of lags for each GMM specication
OLS OLS_FE GMM GMM_SYS1 GMM_SYS2 GMM_SYS3
I/K 2,... 2,... 3,... 3,4,5
Q 2,3,4 2,3,4 3,... 3,4,5
CF/K 2,3,4 2,3,4 3,... 3,4,5
Notes: Table 6 provides the number of lags for each specication of GMMmodels reported
in Table 5. It is used to specify the lag limits of instrument variables in GMM and system-
GMM. (a b) means for the di¤erenced equation, lagged levels dated t-a to t-b are used as
instrument. For the level equation, the rst di¤erence dated t-a+1 is normally used. For
example, the column of GMM means for rst di¤erence equation, two lagged value and
further of I=K, two, three and four lagged value of Q and CF=K are used as instrument.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8. Statistic summary of oil-intensive industries and less
oil-intensive industries
Panel A: Oil-Intensive Industries
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
I/K 4566 0.343 0.099 0.056 0.650
CF/K 3995 0.056 0.036 -0.081 0.203
Q 4349 -0.581 0.106 -0.896 -0.227
Panel B: Less Oil-Intensive Industries
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
I/K 8602 0.280 0.116 0.021 0.632
CF/K 7720 0.054 0.045 -0.147 0.190
Q 8190 -0.650 0.129 -0.963 -0.252
Note: These two subsamples are constructed based on Fukunaga, Hirakata and Sudo
(2010). Investment rate I=K is calculated as Property, Plant and Equipment / total
assets. Cash ow rate CF=Q is measured as (Net Income+Depreciation) / Total As-
set. Tobins q is measured as (Market Value of Equity+Preferred Stock+Long Term
Debt+Current Debt-Current Asset)t / Total Assett 1, and Q = q   1.
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Table 9. The impact of oil price volatility on investment of
oil-intensive rms
GMM_SYS1 GMM_SYS2 GMM_SYS3 GMM_SYS4 GMM_SYS5
L.I/K 7.978e-01*** 8.045e-01*** 8.197e-01*** 8.139e-01*** 8.295e-01***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Q 1.279e-01*** 9.572e-02** 9.486e-02* 8.575e-02** 9.391e-02
(0.002) (0.014) (0.094) (0.030) (0.146)
L.Q 1.569e-02 1.585e-02 1.044e-02 5.340e-02* 2.898e-02
(0.529) (0.641) (0.823) (0.096) (0.638)
CF/K -3.144e-01*** -3.087e-01*** -3.563e-01*** -2.671e-01*** -3.608e-01***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
L.CF/K 8.292e-02* 1.430e-01** 1.580e-01** 1.620e-01** 1.373e-01
(0.093) (0.019) (0.031) (0.034) (0.283)
Oilvol -6.036e-02 -6.838e-02* -6.384e-02* -6.971e-02 -8.166e-02
(0.111) (0.087) (0.100) (0.106) (0.109)
L.Oilvol -6.051e-02* -6.774e-02* -6.347e-02* -6.859e-02* -7.998e-02*
(0.077) (0.060) (0.067) (0.077) (0.078)
Oilvolsq 6.766e-04 7.649e-04* 7.144e-04* 7.794e-04 9.118e-04
(0.106) (0.084) (0.096) (0.103) (0.105)
L.Oilvolsq 7.033e-04* 7.872e-04* 7.373e-04* 7.981e-04* 9.284e-04*
(0.076) (0.059) (0.067) (0.075) (0.078)
AR(1) -9.50 -9.37 -8.69 -9.32 -8.18
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AR(2) -0.23 -0.19 -0.03 -0.54 -0.20
(0.82) (0.85) (0.97) (0.59) (0.84)
AR(3) 0.78 0.68 0.62 0.63 0.62
(0.44) (0.49) (0.54) (0.53) (0.54)
AR(4) 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.39 0.21
(1.00) (0.86) (0.86) (0.69) (0.83)
Hansen J 197.00 195.90 193.40 201.50 194.90
(1.00) (1.00) (0.98) (1.00) (0.55)
N 3531 3531 3531 3531 3531
Note: Table 9 reports the results of dynamic investment model for oil-intensive Japanese
rms. Two-step estimated coe¢ cients and their p-values based on robust standard errors
are reported. The estimated coe¢ cients of time dummy variables are not reported. All
estimates are obtained from the system-GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998),
as implemented in Stata by Roodman (2006). I/K, CF/K, Q are treated as endoge-
nous. AR(1)-AR(4) are Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for autocorrelation in di¤erences.
Hansen J is used for over-identication restrictions. The specication of GMM models is
shown in Table 6.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 10. The impact of oil price volatility on investment of
less oil-intensive rms
GMM_SYS1 GMM_SYS2 GMM_SYS3 GMM_SYS4 GMM_SYS5
L.I/K 8.825e-01 8.997e-01*** 9.574e-01*** 8.437e-01*** 9.037e-01***
(0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Q 2.096e-02 7.690e-02*** 9.401e-02** 7.681e-02** -6.042e-03
(0.983) (0.004) (0.011) (0.013) (0.898)
L.Q 4.591e-02 -2.218e-02 -5.351e-02 -1.515e-02 5.179e-02
(0.928) (0.347) (0.141) (0.559) (0.226)
CF/K -1.095e-01 -1.556e-01*** -1.586e-01** -1.771e-01*** -1.289e-01**
(0.821) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.034)
L.CF/K 1.096e-01 1.324e-01*** 1.602e-01*** 1.019e-01*** 1.256e-01*
(0.819) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.056)
Oilvol 2.072e-02 1.196e-02 1.057e-02 1.520e-02 2.503e-02
(0.968) (0.640) (0.727) (0.569) (0.439)
L.Oilvol 1.140e-02 3.004e-03 1.352e-03 6.012e-03 1.607e-02
(0.981) (0.896) (0.960) (0.801) (0.578)
Oilvolsq -2.239e-04 -1.265e-04 -1.106e-04 -1.623e-04 -2.718e-04
(0.969) (0.655) (0.741) (0.582) (0.447)
L.Oilvolsq -1.331e-04 -3.684e-05 -1.835e-05 -7.156e-05 -1.871e-04
(0.981) (0.890) (0.953) (0.796) (0.576)
AR(1) -2.11 -11.45 -11.19 -11.45 -11.02
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AR(2) 0.06 1.50 1.83 1.40 0.38
(0.96) (0.13) (0.07) (0.16) (0.70)
AR(3) 0.62 0.83 0.77 0.81 0.91
(0.53) (0.41) (0.44) (0.42) (0.36)
AR(4) -0.51 -1.21 -1.25 -1.22 -1.05
(0.61) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.30)
Hansen J 464.80 394.60 274.80 398.60 240.40
(0.15) (1.00) (0.03) (1.00) (0.02)
N 6797 6797 6797 6797 6797
Note: Table 10 reports the results of dynamic investment model for less oil-intensive
Japanese rms. Two-step estimated coe¢ cients and their p-values based on robust stan-
dard errors are reported. The estimated coe¢ cients of time dummy variables are not
reported. All estimates are obtained from the system-GMM estimator of Blundell and
Bond (1998), as implemented in Stata by Roodman (2006). I/K, CF/K, Q are treated as
endogenous. AR(1)-AR(4) are Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for autocorrelation in dif-
ferences. Hansen J is used for over-identication restrictions. The specication of GMM
models is shown in Table 6.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 11. Statistic summary of large rms and small rms
Panel A: Large Firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
I/K 10173 0.299 0.193 0.003 0.927
CF/K 8565 0.060 0.040 -0.091 0.213
Q 8510 -0.562 0.173 -0.920 -0.016
Panel B: Small Firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
I/K 21128 0.277 0.170 0.003 0.792
CF/K 16320 0.081 0.172 -0.384 2.391
Q 18551 -0.616 0.180 -0.991 -0.018
Note: The large rm group is composed of TOPIX large cap and mid cap. The small
rm group is composed of TOPIX small cap. Investment rate I=K is calculated as Prop-
erty, Plant and Equipment / total assets. Cash ow rate CF=Q is measured as (Net
Income+Depreciation) / Total Asset. Tobins q is measured as (Market Value of Eq-
uity+Preferred Stock+Long Term Debt+Current Debt-Current Asset)t / Total Assett 1,
and Q = q   1.
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Table 12. The impact of oil price volatility on investment of
large rms
GMM_SYS1 GMM_SYS2 GMM_SYS3 GMM_SYS4 GMM_SYS5
L.I/K 8.977e-01*** 8.932e-01*** 9.227e-01*** 9.121e-01*** 9.238e-01***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Q 8.082e-02*** 8.947e-02*** 8.491e-02** 7.119e-02* 7.842e-02**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.017) (0.089) (0.022)
L.Q 6.018e-03 -9.608e-03 -9.419e-03 -1.881e-02 -3.251e-02
(0.644) (0.678) (0.782) (0.581) (0.348)
CF/K -1.540e-01*** -1.107e-01* -1.066e-01 -1.913e-01** -2.241e-01***
(0.002) (0.054) (0.218) (0.042) (0.003)
L.CF/K 9.137e-02** 1.323e-01*** 1.907e-01*** 8.108e-02 1.376e-01*
(0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.331) (0.068)
Oilvol -4.511e-02* -4.865e-02* -5.424e-02** -4.327e-02 -6.416e-02**
(0.086) (0.071) (0.049) (0.298) (0.036)
L.Oilvol -4.618e-02* -4.925e-02** -5.338e-02** -4.483e-02 -6.259e-02**
(0.051) (0.042) (0.032) (0.230) (0.022)
Oilvolsq 5.057e-04* 5.448e-04* 6.065e-04** 4.855e-04 7.165e-04**
(0.082) (0.067) (0.047) (0.292) (0.034)
L.Oilvolsq 5.358e-04* 5.717e-04** 6.196e-04** 5.193e-04 7.249e-04**
(0.050) (0.041) (0.032) (0.230) (0.022)
AR(1) -10.91 -10.71 -10.25 -9.50 -10.09
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AR(2) 1.10 1.26 1.22 1.24 1.54
(0.27) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12)
AR(3) 0.75 0.71 0.70 0.66 0.59
(0.45) (0.48) (0.48) (0.51) (0.55)
AR(4) -0.56 -0.53 -0.57 -0.56 -0.60
(0.58) (0.60) (0.57) (0.58) (0.55)
Hansen J 403.80 405.20 291.00 405.70 226.50
(0.85) (1.00) (0.01) (1.00) (0.08)
N 7064 7064 7064 7064 7064
Note: Table 12 reports the results of dynamic investment model for large Japanese rms.
Two-step estimated coe¢ cients and their p-values based on robust standard errors are
reported. The estimated coe¢ cients of time dummy variables are not reported. All
estimates are obtained from the system-GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998),
as implemented in Stata by Roodman (2006). I/K, CF/K, Q are treated as endoge-
nous. AR(1)-AR(4) are Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for autocorrelation in di¤erences.
Hansen J is used for over-identication restrictions. The specication of GMM models is
shown in Table 6.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 13. The impact of oil price volatility on investment of
small rms
GMM_SYS1 GMM_SYS2 GMM_SYS3 GMM_SYS4 GMM_SYS5
L.I/K 8.828e-01*** 8.721e-01*** 9.230e-01*** 8.416e-01*** 9.351e-01***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Q 8.200e-02*** 1.104e-01*** 1.431e-01*** 1.212e-01*** 6.993e-02*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.084)
L.Q 1.397e-03 -2.398e-02 -8.963e-02*** -9.130e-03 -6.807e-03
(0.923) (0.305) (0.002) (0.711) (0.861)
CF/K 1.272e-02 1.925e-02** 3.318e-02** 1.026e-02 1.361e-02
(0.300) (0.038) (0.045) (0.318) (0.330)
L.CF/K -2.278e-02** -4.184e-02*** -3.958e-02** -2.727e-02** -3.772e-02**
(0.025) (0.000) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015)
Oilvol -3.683e-02** -4.656e-02*** -3.135e-02 -4.570e-02** -3.353e-02
(0.047) (0.010) (0.103) (0.012) (0.105)
L.Oilvol -3.790e-02** -4.695e-02*** -3.328e-02* -4.596e-02*** -3.525e-02*
(0.024) (0.004) (0.055) (0.005) (0.059)
Oilvolsq 4.129e-04** 5.211e-04*** 3.531e-04* 5.115e-04** 3.766e-04*
(0.044) (0.009) (0.097) (0.011) (0.100)
L.Oilvolsq 4.410e-04** 5.455e-04*** 3.865e-04* 5.345e-04*** 4.095e-04*
(0.023) (0.004) (0.054) (0.005) (0.058)
AR(1) -14.90 -14.73 -14.42 -14.60 -14.29
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AR(2) 0.54 0.86 1.74 0.76 0.48
(0.59) (0.39) (0.08) (0.45) (0.63)
AR(3) 1.04 1.12 1.08 1.09 1.07
(0.30) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29)
AR(4) -1.48 -1.57 -1.68 -1.58 -1.49
(0.14) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14)
Hansen J 559.70 820.40 353.30 680.90 280.80
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
N 13253 13253 13253 13253 13253
Note: Table 13 reports the results of dynamic investment model for small Japanese rms.
Two-step estimated coe¢ cients and their p-values based on robust standard errors are
reported. The estimated coe¢ cients of time dummy variables are not reported. All
estimates are obtained from the system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998),
as implemented in Stata by Roodman (2006). I/K, CF/K, Q are treated as endoge-
nous. AR(1)-AR(4) are Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for autocorrelation in di¤erences.
Hansen J is used for over-identication restrictions. The specication of GMM models is
shown in Table 6.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 14. The relationship between rm-level investment and
uncertainty: oil price volatility and market volatility
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
L.I/K 9.383e-01*** 8.999e-01*** 8.999e-01***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Q 3.783e-02 6.611e-02*** 6.612e-02***
(0.135) (0.004) (0.003)






Oilvol 6.124e-04* -5.514e-07 -1.323e-01***
(0.071) (0.999) (0.000)
L.Oilvol -4.760e-04*** -4.322e-04*** 7.497e-02***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Marvol -3.177e-04 5.747e-04 2.341e-02***
(0.492) (0.225) (0.000)










Wald Chi2 14390.00 15740.00 15160.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AR(1) -14.56 -14.54 -14.51
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
AR(2) 0.49 0.17 0.17
(0.63) (0.86) (0.86)
AR(3) 0.91 1.23 1.23
(0.36) (0.22) (0.22)
AR(4) -1.08 -1.34 -1.34
(0.28) (0.18) (0.18)
Hansen J 560.40 711.30 711.30
(0.01) (0.67) (0.67)
N 14059 12455 12455
Note: Table 14 reports the results of dynamic investment model with both oil price volatil-
ity and market volatility. Model 1 is constructed to test the basic Q model. Model 2 is
augmented by cash ow. Model 3 is further augmented by squared volatility. Two-step
estimated coe¢ cients and their p-values based on robust standard errors are reported.
The estimated coe¢ cients of time dummy variables are not reported. All estimates are
obtained from the system-GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). I/K, CF/K, Q
are treated as endogenous. AR(1)-AR(4) are Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for auto-
correlation in di¤erences. Hansen J is used for over-identication restrictions.
68
Table 15. Estimated investment and uncertainty e¤ect
Oilvol Marvol Oilvolsq Marvolsq
Contemporaneous e¤ect -1.323E-01 2.341E-02 1.649E-03 -8.809E-04
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lagged e¤ect 7.497E-02 3.596E-02 -1.039E-03 -2.176E-04
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cumulative e¤ect -5.733E-02 5.937E-02 6.100E-04 -1.099E-03
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
long-term e¤ect -5.676E-01 5.878E-01 6.040E-03 -1.088E-02
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: Table 15 summarizes the contemporaneous and lagged e¤ects of oil price volatility
and market volatility on investment, and calculates the cumulative e¤ect and long-term
e¤ect of uncertainty on investment. Estimated coe¢ cients are based on model 3 in table
14. The cumulative e¤ect is calculated as the sum of contemporaneous e¤ect and lagged
e¤ect. The long-term e¤ect is calculated as (b6 + b7)=(1  b0) in Eq.25. That is (contem-
poraneous e¤ect + lagged e¤ect) / (1 - coe¢ cient of lagged investment). The p-value is
obtained through non-linear test procedure in Stata.







































































































































Oil Price Shocks and the Stock
Market: Evidence from Japan
2.1 Introduction
A central question for economists and nancial analysts is how the econ-
omy responds to an exogenous change in the price of oil. The answer to this
question is critical for many decisions, such as the formulation of macro-
economic policy, asset pricing, risk management and portfolio management.
Yet, despite a large body of empirical studies that analyze how oil price
shocks a¤ect output, consumption, employment, ination and stock returns,
there is generally a lack of consensus as to the nature and signicance of the
e¤ects (see for example, Lee, Ni and Ratti, 1995; Hamilton, 1996; Jones,
Leiby and Paik, 2004; Huntington, 2007; Gronwald, 2008). This lack of
consensus may be due to two assumptions that are common in many exist-
ing studies. The rst is that the price of oil is often treated as exogenous
ignoring any reverse causality from the global economy. The second is that
studies that ignore di¤erent shocks i.e., whether a higher oil price is driven
by oil production shortfalls, by a booming world economy or by an increase
in the precautionary demand for crude oil with increased concerns about
future supply shortfalls, also assumes the same e¤ect on the economy of an
exogenous increase in the price of oil. Kilian (2009) who disentangles these
e¤ects nds, in contrast to previous studies, that the U.S. economy responds
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very di¤erently with respect to these underlying oil price shocks.
However, much remains unknown about the response to oil price shocks
of economies other than the U.S.. It is particularly surprising that Japan,
the worlds third-largest oil consumer and a country without any reserves of
its own, has not been the subject of more research. Japan lacks signicant
domestic sources of fossil energy and has to import substantial amounts
of crude oil to meet its rapid economic and industrial growth. After two
oil crises in the 1970s, Japan made e¤orts to diversify its energy resource
to increase energy security including nuclear power, LNG development etc.
Moreover, Japan has a large amount of strategic oil reserves that equal more
than 150 days of consumption both by state and private stockpiles. Most of
the crude oil in Japan is imported from Middle Eastern countries, followed
by Southeast Asian countries and European countries. Although Japan is
fully dependent on foreign crude oil reserves, the major portion of petro-
leum product supply in Japan is covered by domestic production making
it di¤erent from the U.S. and other oil-importing countries. The domestic
petroleum rening system has been able to provide a stable and e¢ cient
supply of quality products. As a result, the Japanese economy is rather
resilient to the oil shocks despite its large dependence on oil (Mork, 1994).
Furthermore, from the second half of 1980s, the Japanese economy over-
heated with rising stock and real estate prices, later known as the Japanese
asset price bubble. Over the next 30 years, the performance of Japanese
economy has been less impressive compared with other developed countries,
such as the U.S. and European Union. Since the second half of the 1990s
till present, the interest rate in Japan has only been slightly above 0%. As
in other oil-importing countries like the U.S., oil price shocks ought to a¤ect
Japans economy through di¤erent channels. For example, oil is one of the
key production components for most goods and services, so higher energy
costs lower usage of oil and lead to lower real output. Furthermore, higher
oil prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic households as consumers
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have lower discretionary income for other goods because of the increased
cost of energy (Kilian, 2010b). In addition, Hamilton (2003) observes that
oil price shocks raise uncertainty about future oil-market conditions and slow
down the economy with reduced or postponed investments and purchases of
energy-dependent durable goods. There are several empirical studies (see for
example Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005; Blanchard and Gali 2007)
that focus on investigating the relationship between oil price shocks and real
economic activity in Japan. Blanchard and Gali (2007) compare the e¤ect
of oil price shocks on CPI, GDP and employment for United States, France,
Germany, United Kingdom, Italy and Japan. Japan behaves di¤erently from
other countries since oil price shocks only have a weak e¤ect on wage and
no signicant e¤ect on other economic indicators. Jimenez-Rodriguez and
Sanchez (2005) also fail to identify any real e¤ect of oil prices on Japanese
GDP growth whereas for U.S., U.K., Germany, France and Italy, they nd
that an increase in oil prices has a signicant negative impact on the GDP
growth. Finally, only a few papers study the implications of oil price shocks
on the Japanese stock markets (see for example, Jones and Kaul, 1996; Aper-
gis and Miller, 2009). Apergis and Miller (2009) investigate how structural
oil price shocks a¤ect stock market returns in a sample of eight countries in-
cluding Japan. They nd that oil market shocks have a signicant but small
magnitude e¤ect on international stock market returns. Previous studies on
Japan are in the context of international comparisons between countries, of
which Japan is one. My chapter is, to the best of my knowledge, the rst to
study the impact of oil shocks specially on the Japanese stock markets using
the approach in Kilian (2009). In addition, di¤erent from previous studies,
I ll the gap by testing whether the variations in Japan real stock returns
to specic supply and demand shocks in the crude oil market are driven by
uctuations in cash ows or by discount rates variations.
The main contribution in this paper is that I use a structural vector
autoregressive (SVAR) approach to study the dynamic relationship between
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oil price shocks and the Japanese stock market. The e¤ects of oil price
shocks on stock returns and dividend growth rates are examined. Using a
structural VAR controls the reverse causality between oil price and stock re-
turns. It also identies three di¤erent shocks to the crude oil market: shock
to the global supply of crude oil, shock to the global demand for all industry
commodities, and oil-market specic demand shock. Moreover, I explicitly
test which demand and supply channels a¤ect the movement of future cash
ows and discount rates, which eventually determine the asset price. The
main results are as follows. First, I nd that unexpected increases in global
demand for all industrial commodities cause a persistent increase in the real
price of Japanese Crude Cocktail while the e¤ect of unexpected oil produc-
tion disruption and unexpected increases in the precautionary demand for
oil are relatively minor. Next, I nd that in contrast to the conventional
perception, demand shocks rather than supply shocks explain most of the
changes in the real price of the Japanese Crude Cocktail. Third, in contrast
to research on the U.S. stock market, I nd only marginal evidence that oil
price shocks contribute to the variation in Japanese real stock returns and
real dividend growth. Finally, again in contrast to results for the U.S. mar-
ket, I nd that the variation of Japanese stock market returns caused by oil
price shocks can be explained by changes of expected real cash ows rather
than changes of expected returns. These results remain qualitatively sim-
ilar even after using a number of robustness checks using alternate model
specications and data. The reason that these results are di¤erent from
what Kilian and Park (2009) have for U.S. is mainly because of the special
Japanese economic circumstances and its heavy dependence on imported oil,
as well as an e¢ cient energy security policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
existing literature. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology,
and discusses the structural shocks to the global oil market and the Japanese
stock market. Section 4 presents empirical results for the global oil market
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and stock market blocks, and reports the robustness check for my main
results. Section 5 compares and contrasts the oil transmission mechanisms
in the U.S. and Japan markets. Section 6 details the main conclusions.
Appendices A and B provide details of the data I use.
2.2 Literature Review
Oil price shocks tend to inuence stock prices and returns through their
e¤ects on current and future changes in real cash ows and/or changes in
expected returns. For example, oil price increases can a¤ect current and
future company earnings negatively by making production more expensive
and reducing demand. Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997), for example,
suggest that monetary policy makers tend to increase interest rates in re-
sponse to the inationary pressures triggered by the oil price shocks; a higher
interest rate then implies a higher required rate of return and lower future
cash ows and consequently a fall in stock prices.
Empirical studies that analyze the e¤ects of oil price shocks on stock
prices or returns fall into two broad categories depending on the level of
aggregation: market-level and industry-level. At the market-level, the em-
pirical evidence is mixed. For example, Jones and Kaul (1996) nd a nega-
tive relationship between oil price shocks and aggregate stock returns based
on Campbells (1991) cash-ow dividend valuation model. Huang, Masulis
and Stoll (1996) fail to nd any relationship between returns on oil future
contracts and U.S. stock returns using both a regression model and a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model. Sadorsky (1999) uses a VAR model and nds
that oil prices and oil price volatility both play important roles in a¤ecting
U.S. real stock returns. Ciner (2001) identies a nonlinear relationship be-
tween oil price shocks and the U.S. stock returns. More recently, Park and
Ratti (2008) nd a positive response of real stock returns to an oil price in-
crease for Norway, but negative responses for 12 other European countries.
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Apergis and Miller (2009) modify Kilians (2009) structural VAR to rst
decompose oil price changes into three supply and demand shocks using a
structural vector error correction (VEC) or VAR model. Next, they use a
VAR to determine the e¤ects of these structural shocks on the stock market
returns. However, they did not nd international stock market returns re-
spond in a large way to oil market shocks. Finally, Kilian and Park (2009)
use a structural VAR model to examine the impact of oil price shocks on
the U.S. stock market, and nd the responses of aggregate U.S. real stock
returns di¤er greatly depending on the causal factors.
In contrast to studies using an aggregate stock market index, the general
conclusion, using industry-level data, is that oil price shocks a¤ect industries
di¤erently depending on their nature (see Lee and Ni, 2002; Sadorsky, 2001;
Boyer and Filion, 2007). For example, for oil-intensive industries such as
petroleum renery and industrial chemicals, the predominant e¤ects of oil
shocks are on the supply side and their returns tend to move together with
the price of oil. However, for other industries such as automobiles, leisure
and travel the e¤ects of oil shocks are on the demand side, where higher
oil prices lower demand on their products and services and consequently
there is a fall in stock prices. A recent study by Fukunaga, Hirakata and
Sudo (2010) using Japanese data nds that the response of stock returns of
industry portfolios depends not only on the nature of the industry but also
the specic underlying causes of the oil price shocks.
On the country level, there are a few empirical studies that focus on
the implication of oil price shocks on the Japanese stock market and all of
them are international comparison studies. Jone and Kaul (1996) conduct
a detailed investigation of the e¤ects of changes in oil prices on stock prices
for U.S., Canada, U.K. and Japan. They also test whether the reaction
of the international stock market to oil shocks can be justied by current
and future changes in cash ows and expected stock returns. They nd
that international stock prices do react to oil price shocks, and that stock
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price changes caused by oil price shocks are substantially greater than that
can be justied by the e¤ects of these shocks on future cash ows. Apergis
and Miller (2009) investigate how oil shocks a¤ect stock market returns for
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K. and U.S.. They
nd a signicant but small e¤ect of oil market shocks on the international
stock market returns.
In the studies referred to above, the relationship between oil price and
stock returns is examined via three main approaches. The rst is to use
regression analysis. However, a major drawback of this approach is that oil
prices are treated as exogenous with respect to the global economy. Second,
many studies use standard VARmodels to control the reverse causality to the
global macroeconomic aggregates but these models assume the same e¤ect of
an exogenous increase in the price of oil regardless of the underlying causes.
Finally, most recent studies following Kilian and Park (2009) use a structural
VARmodel that avoids these problems and studies the e¤ects of demand and
supply shocks in the global crude oil market on the stock market. Kilian
and Park (2009) propose a structural vector autoregression (VAR) model
for the global crude oil market and test its interaction with the U.S. stock
market. Using a structural VAR controls the reverse causality between oil
price and stock returns. Further, it also identies three di¤erent shocks to
the crude oil market: shock to the global supply of crude oil, shock to the
global demand for all industry commodities, and oil-market specic demand
shock. Their results suggest that the real price of oil as well as the stock
market respond di¤erently to the di¤erent causes of the oil price increase.
In this paper, I follow Kilians (2009) approach to examine the implications
of oil price shocks on the Japanese stock market. To my knowledge, this
is the rst paper to specically study the dynamic relationship between oil
price shocks and the Japanese stock market as opposed to previous studies
that focused on international comparison. In addition, I also test whether
the reaction of Japanese stock market to oil price shocks can be justied
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by current and future changes in real cash ow and changes in expected
discounted rate.
Kilian and Park (2009) show that the real price of oil as well as the
stock market respond di¤erently to the di¤erent causes of the oil price in-
creases. Specically, the supply shock does not have a signicant e¤ect on
U.S. stock returns but a negative e¤ect on stock dividend growth. In con-
trast, the aggregate demand shock causes a sustained increase in both U.S.
stock returns and dividend growth. Finally, an increase in the precautionary
demand shock causes a persistent negative e¤ect on both U.S. stock returns
and dividend growth. In addition, they demonstrate that the response of
estimated stock returns to the changes in the oil market can be explained
by both changes in the expected cash ows and changes in the expected dis-
count rates. Similar to the U.S., Japan is an oil importing country but with
a higher dependence on the imports. Thus, I would expect similar results for
the Japanese market but with di¤erent magnitude and persistence. First,
the Japanese economy is more export-driven compared to U.S., so I expect to
see more persistent e¤ects of aggregate demand shock on both stock return
and dividend growth rate. Second, Japan has an e¢ cient energy security
policy and plenty of strategic oil reserves. The hypothesis for the e¤ect of
oil market specic shocks is that it would have less e¤ect on Japanese stock
returns and dividend growth rate compared to U.S.. Third, the interest rate
in Japan has remained close to zero since 1990. This may weaken the role
of expected discount rates in explaining the response of stock returns to oil
price shocks. I would expect to see that the response of aggregate Japanese
real stock returns to oil supply and demand shocks in the crude oil market
is driven by the changes in expected cash ows only.
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2.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Data
I now provide a brief description on the data used in the empirical analysis.
Further details of the data including sources and transformations used in
the main analysis and in the robustness checks are provided in Appendices
2A and 2B respectively. All data used in this paper are monthly and the
sample period starts from January 1988 and ends in December 2009. Table
1 provides the statistical summary of the variables used in the model.
First, I use the DataStream country equity indices for Japan (denomi-
nated in U.S. dollars) to obtain data on real stock returns and real dividend
growth rates. The index rather than individual stock price is used because
this purpose of this study is to examine the e¤ect of oil price shocks on the
aggregate stock market. The individual stock price has undiversiable risk
associated with the individual entity and industry it belongs to. Di¤erent
industries have di¤erent degrees of oil dependence. Some use crude oil as
a raw input while others may only use it for transportation and heating.
Thus, the individual stock price may show a biased response when facing
oil price uctuations. The real stock return is calculated by substracting
the CPI ination rate from the log returns of Japanese stock price index
(TOTMJP$)1. The nominal dividend is constructed from the product of
Japanese stock price index and Japanese stock market dividend yield (TOT-
MJP$(DY)). By deating these dividends by the prevailing level of the CPI,
we obtain corresponding real monthly dividend payments. Second, my mea-
sure of the real price of oil imported by Japan is based on Japan Crude
Cocktail(JCC). The JCC is the average price of customs-cleared crude oil
imported into Japan, and monthly prices are reported by the Trade Statistics
of Japan since January 1988. Figure 1 depicts the time series plot of JCC.
It is worth noting that it is inuenced by exogenous events such as political
1DataStream Code in the bracket.
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instabilities, wars, and global macroeconomic conditions. For example, I ob-
serve a signicant increase in the price of oil during the Persian Gulf War in
1990; a sharp drop in the real price of oil seems followed the Asian crisis from
1997 to 1998; and a signicant increase between 2003 and 2008 coincidently
consistent with the stylized facts about oil prices during this period (i.e.,
booming global economies increase the demand of oil dramatically). Third,
I use global oil production to reect the OPEC cartel activities and political
instabilities for both OPEC and non-OPEC countries. The data is obtained
from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Finally, I use a proxy
of global real economic activity based on the single-voyage bulk dry cargo
ocean shipping freight rates. This index is proposed by Kilian (2009), and
reects global economic activity in that the supply and demand for shipping
services is a good proxy for global trade and therefore for global trends in
real activity.2 A key advantage of this index is its ability to capture the total
world demands, especially demands from emerging countries, such as China
and India. The Baltic Dry Index (BDI) is an alternative proxy measure
of the world economy activity. It tracks worldwide international shipping
prices of various dry cargoes and is seen as one of the purest leading indi-
cator of economic activity. I also report the results on using the BDI in my
robustness checks.
2.3.2 Methodology
I use, following Kilian (2009), a block-recursive structural VAR model to de-
compose the real price of oil in Japan into three components: supply shocks,
aggregate demand shocks and oil-specic demand shocks.3 Structural VAR
is widely used to capture the dynamic relationships among economic vari-
ables of interest. Each variable in the Structural VAR is a linear function of
2The data is available at Kilians homepage http://www.personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/reaupdate.txt.
3Recursive ordering implies that the rst variable in the system will not react contemporaneously to
any shocks from the remaining variables, but all other variables can react to shocks in the rst variable,
and so on. This restriction is concerned with the contemporaneous relations only.
80
its own lagged value and the lagged value of some other variables. The re-
cursive short-run restriction suggested by Kilian and Park (2009) is used as
identifying assumptions, where the variables are ordered from most exoge-
nous to most endogenous. Next, I estimate the dynamic e¤ects of these three
components of oil price shocks on the Japanese stock market variables using
both impulse response functions and variance decomposition. The impulse
responses trace the response of the real stock return or dividend growth rate
to a one-time shock from the three components while the variance decompo-
sition gives the contributions of each source of shock to the variance of the
h-period ahead forecast error for the real stock return or dividend growth
rate.
My structural VAR model comprises a global oil market block and a
Japanese stock market block. It is estimated using monthly data, for the
time series vector , that includes the percentage change in global crude oil
production (prodt), the Kilian index of global real economic activity index
(reat), the real price of JCC (rpot), and two Japanese stock market variables
i.e., the real stock return (rst) and dividend growth rate (rdt). I include
three variables in the global oil market block (i.e., prodt, reat and rpot). For
the Japanese stock market block, I estimate the response of the Japanese
stock market variables (i.e., rst and rdt ) to these supply and demand shocks





where A0 are the contemporaneous terms of zt,  is the intercept vector, Ai is
the i-th matrix of autoregressive coe¢ cients for i = 1 to lag 24, and "t denotes
the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations.4
In the global oil market block, three separate causes of oil price shocks
are modelled: the oil supply shock ("1t) caused by unexpected disruptions in
4 I also perform robustness checks for the results at di¤erent lags i.e., 6, 12 and 18 respectively  see
section 4.6 for details.
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global crude oil production; the aggregate demand shock ("2t) arising from
global real economic activity; oil-specic demand shock ("3t) caused by the
precautionary demand for crude oil. In the Japanese stock market block,
there is only one structural shock: other shocks to stock returns or dividend
growth rate ("4t) not driven by global crude oil demand and supply shocks.
Note that, Eq.1 contains contemporaneous terms on the left hand side
and this would yield inconsistent parameter estimations when using ordinary
least square estimation. In order to overcome this I rewrite the structural
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 = A 10 , Bi = A
 1
0 Ai and et =A
 1
0 "t. Here, the reduced form residuals
et are correlated between each equation and cannot be interpreted as struc-
tural shocks. In order to orthogonalize the shocks, I impose a block-recursive
structure on the contemporaneous terms (i.e., matrix A0 in Eq.1) between
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In the global oil market block, following Kilian (2009) again, I impose
three exclusion restrictions that are based on the following assumptions and
5For a nonsingular triangular matrix (both upper and lower), the inverse is still triangular.
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economic reasoning. First, I assume that global oil production will not
respond immediately to changes in demand driven by the world economy
or oil market specic demand because the costs of adjusting production are
expensive in the short run as well as due to uncertainty about future crude
oil prices. Second, I assume that real economic activity will be a¤ected by
oil supply shocks and aggregate demand shocks contemporaneously, but will
respond with a delay of at least a month to the real price of oil driven by
shocks that are specic to the oil market. Finally, I assume that the real
price of oil is a¤ected by oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil-
specic demand shocks contemporaneously. I note that the innovations to
the real price of oil that cannot be explained by supply shocks and aggregate
demand shocks must be demand shocks that are specic to the oil market.
In the Japanese stock market block, there is only one equation. Here
I follow Lee and Ni (2002) and assume that global crude oil production,
global real activity and the real price of oil are predetermined with respect
to Japanese stock returns. Specically, in common with the literature, I
assume that stock market shocks only a¤ect global crude oil production,
global real activity and the real price of oil with a delay of at least one
month.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Unit Root Tests
I begin the analysis with tests for unit roots in all variables i.e., prodt,
reat, rpot, rst and rdt used in the structural VAR model. I apply Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips- Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (KPSS) tests and report results both with and without a trend. Fur-
ther, I determine the optimal lag length using the Schwarz-Bayes Informa-
tion Criterion (SBIC). The null hypotheses for ADF and PP is the existence
of a unit root I(1), so if the series is stationary I(0), the ADF and PP tests
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should reject the null hypothesis. In contrast, the null hypothesis of the
KPSS statistic is that the series is stationary I(0).
Table 2 reports the results of these ADF, PP and KPSS tests for each
series. I nd that I can reject the null hypothesis that prodt, reat, rst and
rdt contain a unit root at the 1% signicant level, and rpot at 5% under the
ADF test without trend option. Although the PP and KPSS tests suggest
that the real price of JCC contains a unit root, this can be accepted because
economic theory suggests there is a link between the cyclical uctuation
of global real activity and the real price of oil (Kilian and Murphy, 2010).
Further, taking a rst di¤erence of the JCC will result in removal of the
slow-moving component and it will be di¢ cult to nd the persistent e¤ect
of aggregate demand shocks. Second, even if the JCC can be approximately
predicted by a random walk, it is not clear whether this is a unit root or
not. Third, the estimated impulse response is robust even if the stationary
assumption is violated (Pesavento and Rossi, 2007). The cost of not tak-
ing the rst di¤erence is a loss of asymptotic e¢ ciency, which leads to a
wider error band (see for example, Kilian, 2010a; Kilian and Murphy, 2010).
Hence, non-stationarity of the real price of oil is not a major concern if im-
pulse responses are reasonably estimated. This assumption is in common
with the previous literature cited earlier.
2.4.2 Factors A¤ecting the Real price of Oil in Japan
I next study the response of the real price of JCC to the three structural
shocks an oil supply shock, an aggregate demand shock and an oil-specic
demand shock. I note that in order to ensure all shocks have a positive
impact on the real price of oil (i.e., a higher price), the oil supply shocks are
normalized to represent a negative one percent shock, while the aggregate
demand shocks and oil-market specic demand shocks are normalized to
represent one percent positive shock. All statistical inference is based on
a recursive-design wild bootstrap method with 2,000 replications (see for
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example Goncalves and Kilian, 2004).
Figure 2 reports the impulse responses of the real price of JCC to the
three types of shocks that drive the global crude oil market. One-standard
error and two-standard error bands are indicated by dashed and dotted lines
in the Figures. The rst column of Figure 2 shows that oil supply shocks
caused by unexpected oil production disruption lead to a minor increase in
the real price of oil, but these e¤ects are statistically insignicant for my
sample period based on one-standard error bands. On the other hand, the
two demand shocks have larger and more persistent e¤ects. First, aggregate
demand shocks from unexpected increases in global demand for all industrial
commodities cause a persistent increase in the real price of oil. The response
reaches its peak at 8% after ve months, followed by a declining trend and
stabilizes after approximately ten months. This is highly statistically signif-
icant based on both one and two-standard error bands. Second, oil-specic
demand shocks arising from unexpected increases in the precautionary de-
mand for oil, increase oil prices immediately and this reaches its maximum
of 8.5% but the e¤ect declines sharply after two months. It is however, sta-
tistically signicant for the rst nine months based on one-standard error
bands as shown in the third column of Figure 2.
I next report the historical decomposition in the real price of the JCC
over time in Figure 3. I nd that the real price of oil for the period 1988 to
2009 is mainly driven by aggregate demand shocks and oil-market specic
demand shocks with relatively smaller contributions from oil supply shocks.
For example, the JCC decline during the 1997 Asian Crisis and recent -
nancial crisis in late 2008 is largely driven by decreases in global demand
and precautionary demand rather than the oil supply disruptions; the re-
cent surge in oil price from 2002 to 2008 further underlines the role and
importance of these demand shocks.
To summarize, the impulse response results indicate that the real price of
the JCC responds di¤erently to supply and demand shocks in both timing
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and magnitude. Supply shocks include production changes driven by politi-
cal events as well as other oil producersresponse to this shortfall. Demand
shocks capture both shock to the aggregate demand for industrial commodi-
ties in global commodity market which are driven by changes in global real
economic activity, and shock to changes in precautionary demand for crude
oil that reect concerns about the availability of future oil supplies. In
contrast to the conventional perception, I nd that supply shocks play a
relatively minor role while demand shocks explain most of the changes in
the real price of the JCC.
2.4.3 E¤ects on Japanese Real Stock Returns
I now turn to the response of real stock returns to oil price shocks. Fig-
ure 4 shows the cumulative impulse responses of real stock returns to each
of the three supply and demand shocks in the global crude oil market. I
nd that the response of real stock returns di¤ers greatly depending on the
underlying cause of the oil price increases. For example, oil supply shocks
from unanticipated disruptions of crude oil production do not a¤ect stock
returns in Japan greatly. In contrast, higher oil prices caused by aggregate
demand shocks from unexpected increases in global demand for all indus-
trial commodities cause a signicant positive impact on Japanese real stock
returns. The initial response is fairly small (i.e., less than 1%), but the re-
sponse builds for about six months to 2.5% and then followed by a slight
declining trend. This is mainly because positive innovations to the global
business cycle tend to initially stimulate Japans economy, but they also
drive up the oil price while adversely a¤ects the Japanese economy in the
long-run. In section 2.4.2, I nd out that the recent oil price surge has been
mainly driven by the aggregate demand shock, and this explains why the
Japanese stock market has not been adversely a¤ected in recent years. Fi-
nally, the conventional view that higher oil prices lead to lower stock returns
only applies when oil price shocks are driven by oil-specic demand factors,
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such as unexpected increases of precautionary demand for crude oil caused
by concerns about future oil supply shortfalls.
Next, I study the relative importance of each demand and supply shocks
on real stock returns using the variance decomposition. Table 3 reports the
contribution of each demand and supply shock to the total variation in real
stock returns in percentage terms. In the short-run, the e¤ects of these three
shocks on real stock returns are very low, and 99% of the uctuations are
explained by the other shocks. As the horizon increases, the explanatory
power of demand and supply shocks in the global crude oil market increases
signicantly. In the long-run, about 43% of the variations in real stock
returns are driven by the global crude oil market, where the aggregated
demand shocks alone account for 24% of the variability of returns, and oil
supply shocks account for 12% and 6% from the oil-specic demand shocks.6
Therefore, I conclude that shocks to the global crude oil market play an
important role a¤ecting the Japanese stock market.
My results di¤er from Apergis and Miller (2009) who nd marginal evi-
dence that oil price shocks contribute to the variation in Japanese real stock
returns, with only 3% of the changes in the Japanese real stock returns are
accounted for by oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks account for
2% and 3% from the oil-specic demand shocks. The rst reason for these
di¤erences is that they use a modied procedure of Kilian (2009). They rst
employ a vector error-correction or a vector autoregressive model to decom-
pose oil price changes into three parts. Then these shocks are recovered from
the rst step analysis, which are used to determine the e¤ects of oil price
shocks on the stock market using a vector autoregressive model. Second, it
is likely that the main reason for this di¤erence in results is due to their use
of rst-order di¤erenced real prices of oil to remove non-stationarity. This
di¤erencing, as I point out earlier, removes the slow-moving component and
reduces the chance of detecting persistent e¤ects of global shocks on the
6The rounded components do not add up to the sum due to rounding.
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demand for all industrial commodities (see for example by Kilian and Mur-
phy, 2010, for a similar argument). In addition, Apergis and Miller (2009)
include seven lags in their VAR model, while Hamilton and Herrera (2004)
and Kilian (2009) suggest that the dynamics e¤ects are more persistent with
a longer lag length (e.g., 12, 18 or 24).
2.4.4 E¤ects on Japanese Real Dividend Growth Rates
Next, I investigate the response of real dividend growth rates to demand
and supply shocks in the crude oil market. I do this by replacing real stock
returns in the last element of zt with real dividend growth rates, and then re-
estimating Eq.1. The cumulative impulse responses of real dividend growth
rates to each of the three demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market
are shown in Figure 5.
My ndings are similar to those reported in Kilian and Park (2009).
They also nd that expected dividend growth does not remain constant in
response to oil supply and demand shocks using U.S. stock market data. I
nd that unanticipated oil supply disruptions lead to a higher real dividend,
the response is signicantly positive for the rst three months. Next, I nd
that aggregate demand shocks lead to an immediate fall in dividend growth
followed by an increase after three months. Further I nd that oil-specic
demand shocks have only marginal e¤ects on the real dividend growth.
Table 4 reports the results for the variance decomposition for real divi-
dend growth rates. I nd, that in the short-run, the e¤ect of these shocks
is minor with only about 2% of the variations of real dividend growth rates
are associated with shocks from the global crude oil market. In the long
run, 42% of the variability of real dividend growth rates is driven by these
three shocks from the global crude oil market, where the aggregate demand
shocks alone account for 24% of the total variability.
88
2.4.5 Transmission Channels of Oil Price Shocks on Japan Stock
Market
The contemporaneous approach to explain the movement of stock returns
tends to ignore the channels through which demand and supply shocks a¤ect
asset prices. In this study, I aim to ll this gap by testing whether the
variations in Japan real stock returns to specic supply and demand shocks
in the crude oil market are driven by uctuations in cash ows or by discount
rates variations.
I do this using Campbells (1991) stock return decomposition and write
the unexpected changes in asset returns from the previous period (t  1) to



























where rst is the real stock returns, rdt is the real dividend growth rates, Et
is the expectation at time t,  is the discount coe¢ cient that is slightly less
than one, and it is computed as follows:   1=(1 + exp(d  p), where d  p is
the average log dividend-price ratio.
























. Eq.4 states that stock
returns vary through time due to revised expectations about future cash
ows and variations in future discount rates. I can write Eq.4 more com-
pactly as:
rst Et 1(rst) = NCF;t+1 NDR;t+1 (5)
where NCF;t+1 and NDR;t+1 denote the news about future cash ows, and news
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about discount rates respectively.
In order to incorporate the changes in real stock returns arising from
a given supply or demand shock in the crude oil market, I follow Kilian and
Park (2009), and reconstruct Eq.5 in terms of the responses to unanticipated
disturbances in the crude oil market. First, I normalize all expectations of
period t   1 in Eq.5 to zero. Then, I write the changes in real cash ows
and changes in expected returns relative to the baseline in response to an
unexpected disturbance in the crude oil market as follows:



































where 	0;j is measured by the rst element of the impulse response coe¢ -
cients of real stock returns to a shock j in the crude oil market in month t;
ij ('ij, respectively) is the impulse response of real dividend growth (real
stock returns, respectively) in period i to a given structural shock j in the
crude oil market; j = oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock, and oil-
specic demand shock. I note that all these coe¢ cients are estimated by
running the two structural VAR models in sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4.
Finally, I can test whether the impact on real stock returns arising from
di¤erent supply and demand shocks in the global crude oil market can be
fully accounted for by revisions of real cash ows or revisions of expected
























Following the practice in the literature I truncate the innite sum in the
above expressions for the purposes of estimation at 36 lags.
I report, in Panels A and B of Table 5, the Wald-test statistics and
p-values for null hypotheses in Eq.9 and Eq.10. I cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that the change in real stock returns arising from a given shock in
the crude oil market can be attributed in its entirety to revisions of expected
real dividend growth rate based on results in Panel A. On the other hand,
Panel B shows that I can reject the null hypothesis on that expected real
dividend growth do not a¤ect the variation of Japanese real stock returns
caused by three oil price shocks (at 10% signicance level). Taking together
my empirical results imply that Japanese real stock returns are a¤ected by
supply and demand shocks in the global crude oil market from changes of
expected real cash ows rather than changes of expected returns. One possi-
ble explanation as to why expected returns do not seem to matter is Japans
zero-rate monetary policy (Bernanke, 2000). Economic theory suggests that
oil price shocks hurt the stock returns indirectly through the future discount
rate channel. To be more specic, monetary policy makers tend to increase
interest rates in response to the actual or potential inationary pressures
triggered by the oil price shocks. A higher interest rate therefore implies a
higher required rate of return and lowers rmsfuture cash ows and leads
to a lower stock price. However, the interest rates in Japan have been less
than 1% from 1996, and the Bank of Japan imposed a zero-rate policy to
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further stimulate the economy and ght for deation since 2001. Therefore,
my failure to nd changes in discount rates to have any e¤ect on Japanese
stock returns may be due to the persistent low interest rates seen in Japan
since the early 1990s.
2.4.6 Robustness Checks
I test the robustness of the estimation results using di¤erent specications
of the model. First, I study whether my main results are a¤ected by using
di¤erent lag lengths in estimating the structural VAR model. The optimal
lag number based on Akaike information criterion is 4. However, 4 months
are not enough to capture the dynamic e¤ect of oil price shocks on the
stock market. Firms need time to adjust production and strategy when
facing oil price uctuations. Hamilton and Herrera (2004) o¤er evidence in
favour of a longer lag length and conclude that for monthly data 12 lags
is preferred for studies about the relationship between oil price shocks and
economy. Kilian and Park (2009) use 24 lags in their study for the U.S.
market and nd that impulse responses are still signicant after 15 months.
Thus in this paper I use 24 lags for my main model. However, I nd that
impulse responses of real stock returns to the three oil price shocks are not
a¤ected by using alternative lag length (i.e., 6, 12 and 18). With respect
to the variance decomposition, my ndings are consistent with Hamilton
and Herrera (2004) and Kilian (2009) who nd that including more lags in
the VAR model increases the importance of the global crude oil market in
explaining the uctuations of real stock returns. Second, I replace the real
economic index proposed by Kilian (2009) with the BDI. The directions of
the responses to the three structural shocks do not change much, but the
negative e¤ects of the oil-specic demand shocks on stock returns are weaker
when using the BDI. Third, I replace JCC with the West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) and my empirical results remain unchanged. Finally, I use the FTSE
Japan Stock index instead of the DataStream Japan stock market index
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and re-estimate my structural VAR model. Again, this replacement does
not qualitatively change my main results.7
2.4.7 Relating Results for the U.S. and Japan
In the previous section, I estimate the relationship between oil price shocks
and Japanese stock returns and nd that the response of real stock returns
di¤ers greatly depending on whether the oil price shocks are driven by the
supply or demand side in the crude oil market. I now compare my ndings
with the U.S. market in order to relate my results with those obtained in a
large number of studies using U.S. stock market data.8
First, the real price of oil imported by U.S. and Japan reacts similarly to
the supply and demand shocks, but the magnitude and persistence on the
two markets are slight di¤erent (Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Park, 2009; Fuku-
naga, Irakata and Sudo, 2010). For example, an aggregate demand shock
from an unexpected increase in global demand for all industrial commodities
leads to a maximum of an 8% increase in the real price of oil in Japan in
contrast to only a 3% increase using U.S. data. In contrast, an unexpected
increase in precautionary demand for oil leads to more persistent increases
in real oil prices in the U.S. (for 15 months) than in Japan (i.e., sharply de-
creases after two months). This might be because Japan is the third-largest
oil consumer in the world with almost no domestic sources of oil and relies
on imports to meet its consumption needs; therefore, energy security and
e¢ cient supply have always been a priority in Japan. Japanese energy poli-
cies are designed to mitigate the impact of oil price increases and reduce its
foreign oil dependence. It does this by maintaining a large strategic oil re-
serve that represents more than 150 days consumption; further development
7FTSE Japan stock index captures 90% of the Japanese listed companies, which provides a good proxy
for the Japan aggregate stock market.
8 I re-estimate Kilian and Parks (2009) study for the period of January 1988 to December 2009,
and include the same dataset i.e., annualized percentage change in global crude oil production, real
price of crude oil imported by the U.S., Kilians real economics index, and CRSP value-weighted market
portfolio. I obtain similar results to Kilian and Park (2009). For details on the empirical results, the
reader is referred to Kilian and Park (2009).
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of nuclear energy to diversify the energy sources; encouraging energy con-
sumption e¢ ciency (International Energy Agency, Japan Energy policies,
2008).
On the other hand, the response of the aggregate Japanese real stock
returns to the three di¤erent shocks in the global crude oil market that I
obtain are similar to Kilian and Parks (2009) ndings for the U.S. market.
However, the Japanese stock market response to aggregate demand shocks is
much stronger (i.e., 2.5%) than that of for the U.S. stock market (a maximum
of 0.5% increase) over the initial six months. A potential cause of this
di¤erence is that while the aggregate demand shocks stimulate the economy,
it also drives the oil price up and a¤ects the economy via di¤erent channels
(e.g., input-costs channel, income channel, uncertainty and operating costs).
Recent studies nd that oil price increases have less impact on Japans real
economic activity compared to other oil-importing countries such as the U.S.
(e.g., Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005; Blanchard and Gali 2007). As
a consequence, Japanese real stock returns tend to act more positively to
the aggregate demand shocks than the U.S.
Third, my variance decomposition shows that aggregate demand shocks
play a more important role in explaining the variation (i.e., 24%) for the
Japanese real stock returns, compared to 5% in the U.S. market (Kilian
and Park, 2009). One possible explanation for this is the composition of the
Japanese aggregate stock market. For example, Fukunaga, Irakata and Sudo
(2010) who classify the industries into oil-intensive and export-dependent
industries, nd that the latter have a larger increase in the stock prices
with respect to the global demand shocks. The Japanese aggregate stock
market indeed contains more export-dependent industries compared to the
U.S. market. Therefore, at the aggregate market level, the global demand
shocks should also cause a bigger impact on the Japanese aggregate real
stock returns than it does for the U.S. stock market.
Finally, Kilian and Park (2009) nd that changes in both expected real
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cash ows and expected real discount rates are responsible for the impact
response of U.S. real stock returns to disturbances in the crude oil market.
Nevertheless, I nd that the response of aggregate Japanese real stock re-
turns to oil supply and demand shocks in the crude oil market is driven by the
uctuations in real cash ows only. This di¤erence may be because Japanese
rms have di¤erent corporate governance and payout policies compared to
U.S. rms. First, the ownership structure of Japanese rms is typically
highly concentrated among few corporate stockholders, while the ownership
in large U.S. rms is relatively dispersed. Therefore, in contrast to U.S.
rms, there is a smaller scope for information asymmetry and agency prob-
lems in Japan, and Japanese rms are able to adjust their dividends more
often and cut their dividends quicker in respond to poor performance (see
for example, Dewenter and Warther, 1998; Chay and Suh, 2009). Second,
again in contrast to U.S. rms, cash dividends remain a major form of pay-
out across the rms in Japan. Denis and Osobov (2008) report that the
proportion of U.S. rms paying dividends has declined from 61% to 19%,
while at Japanese rms changed from 89% to 83% over the period 1989-2002.
Finally, since the early 1990s, Japan has had persistent low interest rates
and deation and this may weaken the role of expected real discount rates.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I use a structural VAR approach to study the link between
oil price shocks and the Japanese stock market. I nd that the response of
Japanese real stock returns to oil price shocks di¤ers extensively depending
on the specic underlying causes of a higher oil price. For example, oil supply
shocks from unanticipated disruptions of crude oil production do not have
any signicant e¤ect on Japanese real stock returns. Oil-specic demand
shocks from unexpected increases of precautionary demand for crude oil
caused by concerns about future oil supply shortfalls lower the stock returns
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in Japan. In contrast, I nd a positive relationship between the oil price
shocks and the Japanese stock market, when an oil price increase is driven
by aggregate demand shocks.
Furthermore, I test whether the reaction of Japanese real stock returns
to di¤erent shocks in the crude oil market is related to changes in expected
cash ows or changes in expected discount rates. I nd the responses of the
Japanese stock market to all shocks in the crude oil market can be attributed
almost entirely to changes in real cash ows.
Finally, I compare and discuss the oil price shocks transmission mecha-
nisms in the U.S. and Japanese stock markets. I nd that the Japanese stock
market reacts stronger to the unexpected increases in global demand and to
the unexpected increases of precautionary demand for oil than the U.S. stock
market. In addition, aggregate demand shocks play a more important role in
explaining the variation in Japan than U.S. real stock returns. The impact
on Japanese stock returns arising from supply and demand shocks in the
global crude oil market mainly comes from variations in expected cash ows
rather than changes in discount rates, while both changes in cash ows and
discount rates are signicant factors in the U.S. market. However, further
work using Japanese data at the rm level is required to study and explore
the channels through which oil price shocks a¤ect Japanese rms. I leave

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Statistical summary
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
prodt 264 1.760 12.314 -52.664 67.195
reat 264 -0.759 22.862 -50.457 55.153
rpot 264 -0.301 44.035 -87.001 132.109
rst 264 -0.349 6.398 -19.887 23.314
rdt 264 0.076 3.621 -15.743 12.195
Notes: This table reports the statistical summary of the 4 variables used in the structural
VAR. prodt is the annualized percentage change of global crude oil production, reat is
the real economic activity index proposed by Kilian (2009); rpot is the real price of oil
imported by Japan and expressed based on January 1981 dollar, rst is the real Japan
stock returns and rdt is the real Japanese dividend growth rates.
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Table 2. Unit root tests
Variables ADF Test PP Test KPSS Test
Without With Without With Without With
Trend Trend Trend Trend Trend Trend
prodt -17.54*** -17.94*** -17.56*** -18.85*** 0.11 0.04
reat -2.63*** -3.21 -2.60*** -3.11 0.78*** 0.28***
rpot -2.12** -3.41* -1.438 -2.62 1.24*** 0.41***
rst -14.94*** -14.93*** -14.93*** -14.93*** 0.04 0.04
rdt -14.49*** -14.50*** -14.41*** -14.41*** 0.23 0.10
Notes: This table reports the results of unit roots tests for all ve variables that are
proposed to use in my VAR model. prodt is the rst-order di¤erence on global crude oil
production, reat is the real economic activity index proposed by Kilian (2009); rpot is the
real price of oil imported by Japan; rst is the real Japan stock returns and rdt is the real
Japanese dividend growth rates. I use Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron
(PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests, and report results with and
without a trend. The null hypotheses for ADF and PP are the series has a unit root I(1),
while the null hypothesis of the KPSS test is the series is stationary I(0). *Signicant
at 10% level; **Signicant at 5% level; ***Signicant at 1% level.
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Table 3. Percentage contribution of demand and supply shocks
in the crude oil market to the variability of Japanese real stock
returns
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
Months Shock Demand Shock Demand Shock
1 0.01 1.00 0.06 98.93
2 2.68 0.94 0.68 95.70
3 3.32 1.52 0.91 94.24
12 8.38 5.64 3.38 82.61
1 12.15 24.08 6.45 57.31
Notes: This table reports the results of the variance decomposition for each supply and
demand shock on Japanese real stock returns. It presents the percentage contribution of
each shock, namely oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock, oil-specic demand shock,
and other shocks, to the overall variability of real stock returns for 1-month, 2-month,
3-months, 12-month and innity ahead.
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Table 4. Percentage contribution of demand and supply shocks
in the crude oil market to the variability of Japanese real divi-
dend growth
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
Months Shock Demand Shock Demand Shock
1 0.42 1.16 0.51 97.91
2 0.44 1.27 0.70 97.59
3 1.75 1.95 0.76 95.54
12 5.39 11.76 3.21 79.64
1 8.86 24.37 8.78 57.99
Notes: This table reports the results of the variance decomposition for each supply and
demand shock on Japanese real dividend growth. It presents the percentage contribution
of each shock, namely oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock, oil-specic demand
shock, and other shocks, to the overall variability of real stock returns for 1-month, 2-
month, 3-months, 12-month and innity ahead.
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Table 5. Tests of the impact response of Japan real stock returns
and dividend growth
Panel A: The Impact Responses of Real Dividend Growth




piij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.1112 0.7387
Aggregate demand shocks 0.0401 0.8413
Oil-market specic demand shocks 0.8385 0.3598
Panel B: The Impact Responses of Real Stock Returns




pi ij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 7.8261 0.0051
Aggregate demand shocks 11.0202 0.0009
Oil-market specic demand shocks 2.8523 0.0912
Notes: The Panel A presents the Wald-test statistics and p-values for null hypothesis
the impact change in real stock returns arising from a given shock of the global crude oil
market can be fully attribute to changes in expected real dividend growth. The Panel B
presents the Wald-test results for null hypothesis the impact change in real stock returns
arising from a given shock from the global crude oil market can be fully attributed to
changes in expected returns.  ij denotes the response of real stock returns periods after
each oil supply, aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock, while





































































































































Figure 2. Cumulative responses of real price of Japan Crude
Cocktail (JCC) to three structural shocks with one - and two -
standard error bands
Notes: The three panels in Figure 2 plot the impulse responses of the real price of JCC
to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market. The
estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures how a
unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impact the level of oil price at time t + s for
di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to 15 month ahead. All shocks have been normalized
to represent an increase in the real price of oil. The condence intervals are constructed
using a recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 3. Historical decomposition of real price of Japan Crude
Cocktail (JCC) from January 1988 to December 2009
Notes: This gure plots the historical decomposition of uctuations in the real price of
JCC. It shows the cumulative e¤ect of a sequence of structure shocks that a¤ect the real
JCC prices spanning the period from January 1988 to December 2009. The estimates are
based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1.
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Figure 4. Cumulative responses of Japanese real stock returns
to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard error bands
Notes: The three panels in Figure 4 plot the cumulative impulse responses of Japanese
real stock returns to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude
oil market. The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel
measures how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impact the Japanese real
stock returns at time t + s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to 15 month ahead.
The oil supply shock has been normalized to represent a negative one standard deviation
shock, while the aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been
normalized to represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a
recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 5. Cumulative responses of Japanese real dividend growth
to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard error bands
Notes: The three panels in Figure 4 plot the cumulative impulse responses of Japanese
real dividend growth to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude
oil market. The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel
measures how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impact the Japanese real
dividend growth at time t+ s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to 15 month ahead.
The oil supply shock has been normalized to represent a negative one standard deviation
shock, while the aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been
normalized to represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a
recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Chapter 3
Oil Price Shocks and Stock
Markets: How Robust Are
Results Based on Structural
VARs?
3.1 Introduction
The crude oil market is the largest commodity market in the world and total
world consumption was 87 million barrels per day in 2010.1 Crude oil is an
important source of energy and any changes in its price are of major concern
to governments and private business, as large uctuations in the price of oil
adversely a¤ect the oil importing economies. Specically, following oil price
shocks in the 1970s, oil price movements are considered to be a main source
of uctuation in macroeconomic aggregates. For example, Hamilton (2009b)
nds that 10 out of the 11 post-war U.S. recessions were preceded by a sharp
increase in the price of crude oil. Oil price increases alone are not a su¢ cient
condition to cause a recession but they a¤ect many aspects of the economy
through various transmission channels, such as supply side, demand side and
monetary policy (Hamilton, 2003; Kilian, 2009).
There is considerable literature studying the relationship between oil price
shocks and the stock market (Jones and Kaul, 1996; Sadorsky, 1999; Park
1BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011, bp.com/statisticalreview
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and Ratti, 2008;). However, pervious literature su¤ers from two limitations.
First, the oil price is often treated as exogenous with respect to the economy.
Second, these studies assess the impact of higher oil prices without consid-
ering the underlying causes of the oil price increase. Kilian and Park (2009)
propose a structural vector autoregression (VAR) model for the global crude
oil market and its interaction with the U.S. stock market. Using a structural
VAR can control the reverse causality between oil price and stock returns.
Further, it can also identify three di¤erent shocks to the crude oil market:
shock to the global supply of crude oil, shock to the global demand for all
industry commodities, and oil-market specic demand shock. Their results
suggest that the real price of oil as well as the stock market respond di¤er-
ently to the di¤erent causes of the oil price increase.
The purpose of this paper is to test the robustness of structural VAR and
to investigate the impact of oil price shocks on the di¤erent U.S. stock in-
dices using alternate data. The same methodology is applied in this chapter
as in Chapter 2. The di¤erence is that chapter 2 specically tests the e¤ect
of oil price shocks on the Japanese stock market using structural VAR to
capture the dynamic relationship, which has not been done before. In this
paper, the purpose is to test how robustness the relationship between oil
price shocks and U.S. stock markets. Kilian and Park (2009) show that the
response of U.S. value-weighted stock indices to oil shocks depends greatly
on the di¤erent underlying causes of increased prices. I use ve di¤erent
stock indices and two economic indices to conduct a robustness check of
these results. More importantly, how rm size a¤ects this relationship are
examined and is the main contribution of this paper. The indices are clas-
sied as either large rms or small rms. The same model is applied to
large-sized and small-sized rms and see if the relationship between oil price
shocks and stock market is a¤ected.
I nd, in line with Kilian and Park (2009), that the responses of real
stock returns of alternate stock indices di¤er substantially depending on the
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underlying cause of the oil price increase. For instance, the e¤ect of oil supply
shock on U.S. stock returns is statistically insignicant, but an unexpected
increase in the global demand for industrial commodities driven by increased
global real economic activity will cause a sustained increase in U.S. stock
returns. However the magnitude and length of the e¤ect depends on the rm
size. The results for an increase in the precautionary demand for oil are a
bit mixed. For large rms, it causes persistently negative stock returns. For
small rms, it does not have any signicant e¤ect. Overall, oil supply and
demand shocks combined account for 42% of the long-run variation in U.S.
real stock returns, compared with 22% for value-weighted stock returns in
Kilian and Park (2009). The response of U.S. stock returns to shocks in
oil markets can be attributed to the changes in expected discount rates and
changes in expected cash ows, which is in line with Kilian and Park (2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the liter-
ature studying the relationship on the oil price and stock market, providing
the background for my study. Section 3 introduces the structural vector au-
toregressive methodology and discusses the identication assumptions and
other tests available for structural VAR (SVAR). I also describe the data
in this section. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses the
implication of these results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Appendix 3A provides a summary of the literature studying the relationships
of oil price shocks and stock markets.
3.2 Background and Prior Research
3.2.1 Oil Shocks and Stock Returns
Given the importance of crude oil to the world economy, oil price shocks
are often considered to have an important e¤ect on the nancial markets.
For example, Jinjarak (2008) points out that studying the reaction of asset
prices to oil price shocks helps to understand whether such price shocks are
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a major source of uctuations in the economy. Beaudry and Portier (2004)
support this view and provide evidence that stock prices could capture future
technological opportunities that a¤ect productivity with substantial delay.
Huang, Masulis and Stoll (1996) show the theoretical linkage between oil
and stock price.
From the theory of the discounted cash ow method, stock prices are




where P is the stock price, CF is the future ow, Rt is the discount rate, and
E() is the expectation operator. Thus, stock returns are determined both
by the expected cash ows and discount rates. We can use this model to
understand how oil price changes a¤ect stock prices. For example, oil price
shocks have an impact on both expected cash ow and future discount rate.
Rising oil prices a¤ect the production cost, which in turn a¤ects the rms
cash ow. But whether this is a positive or negative e¤ect depends on the
individual industry, i.e., whether it is an oil-producing industry or an oil-
consuming industry. Further, oil price changes a¤ect the discount rate via
changes in both expected ination and the expected real interest rate. For
oil-importing countries like the U.S., rising oil price negatively a¤ects the
balance of payment, puts downward pressure on the U.S. dollar exchange
rate, and then eventually induces inationary pressures, which may trigger
interest rate increases by the central bank. Thus the expected return of the
stock increases, which leads to a negative e¤ect on stock returns. Overall,
the e¤ect of oil shocks on stock markets are determined by the net e¤ect of
oil shocks on changes in expected cash ows and the expected discount rate.
3.2.2 Previous Studies on Oil Price Shocks and Stock Markets
Although considerable research has been carried out to study the relation-
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ship between oil price shocks and nancial markets, the results are mixed.
In the early studies, Kling (1985) reports declining stock prices after shocks
in the crude oil prices. However, in some industries oil price shocks have
a signicant lagged e¤ect on the stock price, which is not consistent with
an informationally e¢ cient market. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) include oil
price changes as an economic state variable and systematic factors that in-
uence stock market returns and pricing to address the e¤ect of oil prices
on asset pricing. They conclude that, although inclusion of oil price changes
reduces the signicance of industrial production and increases that of risk
premium and term structure, there is no clear relationship between oil price
changes and asset pricing. Jones and Kaul (1996) test the reaction of inter-
national stock markets to oil price shocks from the perspective of current
and future changes in real cash ows and/or changes in expected returns
with the postwar quarterly data. Their results suggest that the e¤ect on the
U.S. and Canadian stock market of the crude oil price shocks can be com-
pletely accounted for by the current and expected future cash ow alone,
which indicates that these two stock markets are rationally pricing these
shocks. In contrast, U.K. and Japanese stock markets are more volatile
than can be explained by a rational model. Jones and Kaul (1996) suggest
that oil shocks appear to induce volatility in these two markets. Huang,
Masulis and Stoll (1996) examine both the contemporaneous and leadlag
correlation between NYMEX daily returns of oil futures contracts and U.S.
stock returns for the period 19791983. They nd no relationship between
stock market returns and oil futures returns, even contemporaneously. The
only exceptions are the petroleum stock index and three individual oil stocks
where oil futures returns lead by one day. Sadorsky (1999) uses monthly oil
price data and applies a VAR model to study the dynamic e¤ect of oil price
shocks. He shows that oil price shocks have asymmetric e¤ects on the stock
market and this dynamics has been changing over time by comparing the
forecast errors of stock returns for two sub-periods. He concludes that oil
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price movements are important in explaining U.S. stock return movements
for the period 19471996.
Several studies focus on the e¤ect of oil price shocks on multi-national
stock markets. For example, Fa¤ and Brailsford (1999) investigate the sen-
sitivity of Australian industry equity returns to oil price changes and nd
oil price changes have an important impact on the costs of many rms. Pa-
papetrou (2001) shows that oil prices changes are important in explaining
Greek stock price movements and oil price increases reduce the real stock re-
turns. Basher and Sadorsky (2006) contribute to the literature by studying
the impact of oil price shocks on 21 emerging stock markets and the Mor-
gan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) world index using daily, weekly
and monthly data. They nd strong evidence that oil price shocks play a
signicant role in emerging market stock returns under both unconditional
and conditional risk analysis. Park and Ratti (2008) examine the e¤ect
of oil price shocks and oil price volatility on the real stock returns of the
U.S. and 13 European countries for the period 19862005. They nd that
oil price shocks have a signicant impact on the stock returns, especially
for the U.S. Driesprong, Jacobsen and Maat (2008) nd that changes in oil
price predict stock market returns for 12 out of 18 countries and the world
market index. This predictability is stronger for developed markets than for
emerging markets. They nd that a rise in oil prices leads to lower returns,
due to underreaction of investors to information in the price of oil. Mohanty
et al. (2011) study the link between oil price shocks and stock prices in
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and analyze the impact on
both the country and industry level. They nd that, on the country level,
except for Kuwait, there is a positive relationship between oil price shocks
and the stock market, while on the industry level, 12 out of 20 industries
react positively to the oil price shocks.
All of these studies apply regression based methodology that fails to con-
trol the reverse causality between oil price and stock returns and ignores the
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di¤erent underlying causes of oil price increase.2
3.2.3 Structural VARs
SVARs are widely used to capture the dynamic relationships among eco-
nomic variables of interest. Each variable in the SVAR is a linear function
of its own lagged value and the lagged value of some other variables. The
main advantage of SVARs is the convenience of incorporating the economic
theory into the system through the identifying assumptions.
In an important study Kilian and Park (2009) analyze the relationship
between oil price shocks and the stock market and address two limitations in
existing work. The rst is that the price of oil is often treated as exogenous
with respect to the economy. In fact, it is widely accepted that the oil
price and stock markets respond to the same economic forces. The cause
and e¤ect are not well dened in the previous literature when testing the
relationship between oil price shocks and the macroeconomy This is because
when evaluating the response of the macroeconomy to oil price shocks, the
implication is that all other variables are held equal. In fact, in the real
world, other factors, such as economic expansion, existing ination, and
changes in the exchange rates and interest rates, could increase or decrease
the e¤ect of oil price shocks on stock markets.
The second limitation in existing studies is that they ignore the underly-
ing causes of the oil price changes. Without knowing what drives oil price
shocks, it is not possible to predict the e¤ect of higher oil prices. Kilian and
Park address this question in detail by separating three underlying causes of
the oil price increase; an oil supply shock, a shock to the global demand for
all industrial commodities (an aggregate demand shock) and an oil-market
specic shock (a precautionary demand shock). The identication helps
not only to explain the uctuation in the oil price but also benets macro-
2Park and Ratti (2008) use an unrestricted VAR model, which treats all the variables including oil
price as exogenous. However, the unrestricted VAR model fails to incorporate any economic theory and
treats each variable equally and mechanically.
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economic policy making. They nd that the U.S. stock market responds
di¤erently to three di¤erent kinds of shock. They nd a negative relation-
ship between stock price and oil price only when the price increase is caused
by oil-market specic demand shocks. In contrast, positive shocks to the
global demand for industrial commodities cause both higher real oil prices
and higher stock price. Oil supply side shocks have no signicant e¤ect on
stock returns.
3.2.4 Oil shocks and the Macroeconomy
The crude oil market is the largest commodity market in the world. The
2011 Statistical Review of World Energy from British Petroleum reports
that the total world consumption is around 87.4 million barrels a day, of
which United States consumes approximately 22%.3 Moreover, petroleum
is the major source of U.S. primary energy, and it accounted for about 37%
of the countrys overall energy consumption in 2009.4 Thus, oil price shocks
have received considerable attention from both the nancial press and the
academic literature.
Oil prices could a¤ect the economy from both supply and demand sides.
A higher oil price a¤ects the supply side because oil is a part of inputs,
and make the production of goods more costly for rms. This can be in
the form of transportation costs, heating bills or even raw input. Oil price
shocks also introduce greater uncertainty faced by rms, which may cause
them to postpone their investments. Since the energy demand is inelastic,
higher oil price means greater spending on energy-related products and less
on the other goods, which eventually drives down the discretionary income.
Households, like rms, are also a¤ected by the uncertainty caused by oil
price shocks, which leads to delayed purchases of certain goods and increases
in precautionary saving. In addition, oil price increase may also cause the
3BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011, bp.com/statisticalreview
4U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pecss_diagram.cfm
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reallocation of labor and capital between oil-intensive industries and less oil-
intensive ones. Take the transportation equipment industry as an example,
when oil price increases, the capital and labor will ow out of this industry
and into others in the economy. This could cause a negative output shock
in the short run because of the unemployment.
Putting all these channels together, even though the energy expenditure
as a proportion of GDP in U.S. is decreasing, it is plausible that an oil
price increase could lead to an economic recession. Hamilton (2008 and
2009b) points out that, after World War II, 10 of 11 recessions in U.S.
were preceded by a signicant oil price increase. In addition, oil prices are
also proven to have an e¤ect on many aspects of the economy. Barsky
and Kilian (2004) provide evidence of the link between oil price increases
and productivity slowdown. Moreover, they show that inations have also
been a¤ected by oil price shocks historically. Gisser and Goodwin (1986)
nd that crude oil prices have a signicant impact on the employment rate.
Blanchard and Gali (2007) nd that the e¤ect of price of oil on the economy
has changed substantially over time. They argue that, in the last decade,
although the global economy experienced two oil shocks as great as those
in the 1970s, regardless of the sign and magnitude, the GDP growth and
ination remains relatively stable in most industrialized economies. They
attribute these changes to several hypotheses, such as decreasing real wage
rigidities, more responsible monetary policy, and declining share of oil in
the economy. They conclude that the price of oil and other adverse shocks
worked together for the stagation episodes of the 1970s.
3.2.5 Changing relationship between Oil Shocks and Economy
Recent work focuses on the possible changes in the e¤ects of oil price over
time. Blanchard and Gali (2007) argue that the relationship between oil
price shock and economic consequence is changing over time and conclude
that oil shocks that made a relatively modest contribution to the downturns
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of the 1970s are even less important today. Hamilton (2009a) argues that the
dynamic e¤ect of oil prices has decreased considerably over time although
the oil shocks have stay the same. Hooker (2002) nds that, before 1980, oil
price shocks contribute substantial pass-through to core ination while after
1980 oil price shocks only a¤ect the ination through their direct share in
a price index. The change in the reaction of monetary policy to oil shocks
could be part of the explanation. Driesprong, Jacobsen and Maat (2008)
nd declining pass-through from the price of oil to the price level in 34
countries and indicate that the possible explanations are a reduction in the
oil intensity economies, a reduction in the exchange rate pass-through, a
more favorable ination environment and demand-pushed oil price.
Hamilton (2009b) argues that the doubled price of oil between June 2007
and June 2008, which is a greater price increase than any previous events
in history, is an important factor in the economic recession that happened
in the U.S. in the last quarter of 2007. He mentions that, unlike previous
episodes, the increased oil price in 20072008 results from di¤erent factors.
First, world oil production declined slightly between 2005 and 2007, due to
the production decline from mature oil elds and political instability. Sec-
ond, because of the economy boom in developing countries, such as China,
the demand for oil consistently increases. The economy responses to oil
price shocks in 2007 and 2008 were quite similar to previous episodes, with
decreases in auto sales and the production of motor vehicles and parts. How-
ever, Hamilton indicates that, although the gasoline price could be a possible
explanation for the decreased sales of U.S. automobiles in the rst half of
2009, falling income is the biggest factor driving sales back down in the
fourth quarter of 2008. Moreover, the 20072008 shock is similar to 1990
1991, from the aspect of negatively a¤ecting employment in the automobile
industry. At the same time, consumer sentiment was deteriorating and con-
sumer spending was slowing down. Moreover, there is also a relationship
between oil price shocks and problems in housing. Since oil price shocks
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make a direct contribution to lower income and higher unemployment, this
would depress housing demand.
3.2.6 Hypothesis
This paper uses a structural VAR model introduced by Kilian and Park
(2009) and measures the response of di¤erent U.S. stock indices to demand
and supply shocks in the global oil market. The purpose of this paper
is to test the robustness of Kilian and Parks results with alternate stock
market variables and di¤erent indices of real economic activities. However,
the e¤ect of rm size in this study has not been examined before. I classify
the 6 stock market indices used in this paper into two groups: large rms
and small rms, to test if the responses of small rms to the oil prices shocks
are di¤erent from that of large rms.
Since all the stock market indices are still from U.S. and the stock returns
exhibit very strong correlation in Table 1.1, I would expect the results for
di¤erent stock indices are similar. However, the individual supply or demand
shock may have di¤erent e¤ect on large and small rms. That is because
large rms are usually distributed in oil-intensive industry, which su¤er more
when facing oil price shocks. Small rms are experiencing greater volatility
to economy expansion in the short run. Similarly, the di¤erent indices for
real economic activities would have similar results as Kilian and Park (2009)




Jones and Kaul (1992) provide a basic foundation for using regression-based
methodology to study the e¤ects of oil shocks on the stock market. Their
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model is motivated by Campbell (1991), which states that stock returns
change over time due to changes in expected returns and current and future
expected cash ows. In order to test whether the stock prices overreact to











Where Rt is the stock returns, Xit is a proxy for expected returns and cash
ows, OILt is the percentage change of oil price in period t, IPt is the growth
rate of industrial production.
3.3.2 Structural VAR
In this paper, I follow Kilian and Park (2009) and use an SVAR model that
relates U.S. stock market variables to measures of demand and supply shocks
in the global oil market. The methodology used here is similar to chapter 2.
When we are not condent whether a variable is actually exogenous, an






where zt = [global crude oil producion; global economy activity; oil price; stock returns]
0
.
The model allows for up to two years worth of lags. The optimal lag num-
ber based on Akaike information criterion is 4. However, 4 months are not
enough to capture the dynamic e¤ect of oil price shocks on the stock mar-
ket. Firms need time to adjust production and strategy when facing oil
price uctuations. Hamilton and Herrera (2004) o¤er evidence in favour of
a longer lag length and conclude that for monthly data 12 lags is preferred
for studies about the relationship between oil price shocks and economy.
Kilian and Park (2009) use 24 lags in their study for the U.S. market and
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nd that impulse responses are still signicant after 15 months. Thus in this
paper I use 24 lags for my main model.
Take the rst line of VAR as example, Eq.1 means we let the time path
of changes in global crude oil production be a¤ected by current and past
realization of global economy activity, oil price, and stock returns. The con-
temporaneous terms in the LHS incorporates feedback because the elements
of zt are allowed to a¤ect each other.





where  = A 10 ;Bi = A
 1
0 Ai; et = A
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0 "t:
The error terms et are correlated with each other while the structure
shocks "t are white noise with zero covariance terms, which means that
any of the structure shocks are from an independent source. There is no
contemporaneous term on LHS in Eq.2. However, what we are interested in
are the coe¢ cients in Eq.1, which need to be calculated from Eq.2. It is not a
easy job to do so because the VAR is usually not fully-identied. The number
of unknown coe¢ cients in Eq.1 is higher than that of the equations built on
the relationship between Eq.1 and Eq.2, so we need to impose restriction
on the coe¢ cients of the contemporaneous terms, which form matrix A0 in
Eq.1.
3.3.3 Identifying Assumptions
Traditional VAR and Cholesky Decomposition
The traditional VAR approach has been criticized as lacking any economic
content. The only role that needs to be decided by researchers is to suggest
the appropriate variables to include in the VAR and all the variables are
treated symmetrically. After that, the procedure is almost mechanical. If
there is little economic content in the input, we could expect little economic
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content in the results. Thus there is the possibility that the VAR approach
could lead to spurious relations by mining the data. It is often not clear how
to interpret the coe¢ cients estimated from VAR.
To identify the VAR model, the most popular restriction is the Cholesky
factorization. The Cholesky decomposition makes a strong assumption about
the underlying structural errors using the lower triangular matrix. However,
the test results depend on the ordering of the variables in the VAR. Coo-
ley and Leroy (1985) criticize Cholesky decomposition since the recursive
contemporaneous structure is not consistent with economic theory.
Just as an autoregression has a moving average representation, a VAR





where zt is a 4-variate stochastic process, Xt is the deterministic part of zt,
et is a 4-variate white noise process. The impulse responses, variance de-
composition and history decomposition are all based on the moving average
representation of a vector time series.
There are many equivalent representations for this model, for any non-
singular matrix G,  i can be replaced by  iG and e by G 1e. The most
frequently used method is Cholesky factorization (Lutkepohl 1991). Suppose
 = E(ete
0
t), if we choose any matrix G so that G 1G 1
0
= I, then the new
innovations, "t = G 1et, satisfy E("t"
0
t) = I. These orthogonalized innovations
have the convenient property that they are uncorrelated both across time
and across equations. Such a matrix G can be any solution of GG0 = .
Di¤erent Identifying Assumptions in SVAR
The VAR methodology is criticized by Cooley and Leroy (1985) by us-
ing atheorectical restriction. They argue that a VAR model identied by
Cholesky factorization does not use theory and thus cannot be interpreted
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as a structural model, because di¤erent ordering or di¤erent lag length could
have di¤erent results.
In the previous literature, alternative ways have been proposed for look-
ing at the factorization problem, which impose more of an economic struc-
ture. The aim of an SVAR is to use economic theory rather than Cholesky
decomposition to recover the structural innovations "t from the residual et:
Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard and Watson (1986) introduce a short-
run identication, which assumes the shocks have temporary e¤ects based
on contemporaneous restriction. For many problems, this identication is
simple zero exclusion restriction.
Since economic theory often does not provide su¢ cient contemporaneous
restrictions, Shapiro and Watson (1988) propose an additional identication
method based on restrictions on the long-run properties of economic theory.
They consider the shocks to have permanent e¤ects. Blanchard and Quah
(1989) introduce another long-term restriction to identify a SVAR model
where some variables are stationary and some have unit roots. The shocks
can have either a temporary or a permanent e¤ect on the system, and all
the shocks are treated like exogenous variables.
The above short-run and long-run restrictions are all parametric restric-
tions. Recently, another method, which employs sign restriction on impulse
response, has received increasing interest from researchers(Faust, 1998; Uh-
lig, 2005). Fry and Pagan (2010) state that whether one should use paramet-
ric restrictions or sign restrictions is mainly determined by the research ques-
tions. Since the sign information is weak, it is better to use sign restrictions
with a combination of other parametric ones. Moreover, contemporaneous
restriction might be useful to impose restrictions on longer lags.
Identifying Assumption used in this Paper
In this paper, I use the recursive short-run restriction suggested by Kilian
and Park (2009). The variables in Eq.1 are ordered from most exogenous to
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most endogenous. The restriction of ai;j = 0 means that the response of the
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These assumptions originate from the following intuition based on Kilian
(2009). First, we assume that, in the short run, global oil supply is rigid
because the costs of adjusting oil production are expensive. Hence the crude
oil supply cannot respond to changes in demand either driven by the world
economy or oil-market specic demand in the short run. Second, if the
oil price increases because of increasing demands in the oil market, global
economic activity will respond with a delay. This is because oil is an input of
production; factories cannot change their production line to a more energy-
e¢ cient one in a short time, if oil price has been increased. Third, the
change in either world economy demand or the oil market specic demand
will result in an instantaneous change in the real price of oil. As a result,
shocks to the real price of oil that cannot be explained by oil supply shock
and shocks to global demand for industrial commodities can be explained as
demand shocks that are specic to the oil market. Oil market specic shock
mainly reects the change of precautionary demand for oil when people are
uncertain about future oil supply. Fourth, the oil production, global real
activity and the price of oil are treated as predetermined with respect to
U.S. real stock returns, which a¤ect these three shocks, but with a delay of
at least one month.
In this study, I rst estimate the reduced form VAR model by the least-
squares method; the resulting estimates are then used to construct the struc-
tural VAR representation of the model. Inference is based on a recursive-
design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications (Goncalves and Kilian, 2004).
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Wild bootstrap is a model-based resampling technique designed to provide
renement for the linear regression with heteroscedasticity. It is based on
the symmetry of the probability distribution function of the residuals. Wild
bootstrap has a lower asymptotic risk as an estimator of the true distribution
than a normal approximation.
3.3.4 Tests of VAR
The aim of SVAR is to determine the dynamic response of variables to
di¤erent shocks from the economy. So this methodology does not focus
on the analysis of the coe¢ cient from the regression, but the analysis of
disturbances.
Impulse Response
Impulse response analysis is used to uncover the dynamic relationship be-
tween variables within VARmodels. Impulse responses measure the response
of zi;t+s to a one-time impulse in zj;t with all other variables at time t or be-
fore remaining constant. By imposing restriction on the parameters in the
VAR, the shocks can be attributed an economic meaning.
Start form the vector moving average VAR,
zt = Xt +
1X
i=0
















Since GG0 = , we can isolate the e¤ect of a single component of " by























where e(s) is the s-th unit vector.
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This decomposes the variancecovariance matrix of forecast errors into
N-terms, each of which shows the contribution of a component of " over the
K-period.
Variance Decomposition
The variance decomposition tells us the proportion of the movements in a
time series due to its own shocks and shocks to other variables. In this
paper, it quanties how important "1, "2, "3 have been on average for "4:
As we know the K-period forecast error from Eq.5, denote the K-period
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Historical decomposition decomposes the historical values of the time series
data into di¤erent projections and shows the accumulated e¤ects of current
and past shocks to this data.















The rst sum represents that part of zt+j due to shocks in periods t+1 to
t+ j. The second part is the forecast of zt+j based on information available
at time t.
3.3.5 Data Set Description
I now provide a brief description on my data used in the empirical analy-
sis. All data used in this paper are monthly and the sample period starts
from January 1973 and ends in December 2009. The statistical summary is
provided in Table 1.1.
Price of Oil
The nominal oil price is obtained based on the rener acquisition cost of
imported crude oil that is available on the U.S. Department of Energy from
1974 to 2009, and extended backward to 1973 as in Barsky and Kilian (2002).
Oil price is then deated using the U.S. CPI obtained from the website of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and expressed based on January 1981 dollars.
In chapter 2, the oil price is measured by the Japan Crude Cocktail which
is the oil price imported to Japan. Both oil prices are used to capture the
real acquisition cost of reners.
As plotted in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, we can locate several major events in
the oil market. The Yom Kippur War and Arab oil embargo from 1973
1974 caused an increase in the real price of oil. The Iran-Iraq War from
1980 to 1988 caused a more signicant jump in the real price of oil. On the
demand side, the Asian crisis spanning from 1997 to 1998 led to a sharp
drop in the real price of oil. In recent years, the oil price surge between 2003
and 2008 was mainly driven by economic boom around the world, especially
unexpectedly high growth in emerging Asia. The main objective of the
paper will be to check the robustness of SVARs, which estimate the impact
of oil price shock on the U.S. stock market from the various demand and
supply shocks of the real price of oil. I will relate the real price of oil to the
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additional data described below.
Global Oil Production
The monthly global oil production is obtained from the U.S. Department of
Energy. I construct the percent change in global production and express it
as the annualized percentage change. The changes in global oil production
are a good measure of oil supply shocks, which not only reect the exoge-
nous cartel activities and political struggle among OPEC countries, but also
reect the endogenous response of both OPEC and non-OPEC countries to
the uctuations in the real price of oil (Kilian 2009).
Global Real Economic Activity
Although conventional wisdom suggests that major increases in the price of
oil tend to be driven by exogenous political events in the Middle East, if
there are no other factors a¤ecting oil price, we would not be able to explain
certain price increases in history, such as in 1999/2000, in the absence of
any military conicts in the Middle East. Barsky and Kilian (2004) indicate
that exogenous political events, such as cartel activities, wars and embar-
goes, could indirectly a¤ect the global macroeconomic conditions. Moreover,
macroeconomic conditions also a¤ect oil price directly by simply shifting the
demand for oil. Barsky and Kilian (2002) point out that the sharp increases
in oil price in the 1970s were caused by macroeconomic forces, ultimately by
worldwide monetary expansions. Hamilton (2009b) proves that the upward
pressure on oil price in 20072008 was caused by strong demand confronting
stagnating world production. Thus, we also need a measure of global real
economic activity because of its e¤ect on the real price of oil.
Kilian and Park (2009) construct an index of global real economic activity
using a global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates, which are not
intended as a proxy for global real value added, but rather as a measure of
the component of worldwide real activity that is relevant for global industrial
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commodity markets. They argue that world economic activity is the most
important determinant in the demand for transport services. Increases in
freight rates may be used as indicators of strong cumulative global demand
pressures.
Historical literature has documented a positive correlation between ocean
freight rates and economic activity (Isserlis, 1938; Tinbergen, 1959). Klov-
land (2004) provides evidence that cycles in economic activity are the most
important determinants of the demand for transport services and thus short-
run behaviour of shipping freight rates. Beverelli, Benamara and Asariotis
(2010) argue that economic downturn has a role in suddenly reducing the
dry bulk commodity trade.
To carry out the robustness check, there are several empirical proxies
available to capture the real economy activity.
1.Dry Cargo Tramp Voyage Shipping Spot Rate (DCTVSSR) This
monthly data from January 1970 to February 2009 was mostly collected
in UNCTADs Review of Maritime Transport, various issues.5 There is a
long-term tradition of di¤erentiating the spot voyage charter from the time
charter in the related study.
The spot rate is expressed in 1955 dollars per metric ton. I compute the
period-to-period growth rates, having normalized January of 1985 to unit.
Then I linearly detrend the normalized growth rate to remove the long-
run trends in the demand for sea transport rather than the technological
advances in ship-building.
2.Baltic Dry Index (BDI) The Baltic Dry Index is a number issued
daily by the London-based Baltic Exchange. This index tracks worldwide
international shipping prices of various dry bulk cargoes. The BDI index
provides an assessment of the price of moving the major raw materials by
sea, such as coal, steel, cement and iron ore. Since dry bulk primarily con-
5United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
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sists of materials that function as inputs to the production of intermediate
or nished goods, it could be seen as one of purest leading indicators of
economic activity.
Compared with the DCTVSSR, the BDI is more business-oriented and a
latecomer, starting from 1985. However, BDI index is more comprehensive
and captures 20 di¤erent routes throughout the world and four di¤erent sizes
of oceangoing dry bulk transport vessel. Bakshi, Panayotovb and Skoulakisc
(2011) nd that BDI is a great predictor of global stock returns, commodity
returns and growth in global economic activity.
Stock Variables
I use an equally-weighted stock index, NASDAQ, S&P 500, large rm port-
folio, and small rm portfolio data to carry out the robustness check.
The equally-weighted stock index used here is the Centre for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) equally-weighted market portfolio. Unlike value-
weighted stock indices, which have more weight in larger companies and are
dominated by a few large stocks, equally-weighted indices simply give each
stock an equal weight. An equally-weighted index is more diversied than
a value-weighted index, because it is not dominated by large companies.
Moreover, investors investing in an equally-weighted index may have higher
returns, since small companies generally have a greater growth potential
than large companies.
NASDAQ is the largest electronic screen-based equity securities trading
market in the U.S., with approximately 3700 companies and the highest
trading volume in the world. NASDAQ includes a large number of high
technology companies, which cover almost all the new technology industries,
such as software, computers, communication, biological technology, retail
and wholesale.
S&P 500 is composed of 500 large-cap common stocks actively traded in
the U.S. It is the most widely followed index of large-cap U.S. stocks and is
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considered as a bellwether for the U.S. economy. This index is market-value
weighted, in which stocks with higher market capitalization have a greater
e¤ect on the index than those with smaller market capitalization.
The large rm portfolio and small rm portfolio are obtain from Frenchs
Data library.6 He constructed 6 U.S. stock portfolios based on size, which
include all stocks in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. I use the largest portfolio
and the smallest one in this paper.
The real stock return is calculated by subtracting the CPI ination rate
from the log returns of each stock index. The dividend growth rates are
constructed from the monthly returns, with (r(t)) and without (r_0(t)) div-
idends, of each stock index (Torous, Valkanov and Yan, 2005). Assuming a
$1 investment in the portfolio at the end of December 1925, P (0) = 1, the
value of the portfolio at the each of month t, P (t), is constructed according
to P (t) = (1+r_0(t))P (t 1). Dividends on the portfolio in month t are given
by ((r(t)  r_0(t))P (t 1), and by deating these dividends by the prevailing
level of the CPI, we obtain corresponding real monthly dividend payments.
The annualize dividend is computed by summing the real monthly dividends
for the year preceding month t. The real dividend growth rate is obtained
by taking the rst di¤erence of real annualized dividend payments.
3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion
3.4.1 Results of Unit Root Tests
Table 1.2 presents the results of the Augmented DickeyFuller (ADF), Phillips
Perron (PP) and KwiatkowskiPhillipsSchmidtShin (KPSS) unit root tests
for each variable used in this robustness study. The lag length is determined
using the SchwarzBayes Information Criterion (SBIC). The null hypoth-
esis for ADF and PP is the existence of a unit root I(1), i.e., if the series
is stationary I(0), the ADF and PP tests should reject the null hypothesis.
6Kenneth R. Frenchs Homepage, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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In contrast, the null hypothesis of the KPSS statistic is that the series is
stationary I(0). I use both a constant and a constant with time trend as
deterministic terms.
The ADF test (Said and Dickey, 1984) is based on the comparison of
calculated statistics. The more negative the test number, the stronger the
rejection of the hypothesis that the series has a unit root. The PP test by
Phillips and Perron (1998) is di¤erent from the ADF test in how it deals
with serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the errors. The KPSS tests
introduced by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) complement
the ADF and PP tests by testing both the unit root hypothesis and the
stationarity hypothesis.
The conclusions from the ADF test are quite clear: all variables except
real oil price are stationary. The results of the SPSS test are in line with
the ADF test with the exception that, at both the 5% and 10% signicance
levels, unit roots cannot be rejected for both the stock return of S&P 500
and the large rm portfolio. Dividend growth rate of the large rm portfolio
has a unit root with both the PP and KPSS tests when the deterministic
term is the constant with a time trend.
It is worth noting that log real price of oil is not stationary under most of
the tests at any critical value. However, this is acceptable for the following
reasons. First, economic theory suggests there is a link between cyclical
uctuation of global real activity and the real price of oil (Kilian andMurphy,
2010). If we take the rst di¤erence of oil price, it will remove the slow
moving component and it will be di¢ cult to nd the persistent e¤ect of
aggregate demand shocks. This aggregate demand is dened as the demand
for industrial commodities including crude oil. Second, even assuming that
the real price of oil can be approximately predicted by random walk, it is
not clear whether this is a unit root or not. As regards the methodology,
the estimated impulse response is robust even if the stationary assumption
is violated (Pesavento and Rossi, 2007). The cost of not taking the rst
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di¤erence is a loss of asymptotic e¢ ciency, which leads to a wider error
band. However, as long as the impulse responses are reasonably estimated,
it is not a concern.
3.4.2 The Short-Run Response of Oil Prices to Oil Shocks
I normalize the oil supply shock to represent one negative percentage shock.
The aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock are also
normalized to represent one positive percentage shock. In this way, all three
shocks tend to increase the real price of oil. One-standard error and two-
standard error bands are indicated by dashed and dotted lines. All intervals
are computed based on an appropriate bootstrap method. The impulse re-
sponses together with the bootstrap condence interval are shown in Figures
24. The three panels in Figure 24 show the impulse response of the real
price of oil to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the
crude oil market, separately, with three di¤erent indices of real economic
activity; the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), DCTVSSR and Kilian and Parks
economic index.
Kilian and Park report that oil production disruption causes a transitory
increase in the real price of oil under the one-standard error band. Unex-
pected global demand expansion causes a delay but sustained increase in
the real price of oil. An increase in the oil market specic demand causes
an immediate and persistent increase in the real price of oil.
My robustness check using the BDI and DCTVSSR shows a di¤erent
pattern for the oil supply shock and aggregate demand shock. Data with
BDI show that, with the unexpected oil production disruption, the real price
of oil has a delayed and sustained increase that is statistically signicant
based on one standard error band. Data with DCTVSSR show that the oil
supply shocks lead to a gradual increase in the rst 6 month and then a
persistent increase in the real price of oil. For the aggregate demand shock,
both data samples represent a sharp increase in the real price of oil within
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the rst 4 months followed by a slow decline for the rest of the time period.
These results are statistically signicant based on both the one and two-
standard error bands. The impact of an oil market specic shock is in line
with Kilian and Park, although the increased price declines as time goes by.
3.4.3 The Long-Run Response of Oil Prices to Oil Shocks
Historical decomposition computes the historical e¤ect of a shock and mea-
sures the relative importance of shocks over the sample time period. That is,
historical decomposition shows the accumulated e¤ects of current and past
shocks while impulse response assesses the timing and magnitude of the re-
sponse to one-time shocks. A great merit of the historical decomposition is
that we can follow the demand and supply shocks and their e¤ect on the
real price of oil over a long time.
The robustness checks for the historical decomposition of changes in the
real price of oil in Figures 57 with di¤erent indices of real economic activity
exhibit similar results which are in line with Kilian and Park (2009). These
results suggest that oil price shocks have been driven mainly by the demand
shocks rather than the supply shock in their sample period. The rst panel
in the historical decomposition results indicates that oil supply shocks only
contribute a small part historically to the real price of oil, reecting short
and limited swing in the real price of oil in the gure. On the demand
side, aggregate demand shock causes a relatively longer and more signicant
swing in the real price of oil, especially in the newly added period starting
in 2007. This result is consistent with Hamilton (2009b) in that the price
run-up of 20072008 was caused by strong demand confronting stagnating
world production. The oil market specic shock cause a sharp increase and
decrease in the price of oil, which is consistent with the view that precau-
tionary demand shocks reect rapid shifts in the markets assessment of the
availability of future oil supplies (Kilian, 2009).
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3.4.4 The Response of Stock Returns to Oil Shocks
Figures 813 depict the impulse response of di¤erent stock returns to each
of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market.
Together with the stock index used in Kilian and Park (2009), I use a total
of 6 di¤erent stock returns for comparison purposes. Compared with the
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio used in Kilian and Park, the equally-
weighted market portfolio puts more weight on smaller rms. Thus among
all 6 indices, the S&P500, value-weighted portfolio and large rm portfolio
can be considered to place more weight on the large-sized rms, whereas
NASDAQ, the equally-weighted portfolio and the small rm portfolio are
composed mostly of small-sized rms.
The main results are in line with Kilian and Park (2009) except the
di¤erent results for large and small rms. Although generally supply shocks
do not have a statistically signicant e¤ect on the all the stock returns,
shocks from the demand side have di¤erent stories for large-sized rms and
small-sized rms. Aggregate demand shocks have a longer and stronger e¤ect
on the stock returns of small-sized rms than those of large-sized rm. For
example, the positive impact of an aggregate demand shock on an equally-
weighted market portfolio lasts for 13 months and is statistically signicant
for the rst 12 months based on one-standard error bands. Meanwhile, the
same shock has a much weaker and less sustainable e¤ect on S&P500 with
a persistence of 12 months and is only statistically signicant for the rst
9 months based on one-standard error bands. If there is an unexpected
global economy expansion, it could have two opposite e¤ects on the U.S.
economy. First, the improved business cycle boosts the U.S. economy and
in turn increases U.S. stock returns. Second, economy expansion could drive
up the oil price, which will eventually slow down the U.S. economy. In the
short run, the stimulating e¤ect is more prevailing than the limiting e¤ect,
which makes the second panel of Figures 813 rst rise and then drop down.
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The stronger and longer e¤ect on small-sized rms can be explained by the
fact that unexpected global economy expansion has a stronger and longer
stimulating e¤ect on small rms. This may be because small rms experience
greater volatility in response to short run economy expansion.
The oil market specic shock has a negative and persistent impact on the
stock returns of large-sized rms, whereas it only has a transitory and even
no e¤ect on the stock returns of small-sized rms. The oil-market specic
shock captures the changes of precautionary demand shocks that reect
future concerns about oil supply. Small-sized rms are usually distributed
in less oil-intensive industries, which is why they su¤er less with oil price
spikes.
The variance decompositions in the rst sections of Tables 28 show the
average e¤ect of three shocks from the crude oil market on the U.S. stock
returns for alternate data samples. My data samples show increased ex-
planatory power than those used in Kilian and Park. In the short run, the
e¤ect of these three shocks can be negligible. However in the long run,
when BDI is used as the world economic activity index, about 42% of stock
returns can be explained by the oil price uctuation. Among them, 10%
of changes in U.S. stock returns can be explained by supply shock, 23%
from aggregated demand shock and another 9% from the oil-market specic
shock. BDI outperforms other indices and shows a great predictive power
for global economic activity.
3.4.5 The Response of Dividend Growth Rates to Oil Shocks
Figures 1419 show the impulse response of di¤erent dividend growth rates
to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil
market. It is achieved by replacing real stock returns in the last element
of zt with real dividend growth rates, and then re-estimating Eq.1. The
results for the oil supply shock are mixed. Higher oil price caused by supply
shock statistically lowers the dividend growth rate of S&P500, the large rm
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portfolio and NASDAQ, whereas for the small rm portfolio and the equally-
weighted market portfolio, the e¤ect of supply shock on stock returns can
be neglected. The results for the aggregated demand shock are quite clear:
positive aggregate demand shocks increase the dividend growth rate. For the
oil-market specic shock, the results are similar to those of stock returns.
The precautionary demand shock only has a negative e¤ect on large-sized
rms and no e¤ect on small-sized rms.
The variance decompositions of U.S. real dividend growth in the second
part of Tables 28 show that BDI outperforms other indices for economic
activity and with it oil price shocks show great explanatory power for div-
idend growth. In the long run, overall 40% variation of dividend growth
can be explained by shocks from the crude oil market, with 20% from each
supply and demand side.
3.4.6 Does the E¤ect of Oil Shocks on Stock Returns Come from
Expected Discount Rates or Expected Cash Flows
The contemporaneous approach to explain the movement of stock returns
tends to ignore the channels through which oil price shocks a¤ect asset
prices. In this study, I aim to ll this gap by testing whether the variations
in U.S. real stock returns to specic supply and demand shocks in the crude
oil market are driven by uctuations in cash ows or by discount rates
variations.
I do this using Campbells (1991) stock return decomposition and write
the unexpected changes in asset returns from the previous period (t  1) to




























where rst is the real stock return, rdt is the real dividend growth rate, Et is
the expectation at time t, and  is the discount coe¢ cient that is slightly
less than one, which is computed as follows:   1=(1+ exp(d  p), where d  p
is the average log dividend-price ratio.
























. Eq.12 states that stock
returns vary through time due to revised expectations about future cash
ows and variations in future discount rates. Eq.12 can be written more
compactly as:
rst Et 1(rst) = NCF;t+1 NDR;t+1 (13)
where NCF;t+1 and NDR;t+1 denote the changes in future cash ows, and
changes in discount rates respectively.
In order to incorporate the changes in real stock returns arising from a
given supply or demand shock in the crude oil market, I reconstruct Eq.13 in
terms of the responses to unanticipated disturbances in the crude oil market.
First, I normalize all expectations of period t   1 in Eq.13 to zero. Then, I
write the changes in real cash ows and changes in expected returns relative
to the baseline in response to an unexpected disturbance in the crude oil
market as follows:




































where 	0;j is measured by the rst element of the impulse response coe¢ -
cients of real stock returns to a shock j in the crude oil market in month
t; ij('ij, respectively) is the impulse response of real dividend growth (real
stock returns, respectively) in period i to a given structural shock j in the
crude oil market; j= oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock, and oil-
specic demand shock.
Finally, I can test whether the impact on real stock returns arising from
di¤erent supply and demand shocks in the global crude oil market can be
fully accounted for by revisions to real cash ows or revisions to expected























Following the practice in the literature I truncate the innite sum in the
above expressions for the purposes of estimation at 36 lags.
The Wald-test statistics and p-values for null hypotheses in Eq.17 and
Eq.18 are shown in Panels A and B of Tables 915. Most of the results show
that both hypotheses cannot be rejected at the 10% signicance levels for
three shocks. That is, the stock return uctuation caused by oil price shocks
can be fully explained by the changes in future cash ows and the changes in
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future discount rates, which is in line with Kilian and Park (2009). This re-
sult is important to understand how oil price shocks a¤ect stock returns. On
one side, oil price shocks have an impact on expected cash ow by increas-
ing the production cost. On the other side, oil prices shock also a¤ect the
discount rate via changes in both expected ination and the expected real
interest rate. The exception is in equally-weighted and NASDAQ stock re-
turns. Changes in equally-weighted stock returns caused by oil supply shocks
and oil specic shocks can be attributed entirely to uctuations in expected
discount rate. That is, oil supply and oil specic shocks have no e¤ect on
the cash ow of rms in the equally-weighted index. Changes in NASDAQ
stock returns caused by aggregate demand shocks can be attributed entirely
to uctuations in expected discount rate. Similarly this means aggregate
demand shocks could not a¤ect the cash ow of rms in NASDAQ. In a
summary, oil price shocks tend to have weaker e¤ect on small rms because
they could not a¤ect the cash ow of small rms e¤ectively. The reason is
that small rms are usually distributed in the less oil-intensive industries
and crude oil is rarely used as the raw input, thus oil price shocks can only
have limited e¤ect on the production costs and cash ows.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of oil price shocks on di¤erent types of stock
indices using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach. SVAR is
used to control the reverse casualty between oil price and the stock market
and incorporates economic theory into the atheoretical model. I use the
newly-developed approach used by Kilian and Park (2009) to classify the
oil price shocks into three di¤erent types: a supply shock, an aggregated
demand shock and an oil-market specic shock. The main purpose of this
paper is to study whether the results of SVAR are robust with di¤erent
stock market variables and indices for global economic activity. I use ve
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di¤erent stock indices: an equally-weighted stock index, NASDAQ, a small
rm portfolio, a large rm portfolio and S&P500, and two di¤erent variables
to proxy the world economy activity besides the data used in Kilian and
Park: the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) and Dry Cargo Tramp Voyage Shipping
Spot Rate (DCTVSSR). BDI shows great explanatory power to capture
world-wide economic activity.
I nd that oil supply and demand shock have di¤erent e¤ects on oil
price. While Kilian and Park nd that oil supply shock has only a transitory
positive e¤ect on the real price of oil within the rst year, I nd that in
my data samples with BDI and DCTVSSR, oil supply shock persistently
increases the oil price for more than 15 months. Moreover, in line with Kilian
and Park, aggregate demand shock has a delayed and sustained positive
impact on oil price, while oil-market specic shock has an immediate and
persistent e¤ect on the oil price.
In addition, the three di¤erent shocks also have di¤erent e¤ects on U.S.
stock returns. Higher oil prices triggered by an unexpected oil supply dis-
ruption only causes a negligible movement in the stock market. Aggregate
demand shock caused by the world economic activity expansion increases
stock returns persistently. However the magnitude and length of the e¤ect
depends on the rm size. Firm size e¤ect is one of the important contribu-
tions of this paper since it is the rst paper to examine whether di¤erent
sized rms have di¤erent responses to the oil price shocks. I nd that the ag-
gregate demand shock has a longer and stronger e¤ect on the stock returns of
small-sized rms compared to those of large-sized rms. Further, oil-market
specic shocks have a negative e¤ect on the stock returns of large-sized rms
while it has no statistically signicant e¤ect on small-sized rms.
Overall, 42% of stock return variation can be explained by the uctuation
in the oil market, with 23% from the demand side and 9% from the sup-
ply side. Finally, the stock return variations caused by oil price shocks can
be explained by both the changes in expected cash ows and the changes
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in expected discount rates. This paper contributes to the current litera-
ture studying the relationship between oil price shocks and stock markets
by highlighting the importance of classifying oil price shocks according to
their causes. This is important for policy makers and business owners to
allow them to respond di¤erently to movements in the real price of oil and





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.1 Statistical summary of all the variables used in struc-
tural VAR model
Stock Returns
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
S&P500_Rn 433 0.525 4.584 -21.784 15.668
NASDAQ_Rn 433 0.609 6.472 -27.311 21.983
Equally-weigted_Rn 433 0.842 5.866 -27.414 29.427
Value-weighted_Rn 433 0.528 4.728 -22.738 15.418
Large portfolio_Rn 433 0.488 4.544 -20.7442 17.588
Small portfolio_Rn 433 0.751 6.364 -29.994 27.384
Variance-Covariance Matrix S&P500 NASDAQ Equally Value- Large Small
-weigted weighted portfolio portfolio
S&P500_Rn 1
NASDAQ_Rn 0.852 1
Equally-weigted_Rn 0.782 0.872 1
Value-weighted_Rn 0.986 0.906 0.853 1
Large portfolio_Rn 0.992 0.848 0.768 0.979 1
Small portfolio_Div 0.728 0.868 0.963 0.813 0.719 1
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Stock Dividend
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
S&P500_Div 443 0.103 1.624 -10.498 19.728
NASDAQ_Div 443 0.489 12.815 -59.817 255.364
Equally-weigted_Div 443 0.463 1.471 -4.506 5.717
Value-weighted_Div 443 0.112 1.332 -7.250 14.349
Large portfolio_Div 443 0.074 1.711 -11.058 20.905
Small portfolio_Div 443 0.295 2.247 -6.639 9.445
Variance-Covariance Matrix S&P500 NASDAQ Equally Value- Large Small
-weigted weighted portfolio portfolio
S&P500_Div 1
NASDAQ_Div 0.659 1
Equally-weigted_Div 0.246 0.081 1
Value-weighted_Div 0.953 0.602 0.356 1
Large portfolio_Div 0.944 0.663 0.236 0.907 1
Small portfolio_Div 0.213 0.126 0.487 0.273 0.166 1
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Economic Index
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Kilian Index 443 -0.093 25.932 -57.179 78.115
BDI 300 0.194 14.967 -122.099 65.515
Freight 443 -0.340 75.311 -492.280 720.119






Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Oil production 443 2.540 18.937 -71.406 112.876
Real oil price 443 3.392 47.248 -114.779 117.3628
Note: This table reports the statistical summary of all the variables used in this study,
including the stock return and dividend growth of S&P 500, NASDAQ, equally-weighted
index, value-weighted index, large portfolio and small portfolio. There are three di¤erent
proxy of real economic activities used in this study: Kilians index, Baltic Dry Index and
Dry Cargo Tramp Voyage shipping rate. The variance-covariance matrix is provided for
each block of variables.
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Table 1.2 Unit root tests on all the variables used in structural
VAR model
Stock Returns
Variables Test Deterministic Lags Test 1% 1% 1%
terms value Critical Critical Critical
value value value
S&P500_Rn ADF c 0 -19.95 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 0 -19.93 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
PP c 8 -30.02 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 8 -30.00 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 8 0.17 074 0.46 0.35
c, t 8 0.17 0.22 0.15** 0.12**
NASDAQ_Rn ADF c 0 -18.30 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 0 -18.29 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
PP c 6 -18.23 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 6 -18.22 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 2 0.10 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 2 0.09 0.22 0.15 0.12
Equally- ADF c 0 -16.57 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
weighted c, t 0 -16.55 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
index_Rn PP c 5 -16.39 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 5 -16.37 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 0 0.04 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 0 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.12
Value- ADF c 0 -19.17 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
weighted c, t 0 -19.16 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
index_Rn PP c 6 -19.17 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 6 -19.15 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 6 0.13 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 6 0.13 0.22 0.15 0.12
Large ADF c 0 -19.82 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
portfolio_Rn c, t 0 -19.80 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
PP c 9 -19.93 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 8 -19.91 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 9 0.18 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 9 0.17 0.22 0.15** 0.12**
Small ADF c 0 -16.97 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
portfolio_Rn c, t 0 -16.95 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
PP c 10 -16.64 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 10 -16.62 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 6 0.04 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 6 0.04 0.22 0.15 0.12
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Stock dividend
Variables Test Deterministic Lags Test 1% 1% 1%
terms value Critical Critical Critical
value value value
S&P500_Div ADF c 11 -5.08 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 11 -5.03 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
PP c 10 -22.59 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 10 -22.57 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 8 0.17 074 0.46 0.35
c, t 9 0.06 0.22 0.15 0.12
NASDAQ_Div ADF c 0 -21.57 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 0 -21.60 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
PP c 3 -21.56 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 3 -21.60 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 2 0.19 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 2 0.06 0.22 0.15 0.12
Equally- ADF c 2 -4.30 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
weighted c, t 2 -4.28 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
index_Div PP c 12 -11.95 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 12 -12.00 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 15 0.13 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 15 0.06 0.22 0.15 0.12
Value- ADF c 11 -4.22 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
weighted c, t 11 -4.16 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
index_Div PP c 12 -22.54 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 12 -22.51 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 12 0.09 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 12 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.12
Large ADF c 11 -5.51 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
portfolio_Div c, t 11 -5.50 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
PP c 10 -23.29 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 1 -2.00 -3.98** -3.42** -3.13**
KPSS c 16 0.58 0.74 0.46** 0.35**
c, t 16 0.40 0.22** 0.15** 0.12**
Small ADF c 23 -5.12 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
portfolio_Div c, t 23 -5.12 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
PP c 12 -15.67 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 12 -15.66 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 14 0.11 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 6 0.10 0.22 0.15 0.12
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Economic index
Variables Test Deterministic Lags Test 1% 1% 1%
terms value Critical Critical Critical
value value value
KilianIndex ADF c 2 -3.44 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 2 -3.46 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
PP c 4 -3.11 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 4 -3.12 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 16 0.27 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 12 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.12
BDI ADF c 0 -13.00 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 0 -12.98 -3.99 -3.42 -3.14
PP c 13 -12.48 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 13 -12.45 -3.99 -3.42 -3.14
KPSS c 8 0.03 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 8 0.03 0.22 0.15 0.12
Freight ADF c 0 -14.18 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 0 -14.16 -3.98 -3.42 -3.14
PP c 13 -13.21 -3.45 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 13 -13.19 -3.98 -3.42 -3.14
KPSS c 10 0.06 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 10 0.06 0.22 0.15 0.12
Oil variables
Variables Test Deterministic Lags Test 1% 1% 1%
terms value Critical Critical Critical
value value value
Oil ADF c 0 -22.31 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
production c, t 0 -22.36 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
PP c 19 -22.41 -3.44 -2.87 -2.57
c, t 21 -22.56 -3.98 -3.42 -3.13
KPSS c 21 0.21 0.74 0.46 0.35
c, t 23 0.04 0.22 0.15 0.12
Real oil ADF c 1 -2.77 -3.44** -2.87** -2.57
price c, t 1 -2.82 -3.98** -3.42** -3.13**
PP c 1 -1.97 -3.44** -2.87** -2.57**
c, t 1 -2.00 -3.98** -3.42** -3.13**
KPSS c 16 0.58 0.74 0.46** 0.35**
c, t 16 0.40 0.22** 0.15** 0.12**
Note: This table reports the results of unit root tests for all variables used in the SVAR
model. I use Augmented DickeyFuller (ADF), PhillipsPerron (PP) and Kwiatkowski
PhillipsSchmidtShin (KPSS) tests, and report results with and without a trend. The
null hypotheses for ADF and PP are the series has a unit root I(1), while the null
hypothesis for the KPSS test is the series is stationary I(0).
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Table 2.1 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of value-weighted
real stock return with BDI
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.27 2.23 2.11 95.39
2 1.79 3.86 4.16 90.19
3 2.73 4.78 5.43 87.06
12 6.28 12.80 6.25 74.67
1 9.93 22.90 9.36 57.81
Table 2.2 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of value-weighted
real dividend growth with BDI
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.89 0.35 1.33 97.43
2 1.03 1.84 2.94 94.19
3 1.26 2.66 2.86 93.22
12 3.51 7.38 4.51 84.60
1 9.97 20.28 9.94 59.81
Note: This table reports the results of the variance decomposition for each supply and
demand shock on U.S. stock return and real dividend growth with BDI as the economic
activity index. It presents the percentage contribution of each shock, namely oil supply
shock, aggregate demand shock, oil-specic demand shock, and other shocks, to the overall
variability of real stock returns and dividend growth for 1 month, 2 months, 3 months,
12 months and innity ahead.
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Table 3.1 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of value-weighted
real stock return with dry cargo tramp rate
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.10 0.24 0.59 99.07
2 0.18 1.39 3.11 95.33
3 0.49 1,87 4.66 92.98
12 1.43 7.13 6.14 85.30
1 5.65 15.18 10.42 68.75
Table 3.2. Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of value-weighted
real dividend growth with dry cargo tramp rate
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.00 1.07 0.83 98.10
2 0.03 2.77 1.14 96.06
3 0.04 2.72 1.13 96.11
12 1.07 11.15 3.24 84.54
1 4.18 25.29 6.59 63.95
Note: This table reports the results of the variance decomposition for each supply and
demand shock on U.S. stock return and real dividend growth with Dry Cargo Tramp
Rate as the economic activity index. It presents the percentage contribution of each
shock, namely oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock, oil-specic demand shock, and
other shocks, to the overall variability of real stock returns and dividend growth for 1
month, 2 months, 3 months, 12 months and innity ahead.
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Table 4.1 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks
in the crude oil market to the overall variability of equally-
weighted real stock return
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.02 1.31 0.19 98.47
2 0.07 1.84 1.48 96.61
3 0.77 3.08 1.59 94.56
12 1.46 5.88 2.35 90.31
1 4.07 18.52 7.89 69.53
Table 4.2 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks
in the crude oil market to the overall variability of equally-
weighted real dividend growth
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.01 0.77 0.79 98.43
2 0.18 1.68 0.72 97.42
3 0.24 3.17 1.11 95.48
12 1.72 16.49 1.28 80.51
1 6.86 22.98 6.01 64.15
Note: This table reports the results of the variance decomposition for each supply and
demand shock on U.S. equally-weighted market portfolio stock return and real dividend
growth. It presents the percentage contribution of each shock, namely oil supply shock,
aggregate demand shock, oil-specic demand shock, and other shocks, to the overall
variability of real stock returns and dividend growth for 1 month, 2 months, 3 months,
12 months and innity ahead.
155
Table 5.1 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of NASDAQ real
stock return
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.02 1.41 0.95 97.63
2 0.03 1.99 2.54 95.44
3 0.34 2.44 3.12 94.09
12 1.29 4.79 4.84 89.08
1 3.48 13.14 13.03 70.35
Table 5.2 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of NASDAQ real
dividend growth
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.01 0.98 2.64 96.37
2 0.19 1.26 3.03 95.52
3 0.19 1.27 3.05 95.50
12 1.83 7.89 4.56 85.72
1 3.67 12.99 9.17 74.17
Note: This table reports the results of the variance decomposition for each supply and
demand shock on NASDAQ stock return and real dividend growth. It presents the per-
centage contribution of each shock, namely oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock,
oil-specic demand shock, and other shocks, to the overall variability of real stock returns
and dividend growth for 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 12 months and innity ahead.
156
Table 6.1 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of small rms real
stock return
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.07 0.59 0.00 99.33
2 0.11 1.11 0.06 98.73
3 0.62 2.68 0.24 96.46
12 1.46 5.93 1.66 90.95
1 3.75 16.17 8.60 71.48
Table 6.2 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of small rms real
dividend growth
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.02 0.14 2.17 97.67
2 0.42 0.51 2.78 96.28
3 0.43 0.50 2.75 96.32
12 1.11 6.15 6.03 86.71
1 3.10 13.99 11.84 71.06
Note: This table reports the results of the variance decomposition for each supply and
demand shock on U.S. small rm portfolio stock return and real dividend growth. It
presents the percentage contribution of each shock, namely oil supply shock, aggregate
demand shock, oil-specic demand shock, and other shocks, to the overall variability of
real stock returns and dividend growth for 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 12 months and
innity ahead.
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Table 7.1 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of large rms real
stock return
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.02 1.96 1.44 96.58
2 0.08 2.10 2.73 95.10
3 0.35 2.71 3.99 92.95
12 1.81 5.44 5.17 87.57
1 5.31 10.81 8.94 74.94
Table 7.2 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of large rms real
dividend growth
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.00 0.17 0.91 98.92
2 0.28 0.58 0.97 98.18
3 0.57 1.05 1.29 97.09
12 1.55 7.55 2.24 88.67
1 4.79 12.88 5.49 76.84
Note: This table reports the results of the variance decomposition for each supply and
demand shock on U.S. large rm portfolio stock return and real dividend growth. It
presents the percentage contribution of each shock, namely oil supply shock, aggregate
demand shock, oil-specic demand shock, and other shocks, to the overall variability of
real stock returns and dividend growth for 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 12 months and
innity ahead.
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Table 8.1 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of S&P500 real
stock returns
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.02 1.59 1.93 96.47
2 0.04 1.59 3.70 94.66
3 0.35 2.07 4.98 92.60
12 1.82 5.43 5.77 86.98
1 5.77 10.79 9.49 73.96
Table 8.2 Percent contribution of demand and supply shocks in
the crude oil market to the overall variability of S&P500 real
dividend growth
Horizon Oil Supply Aggregate Oil-Specic Other Shocks
months shock demand shock demand shock
1 0.24 0.24 1.42 98.09
2 0.29 0.64 1.53 97.54
3 0.48 2.06 1.79 95.67
12 1.66 7.26 3.92 87.16
1 4.96 13.53 6.64 74.87
Note: This table reports the results of the variance decomposition for each supply and
demand shock on S&P 500 stock return and real dividend growth. It presents the per-
centage contribution of each shock, namely oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock,
oil-specic demand shock, and other shocks, to the overall variability of real stock returns
and dividend growth for 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 12 months and innity ahead.
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Table 9 Tests of the impact response of U.S. value-weighted real
stock returns using BDI
Panel A: The impact responses of real dividend growth




piij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.4376 0.5083
Aggregate demand shocks 0.0622 0.8031
Oil-market specic demand shocks 0.0139 0.9061
Panel B: The impact responses of real stock returns




pi ij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 1.3559 0.2443
Aggregate demand shocks 0 0.9983
Oil-market specic demand shocks 0.0188 0.8908
Note: Panel A presents the Wald test statistics and p-values for the null hypothesis
the impact change in real stock returns arising from a given shock of the global crude
oil market can be fully attributed to changes in expected real dividend growth. Panel
B presents the Wald test results for the null hypothesis the impact change in real stock
returns arising from a given shock from the global crude oil market can be fully attributed
to changes in expected returns.  ij denotes the response of real stock returns i periods
after each oil supply, aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock,
j = 1; 2; 3 while ij denotes the response of real dividend growth to these three shocks.
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Table 10 Tests of the impact response of U.S. value-weighted
real stock returns with dry cargo tramp rate
Panel A: The impact responses of real dividend growth




piij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 1.3766 0.2407
Aggregate demand shocks 0.0843 0.7716
Oil-market specic demand shocks 0.8689 0.3513
Panel B: The impact responses of real stock returns




pi ij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.0418 0.8379
Aggregate demand shocks 0.6658 0.4145
Oil-market specic demand shocks 2.2892 0.1303
Note: Panel A presents the Wald test statistics and p-values for the null hypothesis
the impact change in real stock returns arising from a given shock of the global crude
oil market can be fully attributed to changes in expected real dividend growth. Panel
B presents the Wald test results for the null hypothesis the impact change in real stock
returns arising from a given shock from the global crude oil market can be fully attributed
to changes in expected returns.  ij denotes the response of real stock returns i periods
after each oil supply, aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock,
j = 1; 2; 3 while ij denotes the response of real dividend growth to these three shocks.
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Table 11 Tests of the impact response of equally-weighted real
stock returns
Panel A: The impact responses of real dividend growth




piij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 16.0117 0.0001
Aggregate demand shocks 0.7588 0.3837
Oil-market specic demand shocks 12.8005 0.0003
Panel B: The impact responses of real stock returns




pi ij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.3039 0.5814
Aggregate demand shocks 0.2306 0.6311
Oil-market specic demand shocks 0 0.9955
Note: Panel A presents the Wald test statistics and p-values for the null hypothesis
the impact change in real stock returns arising from a given shock of the global crude
oil market can be fully attributed to changes in expected real dividend growth. Panel
B presents the Wald test results for the null hypothesis the impact change in real stock
returns arising from a given shock from the global crude oil market can be fully attributed
to changes in expected returns.  ij denotes the response of real stock returns i periods
after each oil supply, aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock,
j = 1; 2; 3 while ij denotes the response of real dividend growth to these three shocks.
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Table 12 Tests of the Impact Response of NASDAQ Real Stock
Returns
Panel A: The impact responses of real dividend growth




piij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.8935 0.3445
Aggregate demand shocks 3.8915 0.0485
Oil-market specic demand shocks 0.6968 0.4039
Panel B: The impact responses of real stock returns




pi ij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.0161 0.899
Aggregate demand shocks 0.5339 0.465
Oil-market specic demand shocks 1.2434 0.2648
Note: Panel A presents the Wald test statistics and p-values for the null hypothesis
the impact change in real stock returns arising from a given shock of the global crude
oil market can be fully attributed to changes in expected real dividend growth. Panel
B presents the Wald test results for the null hypothesis the impact change in real stock
returns arising from a given shock from the global crude oil market can be fully attributed
to changes in expected returns.  ij denotes the response of real stock returns i periods
after each oil supply, aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock,
j = 1; 2; 3 while ij denotes the response of real dividend growth to these three shocks.
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Table 13 Tests of the impact response of small rms portfolio
real stock returns
Panel A: The impact responses of real dividend growth




piij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.697 0.4038
Aggregate demand shocks 0.0297 0.8632
Oil-market specic demand shocks 0.1019 0.7495
Panel B: The impact responses of real stock returns




pi ij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.4984 0.4802
Aggregate demand shocks 1.0267 0.3109
Oil-market specic demand shocks 0.1434 0.7049
Note: Panel A presents the Wald test statistics and p-values for the null hypothesis
the impact change in real stock returns arising from a given shock of the global crude
oil market can be fully attributed to changes in expected real dividend growth. Panel
B presents the Wald test results for the null hypothesis the impact change in real stock
returns arising from a given shock from the global crude oil market can be fully attributed
to changes in expected returns.  ij denotes the response of real stock returns i periods
after each oil supply, aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock,
j = 1; 2; 3 while ij denotes the response of real dividend growth to these three shocks.
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Table 14 Tests of the impact response of large rms portfolio
real stock returns
Panel A: The impact responses of real dividend growth




piij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 1.0867 0.2972
Aggregate demand shocks 0.1394 0.7089
Oil-market specic demand shocks 0.2503 0.6169
Panel B: The impact responses of real stock returns




pi ij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.2861 0.5927
Aggregate demand shocks 1.0794 0.2988
Oil-market specic demand shocks 2.2424 0.1343
Note: Panel A presents the Wald test statistics and p-values for the null hypothesis
the impact change in real stock returns arising from a given shock of the global crude
oil market can be fully attributed to changes in expected real dividend growth. Panel
B presents the Wald test results for the null hypothesis the impact change in real stock
returns arising from a given shock from the global crude oil market can be fully attributed
to changes in expected returns.  ij denotes the response of real stock returns i periods
after each oil supply, aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock,
j = 1; 2; 3 while ij denotes the response of real dividend growth to these three shocks.
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Table 15 Tests of the impact response of S&P500 real stock
returns
Panel A: The impact responses of real dividend growth




piij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.5161 0.4725
Aggregate demand shocks 0.0248 0.8748
Oil-market specic demand shocks 0.3389 0.5605
Panel B: The impact responses of real stock returns




pi ij ; j = 1; 2; 3
Oil supply shocks 0.2937 0.5879
Aggregate demand shocks 1.1274 0.2883
Oil-market specic demand shocks 1.796 0.1802
Note: Panel A presents the Wald test statistics and p-values for the null hypothesis
the impact change in real stock returns arising from a given shock of the global crude
oil market can be fully attributed to changes in expected real dividend growth. Panel
B presents the Wald test results for the null hypothesis the impact change in real stock
returns arising from a given shock from the global crude oil market can be fully attributed
to changes in expected returns.  ij denotes the response of real stock returns i periods
after each oil supply, aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock,




























































































































































































































































































Figure 2 Responses of real price of oil to three structural shocks
with BDI as the economic activity index
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of the real price of oil to each of the
three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market with BDI as economic
activity index. The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel
measures how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the level of oil price
at time t+ s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead.
All shocks have been normalized to represent an increase in the real price of oil. The
condence intervals are constructed using a recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000
replications.
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Figure 3 Responses of real price of oil to three structural shocks
with dry cargo tramp rate as economic activity index
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of the real price of oil to each of the
three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market with dry cargo tramp
rate as economic activity index. The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in
Eq.1. Each panel measures how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the
level of oil price at time t+ s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15
months ahead. All shocks have been normalized to represent an increase in the real price
of oil. The condence intervals are constructed using a recursive-design wild bootstrap
with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 4 Responses of real price of oil to three structural shocks
in Kilian and Park (2009)
Note: The three panels replicate the impulse responses of the real price of oil to each
of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market, as detailed by
Kilian and Park (2009). The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1.
Each panel measures how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impact the level
of oil price at time t + s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15
months ahead. All shocks have been normalized to represent an increase in the real price
of oil. The condence intervals are constructed using a recursive-design wild bootstrap
with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 5 Historical decomposition of real price of oil from Janu-
ary 1973 to December 2009with BDI as economic activity index
Notes: This gure plots the historical decomposition of uctuations in the real price of
oil with BDI as economic activity index. It shows the cumulative e¤ect of a sequence of
structure shocks that a¤ect the real oil prices spanning the period from January 1973 to
December 2009. The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1.
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Figure 6 Historical decomposition of real price of oil from Jan-
uary 1973 to December 2009 with dry cargo tramp rate as eco-
nomic activity index
Notes: This gure plots the historical decomposition of uctuations in the real price of
oil with dry cargo tramp rate as economic activity index. It shows the cumulative e¤ect
of a sequence of structure shocks that a¤ect the real oil prices spanning the period from
January 1973 to December 2009. The estimates are based on the structural VAR model
in Eq.1.
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Figure 7 Historical decomposition of real price of oil from Jan-
uary 1973 to December 2007 in Kilian and Park (2009)
Notes: This gure replicates the historical decomposition of uctuations in the real price
of oil of Kilian and Park (2009). It shows the cumulative e¤ect of a sequence of structure
shocks that a¤ect the real oil prices spanning the period from January 1973 to December
2007. The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1.
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Figure 8 Cumulative responses of equally-weighted real stock
returns to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard
error bands
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of equally-weighted real stock returns
to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market. The
estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures how a
unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real stock returns at time t+ s for
di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead. The oil supply
shock has been normalized to represent a negative one-standard deviation shock, while the
aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been normalized to
represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a recursive-design
wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 9 Cumulative responses of NASDAQ real stock returns to
three structural shocks with one-and two-standard error bands
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of NASDAQ real stock returns to each
of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market. The estimates are
based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures how a unit impulse of
structure shocks at time t impacts the real stock returns at time t+ s for di¤erent values
of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead. The oil supply shock has been
normalized to represent a negative one-standard deviation shock, while the aggregate
demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been normalized to represent
positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a recursive-design wild
bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 10 Cumulative responses of small rm portfolio real stock
returns to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard
error bands
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of small rm portfolio real stock
returns to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market.
The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures how
a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real stock returns at time t + s
for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead. The oil supply
shock has been normalized to represent a negative one-standard deviation shock, while the
aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been normalized to
represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a recursive-design
wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 11 Cumulative responses of large rm portfolio real stock
returns to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard
error bands
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of large rm portfolio real stock returns
to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market. The
estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures how a
unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real stock returns at time t+ s for
di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead. The oil supply
shock has been normalized to represent a negative one-standard deviation shock, while the
aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been normalized to
represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a recursive-design
wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 12 Cumulative responses of S&P500 real stock returns to
three structural shocks with one-and two-standard error bands
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of S&P500 portfolio real stock returns
to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market. The
estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures how a
unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real stock returns at time t+ s for
di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead. The oil supply
shock has been normalized to represent a negative one-standard deviation shock, while the
aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been normalized to
represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a recursive-design
wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 13 Cumulative responses of value-weighted real stock
returns to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard
error bands in Kilian and Park (2009)
Note: The three panels replicate the impulse responses of value-weighted real stock returns
to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market in Kilian
and Park (2009). The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each
panel measures how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real stock
returns at time t+ s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months
ahead. The oil supply shock has been normalized to represent a negative one-standard
deviation shock, while the aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock
have been normalized to represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed
using a recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 14 Cumulative responses of equally-weighted real divi-
dend growth to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard
error bands
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of equally-weighted real dividend
growth to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market.
The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures
how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real dividend growth at
time t + s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead.
The oil supply shock has been normalized to represent a negative one-standard deviation
shock, while the aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been
normalized to represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a
recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 15 Cumulative responses of NASDAQ real dividend growth
to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard error bands
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of NASDAQ real dividend growth
to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market. The
estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures how a
unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real dividend growth at time t+ s
for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead. The oil supply
shock has been normalized to represent a negative one-standard deviation shock, while the
aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been normalized to
represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a recursive-design
wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 16 Cumulative responses of small rm portfolios real
dividend growth to three structural shocks with one-and two-
standard error bands
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of small rm portfolio real dividend
growth to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market.
The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures
how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real dividend growth at
time t + s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead.
The oil supply shock has been normalized to represent a negative one-standard deviation
shock, while the aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been
normalized to represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a
recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 17 Cumulative responses of large rm portfolio real divi-
dend growth to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard
error bands
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of large rm portfolio real dividend
growth to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market.
The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures
how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real dividend growth at
time t + s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead.
The oil supply shock has been normalized to represent a negative one-standard deviation
shock, while the aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been
normalized to represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a
recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 18 Cumulative responses of S&P500 real dividend growth
to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard error bands
Note: The three panels plot the impulse responses of S&P500 portfolio real dividend
growth to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market.
The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1. Each panel measures
how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real dividend growth at
time t + s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum of 15 months ahead.
The oil supply shock has been normalized to represent a negative one-standard deviation
shock, while the aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic demand shock have been
normalized to represent positive shock. The condence intervals are constructed using a
recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Figure 19 Cumulative responses of value-weighted real dividend
growth to three structural shocks with one-and two-standard
error bands in Kilian and Park (2009)
Note: The three panels replicate the impulse responses of value-weighted real dividend
growth to each of the three demand and supply shocks that a¤ect the crude oil market in
Kilian and Park (2009). The estimates are based on the structural VAR model in Eq.1.
Each panel measures how a unit impulse of structure shocks at time t impacts the real
dividend growth at time t + s for di¤erent values of s. Here I limit s to a maximum
of 15 months ahead. The oil supply shock has been normalized to represent a negative
one-standard deviation shock, while the aggregate demand shock and oil-market specic
demand shock have been normalized to represent positive shock. The condence intervals
are constructed using a recursive-design wild bootstrap with 2,000 replications.
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Conclusion
This thesis studies the interaction between oil price shocks and nancial
markets on both rm and aggregate levels. Chapter 1 is a rm-level study
and empirically tests the relationship between oil price uncertainty and rm-
level investment. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how oil price
volatility a¤ects investment for a panel of Japanese rms. This is the rst
paper to address this relationship in the Japanese market. Chapter 2 uses
a structural VAR approach to specically study the link between oil price
shocks and the Japanese stock market for the rst time. It also lls the
gap by testing whether the variations in Japanese real stock returns to the
shocks in the crude oil market are driven by current and future variations in
expected cash ows and/or variations in expected discount rate. Chapter 3
tests the robustness of SVAR and investigates the impact of oil price shocks
on the di¤erent U.S. stock indices using alternate data. More importantly,
it determines how rm size a¤ects the relationship between oil price shocks
and the stock market.
The results in Chapter 1 show that there is a U-shaped rather than simply
a linear relationship between oil price volatility and strategic investment for
a sample of Japanese rms. The results are well supported by compound
option theory. The U-shaped relationship is robust to a number of di¤erent
econometric estimations and di¤erent measures of volatility. The results
from subsamples conrm this U-shaped relationship. Moreover, it shows
that oil volatility has a strong and signicant e¤ect on investment of oil-
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intensive rms, whereas oil volatility has no statistically signicant e¤ect on
that of less oil-intensive rms. For the rms with di¤erent size, the negative
e¤ect of oil price volatility on investment is stronger and more signicant for
small rms. These results are stronger than previous research conducted in
the U.S. (Mohn and Misund, 2009).
Chapter 2 concludes that the response of Japanese real stock returns
to oil price shocks di¤ers extensively depending on the specic underlying
causes of a higher oil price, which is in line with Kilian and Park (2009)
for the U.S.. Specically, oil supply shocks from unanticipated disruptions
of crude oil production do not have any signicant e¤ect on Japanese real
stock returns. When an oil price increase is driven by aggregate demand
shocks, there is a positive relationship between the oil price shocks and
the Japanese stock market. Oil-specic demand shocks from unexpected
increases of precautionary demand for crude oil lower the stock returns in
Japan. Further, I nd the responses of the Japanese stock market to all
shocks in the crude oil market can be attributed almost entirely to changes
in real cash ows.
The largest contribution of Chapter 3 is that it determines how rm
size a¤ects the relationship between oil price shocks and the stock market.
For example, aggregate demand shock caused by world economic activity
expansion increases stock returns persistently. However the magnitude and
length of the e¤ect depends on the rm size. The aggregate demand shock
has a longer and stronger e¤ect on the stock returns of small-sized rms
than those of large-sized rms. Further, an oil-market specic shock has
a negative e¤ect on the stock returns of large-sized rms while it has no
statistically signicant e¤ect on small-sized rms.
Crude oil is an important input in production process and also used to
generate power, and facilitate the advance of economy. Any adverse impact
on oil price could bring chaos to the nancial market on both rm and
aggregate level. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a clear picture
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about how oil price shocks interact with nancial markets and how our
policymakers can make e¤ective decisions when facing oil price volatilities.
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